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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is conducted in the field of Information Systems (IS) and examines the role 
of controls in an outsourcing arrangement within a vendor organisation. Recent 
industry analyses have projected a steady albeit limited growth within the industry, as a 
result of the changing landscape and shifts in customer’s priorities. There is thus a 
critical need to attend to this domain and provide insights into the role of controls, their 
potential limitations and constraints, in order to better improve overall outsourcing 
performance. To do so, this study draws upon IS control theory developed by Kirsch 
(1997), and extends it to a long-term outsourcing arrangement.  
 
The broad objective of this study is to extend IS control theory to an outsourcing 
arrangement. While the body of control research has been diverse and examined a wide 
range of issues, most studies are focused on examining controls in internal, outsourced 
and offshored IS projects, thus little is known as to what constitutes outcome and 
behaviour controls in outsourcing arrangements. Secondly, the body of control research 
is lacking an organisation control perspective. This study thus extends IS control theory 
to understand the interface between outsourcing and organisation controls and its 
influence on individuals in the course of their work. Thirdly, to date, there is a lack of 
understanding within the body of control research as to how controls can exert influence 
on the clan. Finally prior researchers have perceived self-control as being non-influential 
towards achieving desired project outcomes. This study thus contributes to the 
aforementioned four knowledge gaps.  
 
A multiple case study approach is adopted to examine how controls in the 
organisational environment of an outsourcing services provider, such as organisation 
structure, existing rules and procedures or hierarchical interplay in order to achieve the 
specified outcomes by clients. Two quite different teams serving different clients are 
examined to identify similarities and differences between the way that outsourcing work 
is controlled and managed. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were utilised as the primary data collection technique. A 
total of fifteen participants working within two outsourcing teams from a modern 
globalised technology firm, Genius Technologies (GTECH) (alias) were interviewed 
over a period of three months. A hybrid of thematic and inductive analysis techniques 
was employed to analyse the data collected.  
 
A qualitative approach was taken because of the newness of this area of research and the 
need to identify significant concepts and themes before any quantitative studies are 
pursued. Understanding how the subjects perceive control and the significance and 
meaning they attribute to it, provides an important basis for future research.   
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The current study found a series of outcome and behaviour controls, which have formed 
a baseline of controls that can be drawn upon by researchers for future testing. The 
results of the study also suggest that outsourcing and organisation controls operate in 
tandem with one another and exercise controls over individuals by setting boundaries 
and standards for appropriate behaviours. In this view, employees working within 
outsourcing arrangements are subjected to two controls from two distinct domains, both 
inter-organisationally and within the organisation. The interface of controls was found 
to impact on the clan. The study found that the time-limitation sets by outcome 
controls can impact on the quality of solution. The organisation structure results in 
formal collaboration within the organisation, while existing standardised procedures can 
impact on responsiveness and competitiveness. Lastly individuals were exercising self-
control in relation to the need to perform to set performance measurements within the 
organisation, and actively bypass limitations through their “know-how” and experiences.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis is conducted in the field of Information Systems (IS) and examines the role 
of controls in an outsourcing arrangement within a vendor organisation. This is an 
important domain considering the projection of a steady but limited growth of the 
outsourcing industry (Gartner 2017c; IBIS World 2016; Report Linker 2017; Statista 
2017) as a result of recent industry shifts in client priorities and the emergence of new 
technologies (Hall 2017). There is thus a critical need to attend to this domain and 
provide insights into the role of controls as well as their potential limitations and 
constraints, in order to better improve overall outsourcing performance. A qualitative 
multiple case study approach is adopted to examine how controls in the organisational 
environment of an outsourcing services provider, such as organisation structure, existing 
rules and procedures or hierarchical interplay in order to achieve the specified outcomes 
by clients. This research also aims to contribute towards the body of control research 
that is based on IS control theory developed by Kirsch (1997) two decades ago. 
 
This chapter introduces the research topic through an outline of the research 
background, including an introduction to the foundations of control theory, an overview 
of the current state of research as well as the identified knowledge gaps (Section 1.2). 
This will be followed by an introduction to the aims and objectives of the study as well 
as an outline of the primary research question, and the four sub-questions (Section 1.3). 
Next, the significance and expected contributions of the study will be discussed (Section 
1.4). Finally, an outline of the thesis structure is presented (Section 1.5).  
1.2 Research background 
Outsourcing can be broadly defined as ‘making arrangements with an external entity for 
provision of goods or services to supplement of replace internal efforts’ (Hirschheim & 
Dibbern 2009, p. 3). Examples of outsourcing include call centres, human resource 
payroll functions, marketing or recruitment services (IBIS World 2016), applications, 
infrastructure and data centre management (Beulen, Van Fenema & Currie 2005; 
Brown & Wilson 2005, pp. 22-23). What is regarded as outsourcing in this study 
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should not be confused with that of outsourcing of IS projects, where an organisation 
procures the services of a vendor for the development of new technological systems. In 
order to prevent confusion, this study follows prior research such as Rustagi, King and 
Kirsch (2008), and the term outsourcing arrangement will be used to depict the domain 
and context of the study.  
 
The strategic relevance of technology outsourcing in today’s society has recently been 
questioned as a result of organisations focusing on quality deliveries as opposed to cost-
savings initiatives (Hall 2017). In spite of this, global market analyses continue to 
project a steady growth within the outsourcing industry (Gartner 2017c; Report Linker 
2017; Statista 2017). The importance of outsourcing thus should not be 
underestimated, as organisations continuing to reap the rewards from outsourcing of 
business functions (Hall 2017). For instance, academia and industry practitioners are 
both in agreement of the benefits of outsourcing for organisations, as it allows 
organisations to shift the burden of the costs of technologies to the vendor, to leverage 
vendors’ expertise and allow organisations to focus on their competencies (Cao & 
Lumineau 2015; Gartner 2017c; Ghodeswar & Vaidyanathan 2008; Hall & Liedtka 
2007; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017).  
 
In spite of changing trends within the industry, what will remain constant in any form 
of outsourcing arrangement will be the use of contracts to concretise the partnership 
between client and vendor (Goo et al. 2009; Huber et al. 2013; Lacity 2002; Lioliou et 
al. 2014). Contracts serve to balance the power between client and vendor and aim at 
preventing vendor opportunism and served as the reference point for how client and 
vendor relate to one another (Kern & Wilcocks 2002; Lioliou et al. 2014). Contractual 
clauses as well as terms and conditions thus essentially function as controls through, for 
instance, specification of performance metrics and types of behaviours vendors must 
adhere to and adopt for the purposes of conducting outsourcing activities (Huber et al. 
2013; Tiwana 2007).  
 
Having provided an outline on outsourcing and the pivotal role of contracts, the 
following section will provide a brief overview of empirical control research on 
outsourcing.  
1.2.1 Empirical control research on outsourcing 
There are two main streams of research within the knowledge base that have examined 
controls within the context of outsourcing, namely transaction costs economic (TCE)-
inspired (Williamson 1979; 1985; 1998) and control theory-based approaches 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kang et al. 2014; Kang et al. 2012; Rustagi, King & 
Kirsch 2008). The fundamental difference between the two approaches rests upon their 
unit of analysis.  
 
The first stream is inspired by transaction costs economic (TCE) perspective 
(Williamson 1979; 1985; 1998). TCE proponents placed emphasis on the governance 
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of client-vendor relationship at the contractual level (Huber et al. 2013; Lioliou 2015; 
Lioliou et al. 2014). Situating controls at the contractual level, TCE-based researches 
distinguished controls as formal and relational governance mechanisms (Huber et al. 
2013; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Lioliou et al. 2014). Formal governance, the 
contractual clauses, ‘aims to coordinate activities between partners and prevent 
opportunistic behaviours through the creation of a mutually agreed upon and legally 
binding set of acceptable behaviours’ (Lioliou et al. 2014, p. 505). Relational governance 
on the other hand, aims to cope with unforeseen circumstances and refers to the softer, 
more “human” aspects of the outsourcing relationship, and serves as a form of social 
control (Huber et al. 2013; Kirsch 2004; Tiwana 2010). The key issue with TCE 
examinations of control in outsourcing arrangements rest upon their focus at the 
contractual level (Kern & Wilcocks 2002), which does not pinpoint the forms of 
controls that directly influence and impact on the work of employees in outsourcing 
arrangements. Little is known about what contract clauses function as controls and 
depict how one should act and behave in accordance to prescribed standards, policies 
and procedures.  
 
The second stream of research is control theory-based, and is focused on examining the 
control practices between client and vendor in both internal, outsourced and offshored 
projects, i.e. how clients utilise a portfolio of controls to exercise controls over vendors 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008). This 
stream of research is rooted in organisation control theory (Ouchi 1979; 1980), agency 
control theory (Eisenhardt 1985) and cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan 1985; 
1998; Kirsch & Cumming 1996). (Details on the theoretical foundation can be found in 
Section 2.4.1). In the past two decades, control theory-based researches have relied on 
the control conceptual framework, i.e. portfolio of controls, purposefully developed by 
Kirsch (1997) to examine controls within the context of internal IS development 
projects. The control portfolio, consisting of formal (outcome and behaviour) and 
informal (clan and self) controls is frequently referred by researchers as IS control theory 
(Wiener et al. 2016) (Refer to Section 1.2.2 below for a more detailed understanding of 
the four key concepts of IS control theory).  
 
IS control theory conceptualises the client-vendor relationship as a controller-controlee 
pair-wise relationship, where controllers exercise controls through the use of either 
formal or informal control modes with different control mechanisms (devices, tools and 
techniques) targeted at regulating the behaviour of controlees towards achieving desired 
outcomes (Kirsch 1997). IS control theory was subsequently extended by Choudhury 
and Sabherwal (2003) to examine controls within the context of outsourced IS projects. 
Since Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003), majority of empirical researches have been 
focused on examining controls in IS outsourced (e.g. Remus & Wiener 2012; Srivastava 
& Thompson 2012) and offshored (e.g. Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Huber et al. 
2013; Tiwana 2010) project domains, albeit with differing focus.  
 
Owing to the need to examine precisely how outsourcing and organisation controls 
interface to influence and impact on the work of individuals in an outsourcing 
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arrangement, this study thus departs from the TCE perspective and draws upon IS 
control theory (formal and informal controls) in the examination.  
The following section will introduce the key concepts and terminologies of IS control 
theory.  
1.2.2 Formal and informal controls 
Formal controls consist of outcome and behavioural controls. Outcome controls refer to 
the specification of desired outcomes by the controller with no regard for the process by 
which the outcomes were achieved (Kirsch 1997). Examples of outcome controls from 
empirical research conducted within the context of internal, outsourced and offshored 
IS projects include project plans with specification of deliverables (Choudhury & 
Sabherwal 2003; Susilo, Heales & Rohde 2007), and adherence to budget, timeline and 
scope (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Srivastava & Thompson 2012).  
 
Behaviour controls on the other hand refer to the rules and procedures that will serve to 
monitor the controlees’ progress towards attaining specified outcomes (Kirsch 1997). 
Empirical studies have observed behavioural controls such as the use of meetings, 
conference calls, or the reliance on progress reports to ensure the controlee is on track to 
achieving outcomes (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997).  
 
In outsourcing arrangements, outcome controls do not differ from previous empirical 
research conducted in internal, outsourced and offshored project contexts. Identified 
outcome controls include performance metrics, service levels, key performance 
indicators (KPIs), and measurement charters (Lioliou et al. 2014). Behavioural controls, 
in outsourcing, are pre-specified within the contracts established between client and 
vendor (Tiwana 2007). Some control mechanisms are similar to those identified in 
previous studies on internal, outsourced and offshored IS projects, such as the 
specification of frequency of review meetings and reports (Cao & Lumineau 2015). 
There are however also other behaviour control mechanisms that are unique to 
outsourcing arrangements such as processes for dispute resolutions and conflict 
arbitration (Chen & Bharadwaj 2009; Goo et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002).  
 
Clan and self-control fall under the umbrella of informal control modes. In relation to 
IS projects, clan control as developed by Kirsch (1997), involves the propagating of 
common beliefs and goals and the establishing of a shared understanding between 
controller and controlee. Empirical observations of clan controls include socialisation 
activities (informal activities/social events) between controller and controlee as well as 
peer pressures to perform to existing norms (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 
1997; Ouchi 1980).  
 
Self-control, involves controls that are established by an individual. Self-control is based 
on the premise that individuals are intrinsically motivated to perform self-monitoring 
against the achievement of assigned goals and targets, and to practice self-sanctioning in 
accordance with clan behaviour (Henry, Narayanaswamy & Purvis 2015; Kirsch 1997). 
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It is also posited to be related to the experience of individuals, i.e. the “know-how” to 
get things done (Kirsch 1997). Mechanisms to implement self-control are usually 
initiated by the employees.  
 
In the following section, the main research objectives and research questions of the 
study will be discussed and outlined in relation to the identified knowledge gaps. The 
four main knowledge gaps were identified from the literature review and will be 
discussed further in chapter two. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
The overall objective of this study is to contribute towards the body of control research 
that has drawn upon IS control theory.  
 
This study is an attempt to bridge the existing knowledge gap by gaining an 
understanding as to how outsourcing and organisation controls operate in tandem and 
exert control over the work of individuals in outsourcing arrangements. Additionally, 
prior control research has presented a picture of controls as neutral and free from 
limitations, when a significant body of research has shown that the creative nature of 
the work of IS professionals do not bode well with controls (Nandhakumar & Avison 
1999; Truex, Baskerville & Travis 2000). Thus, while this study draws upon control 
theory, however it is also a departure from prior literature in that the focus is to 
illuminate how outsourcing and organisation controls can limit the ability for IS 
professionals to achieve client-specified outcomes in outsourcing arrangement. Thus, 
the primary research question addressed by this study is: 
 
 RQ: How might extending IS control theory to an 
outsourcing arrangement contribute to our understanding on 
how outsourcing and organisation controls interface with one 
another to limit the ability for individuals to attain client-
specified outcomes? 
 
 
This research question has then been broken down into the following components. 
 
TCE perspective is commonly used to examine controls in outsourcing arrangements 
(Huber et al. 2013; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Lioliou et al. 2014). This is based on 
research showing that not all formal governance mechanisms, i.e. contractual clauses, 
function as controls and guide the actions and behaviours of individuals (Kern & 
Wilcocks 2002). Although some studies have drawn upon concepts from control theory 
to investigate outsourced settings (Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Tiwana 2007; 2010), 
few have extended IS control theory in its entirety to examine controls in outsourcing 
arrangements. Thus to enhance future research, this study aimed to gain an 
understanding from those working in an outsourcing arrangement, of the forms of 
controls they are subjected to. In doing so, this research will obtain insights into how 
formal governance mechanisms translate to outcome and behaviour controls.  
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The above identified knowledge gap is reflected in the following sub-research question: 
 
 SQ1: What are the forms of formal governance mechanisms 
established between client and vendor, and how do they 
translate to outcome or behavioural controls that act upon 
individuals? 
 
 
Secondly, the current body of control research is predominantly situated at either the 
project or outsourcing level of analysis (Wiener et al. 2016). With the exception of 
Cram (2016) and Cram et al. (2016) whose studies have primarily focused on examining 
the causal relationship between project and organisation controls, few researchers have 
attempted to understand how controls within the organisation environment influence or 
operate in tandem with controls at the outsourcing level to influence members’ work. 
Additionally, prior empirical studies conducted within the context of professional 
services and consultancy firms have collectively outlined the series of organisational 
controls, such as hierarchies, standardised work procedures, performance evaluations, 
career paths and culture that can influence the work of employees (Alvesson & 
Kärreman 2004; Orlikowski 1991). The question remains however, as to what extent do 
organisational controls at the vendor organisation play a role in employees’ achievement 
of client-specified outcomes. Consequently sub-question 2 is as follow: 
 
 SQ2: What are the forms of controls present within the 
vendor organisational environment that influence or operate 
in tandem with controls at the outsourcing level to ensure that 
individuals work towards achieving client-specified outcomes?  
 
 
Prior research conducted within the context of in-house, outsourced, offshored and 
outsourcing arrangements are in general agreement with regards to the role of the clan 
in propagating shared values and beliefs. In this study, an understanding is sought as to 
how controls at both outsourcing and organisation environment can exert influence on 
the clan. This is reflected in the third research question developed and is produced 
below: 
 
 SQ3: What are the limitations of outsourcing and 
organisation controls and how do they exert influence on the 
clan? 
 
 
Lastly, self-control has rarely been studied in research into outsourced IS projects 
(Gopal & Gosain 2009; Srivastava & Thompson 2012; Tiwana & Keil 2009). Authors 
on IS outsourced projects are in general agreement that there will be controls 
established within the vendor organisation to encourage individuals to achieve expected 
project outcomes (Gopal & Gosain 2009; Tiwana 2010; Tiwana & Keil 2009). 
However, to date, there is a lack of understanding with regards to what forms of 
controls exist within the organisational environment that promote individuals to 
exercise self-control within the vendor organisation. This study thus aims to show how 
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individuals contest and disagree with controls, but still self-sanction in accordance to 
performance measurements and incentives. This is reflected in sub-research question 
four:  
 
 SQ4: How do individuals self-sanction in relation to 
performance measurements and incentives? 
 
  
The following section will outline the significance and expected contributions of this 
study.  
1.4 Significance and Expected Contributions of the Study 
This study is expected to contribute to the body of control researches in the following 
ways.  
 
Firstly, the study will contribute to the body of control research by establishing a 
baseline of formal controls within the outsourcing arrangements. This will provide a 
rich description, which could form the basis for testing in future work. Secondly, this 
study will be able to obtain insights into “how things work” within outsourcing 
arrangements, as little is known with regards to the role of organisation controls in that 
domain. There is thus a need to clarify these relationships and illustrate the controls 
that might influence the course of work towards achieving client-specified outcomes. 
Thirdly, prior research has primarily focused on examining the effects of controls and 
project performances, antecedents of controls etc.  
 
The study will also be able to identify from participants’ perspectives limitations and 
constraints on their work, and its impact on the clan, i.e. the relationship between client 
and vendor. This application of the notion of clan control is particularly significant, as it 
will enable this study to highlight the potential detrimental effects of formal controls on 
the clan. Last but not least, research results to date are inconclusive with regards to the 
source of controls that encourages individuals to exercise self-control.  This study thus 
aims to contribute to research by incorporating extrinsic rewards and will outline how 
individuals, in the conduct of their work sanction themselves in accordance with the 
organisation’s goals.  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This research investigated the role of controls in an outsourcing arrangement within a 
vendor organisation. The dissertation is organised as follows. 
 
Chapter Two provides a review of scholarly works on control theory. This initial phase 
of the study involved the development of the conceptual framework that integrates 
outsourcing and organisational controls. This was achieved through an exploration of 
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prior empirical studies within the body of control research, which was necessary to gain 
an understanding of the research landscape, and identify crucial gaps that need to be 
addressed.  
 
Chapter Three describes and justifies the research methodology and methods used to 
accomplish the research. The choice of site for this study - Genius Technologies 
(GTECH), a multinational corporation based in Victoria, Australia based in the 
technology industry is explained.   The method adopted was one of an interpretive 
multiple case study design, where each case study represents one of the two teams, i.e. 
Team ALPHA and BETA that belong to the strategic outsourcing division at 
GTECH.  The practical implications, limitations, and the trustworthiness of the study 
will also be outlined in this chapter. The qualitative approach using primarily interviews 
for data collection, as well as the approach to data analysis is explained and justified.  
 
A total of sixteen interviews were conducted with fifteen participants (one reinterview) 
between December 2014 and March 2015. The interviews were taped and transcribed, 
then analysed using NVivo10 software. Field notes (Refer Appendix D for an example 
of a field note) written after interviews complemented the interview data through the 
noting down of both significant and insignificant comments, events and incidents. 
Documents provided by participants such as the request for service (RFS) template 
(Refer Figure 5.1), as well as physical artefacts produced through the course of 
interviews, i.e. workflow diagram (Appendix E) and a sketch of organisation chart 
(Appendix F) were collected, and formed part of the analysis data. The analysis utilised 
a hybrid of thematic and inductive analytic strategies. Data was analysed in accordance 
to the research objectives and questions asked framed within the conceptual framework. 
The practical implications, limitations, and the trustworthiness of the study will also be 
outlined in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Four presents the research in context with a description of the research site, i.e. 
GTECH, as well as the two cases, i.e Team ALPHA and BETA. The differences in 
context between ALPHA and BETA will be outlined, followed by an introduction to 
the participants of each case (team) respectively.   
 
Chapter Five is the first of the two data analysis and findings chapters. It presents an 
analysis of the data such as interviews, field notes and artefacts collected from the field 
study in relation to Team ALPHA (the first case study). These findings are informed 
and organised according to the concepts from the framework  (discussed in Chapter 
Two), and in accordance with the thematic framework developed in Chapter Three that 
was used to sort and group the analysis of the data into themes and organise the 
findings.  
 
Chapter Six is the second of the two data analysis and findings chapters, and follows the 
same approach, structure and format as Chapter Five. It presents the analysis and results 
of the second case study, Team BETA.  
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Chapter Seven details the results of the cross-case analysis, which brings together the 
findings, reported in Chapters Five and Six. It serves to provide an overall picture of the 
controls that surfaced throughout the interviews in this study, and is structured to 
address the research questions.  
 
Chapter Eight will conclude the thesis through a discussion of the major insights and 
key findings of the study. It will also discuss the research contributions, 
recommendations and the implications of this study for IS control theory. Future 
research opportunities will be discussed, which will be followed by concluding 
comments. The next chapter entails a review of literature in relation to the topic of 
interest.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Overview 
Research on control in organisations advocates that appropriate control modes will align 
goals and behaviours to improve performance. One of the aims of this study is to 
contribute specifically to the work of Kirsch (1997) to adapt general control theory to be 
more directly applicable in an IS setting. This is achieved by an in-depth exploration of 
an outsourcing arrangement, specifically within the vendor organisation. This study also 
aims to understand how outsourcing controls interface with organisation controls, and 
the extent to which they limit the ability for individuals to attain intended client-
specified outcomes.  
 
This chapter will thus begin by defining what is referred to as the outsourcing 
arrangement, and provide an outline of the outsourcing industry. This will be followed 
by an introduction of control modes including its theoretical foundations, key concepts 
and terminologies, as well as a review of the current knowledge base in order to situate 
this study. Following this, this chapter will develop the conceptual framework that is 
used to examine the topic of interest.  
2.2 Outsourcing 
Outsourcing can be broadly defined as ‘making arrangements with an external entity for 
provision of goods or services to supplement of replace internal efforts’ (Hirschheim & 
Dibbern 2009, p. 3). Outsourcing services fall into two main categories, namely business 
process outsourcing (BPO) and technology outsourcing (Statista 2017). BPO includes a 
variety of back and front office functions, including call centres, human resource payroll 
functions, marketing or recruitment services (IBIS World 2016). Technology 
outsourcing refers to the outsourcing of applications, infrastructure or data centre 
operations (Beulen, Van Fenema & Currie 2005; Brown & Wilson 2005, pp. 22-23).  
 
Recent market analyses conducted on the global outsourcing market has presented a 
picture of steady growth within the outsourcing industry. For instance, a 2016 market 
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share analysis of the worldwide outsourcing market by Gartner (2017c) based on 
analysis of  the top ten outsourcing providers highlighted that the market has grown 
about 4.6% equal to US$283 billion. Another worldwide survey conducted by Statista 
(2017) from 2000 to 2016, based on industry-wide active contracts over US$25 million 
estimated that the global outsourcing market to be worth approximately US77 billion 
dollars. In Australia, a recent study on the BPO industry conducted by IBIS World 
IBIS (2016) depicted a 1.6% annual growth rate from 2011-2016, and the industry is 
forecasted to reach $31.4 billion in 2017. In spite of the high growth estimations and 
the large size of the global outsourcing market reported in studies above, industry 
analysts have also projected limited growth within the industry (Report Linker 2017; 
Statista 2017), as organisations began to seek quality over costs savings and due to the 
emergence of new technologies (IBIS World 2016).  
 
Nonetheless, the pivotal role of outsourcing cannot be undermined, and the above 
statistical data indicates that demands for outsourcing are still prevalent. Reviews and 
empirical research highlight the advantages of outsourcing for organisations, of business 
functions of technologies (1) to improve internal costs and financials through shifting of 
burden of technology costs to vendor; (2) to leverage on vendors’ expertise (improved 
technology performance); and (3) enable the outsourcing organisation to focus on its 
own competencies (Cao & Lumineau 2015; Ghodeswar & Vaidyanathan 2008; Hall & 
Liedtka 2007; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017).  
 
It has to be noted that what is regarded as outsourcing in this study should not be 
confused with that of outsourced IS projects, where an organisation procures the 
services of a vendor for the development of new technological systems. To prevent 
confusion, following Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008) the term outsourcing 
arrangement is used to depict the domain and context of the study.  
2.3 Control Research 
For the context of this research the broad definition of control as ‘an attempt to affect 
the behaviour of another person or group as a means to achieve goals’ (Cram, Brohman 
& Gallupe 2016, p. 218) is adopted. 
2.3.1 Theoretical foundations  
There are different perspectives, meanings and interpretations of controls within 
literature. According to Henry, Narayanaswamy and Purvis (2015), there are three main 
theoretical perspectives of controls, namely organisation theory (Ouchi 1980), agency 
theory (Eisenhardt 1985) and cognitive evaluation theory (Jaworski 1988; Manz, 
Mossholder & Liuthans 1987; Manz & Sims Jr 1980). Both organisation and agency 
control theories focused on performance evaluations as control strategies, and proposed 
two primary control modes (outcome and behaviour controls), as well as how they can 
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be utilised within organisations to align individuals to goals and objectives (Eisenhardt 
1985; Ouchi 1979; 1980).  
 
The organisation control perspective places focus on the clarity of tasks and goal 
incongruences as determinants of choice of control strategies (Ouchi 1980).  That is, 
outcome controls are used when a task can be precisely measured and evaluated. 
Behaviour controls are used in conjunction with outcome controls through agreements 
that specified the types of objectives of tasks to be accomplished. An agency perspective 
however recognises the goal incongruences between members in an organisation, and 
therefore places the focus on designing reward structures as a way to align the incentives 
of principal and agent (Eisenhardt 1985). Eisenhardt (1985) proposed that the choice of 
control strategies should be based on (1) costs, i.e. the relative costs of measuring 
behaviour versus outcomes, and (2) the degree of uncertainty that would result in risks.  
 
The agency perspective thus supplements the organisation approach in that it 
recognised that principals and agents have different goals, and the design of control 
systems within organisations should align the incentives and goals of both principals 
and agents so that they are both steered towards the achieving the same outcome 
(Eisenhardt 1985). The choice between outcome and behaviour controls rests upon the 
costs of measuring behaviour versus outcomes, as well as uncertainties in the 
environment (Eisenhardt 1985). Outcome control is used when measuring outcomes is 
less expensive than measuring inputs and when environment uncertainty is low. 
Behavioural control is used when measuring inputs is less expensive than measuring 
outcomes and when uncertainty puts the agent at risk. An agential perspective to 
assessing the choice of control strategies also takes into consideration the environmental 
factors, such as competition, government policies, all of which result in an employee 
bearing the risks of performance evaluation. Eisenhardt (1985) thus further 
supplemented the organisational approach by proposing risk-sharing mechanisms 
between organisation and employees.  
 
However, in organisations, measurements of inputs or outputs as well as facilitating 
control of behaviour might not be possible, Ouchi (1980) proposed clan control as a 
control strategy that is to be utilised when a principal does not know exactly how, or 
what behaviour or outcome to assess.  
 
The cognitive evaluation approach to controls rests on the idea that individuals prefer 
activities to be self-determined as opposed to being determined by others (Deci & Ryan 
1985; 1998; Kirsch & Cumming 1996). That is, individuals will be intrinsically 
motivated to self-manage and self-reward, based on the idea of “free choice” and 
autonomy (Deci & Ryan 1998; Ryan & Deci 2000). Individuals thus conduct a certain 
action for reasons of self-satisfaction in that it is interesting or enjoyable (Frey, 
Homberg & Osterloh 2013; Lindenberg 2001; Ryan & Deci 2000). Rewards and 
incentives, i.e. extrinsic motivations, as well as other forms of controls also play a role in 
motivating individuals to exercise self-control (Jaworski 1988).  
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IS control theory is based on all the aforementioned theoretical perspectives to examine 
controls within the context of IS projects. This study aims to extend IS control theory 
to an outsourcing arrangement, however from a different perspective, as will be 
illustrated later in Section 2.3.5. The following section outlines the current knowledge 
base and the knowledge gaps in IS control theory. 
2.3.2 IS control theory 
IS control theory was purposefully developed by Kirsch (1997) to examine controls 
within the context of in-house IS development projects.  The theory is a departure from 
viewing the relationship between client and vendor as an authoritative, principal-agent 
relationship where one exerts control over another (Kirsch 1997). Instead, Kirsch (1997) 
suggests a pair-wise control relationship exists between clients (controllers) and vendors 
(controlees). Kirsch (1997) theorised that controllers and controlees exert control over 
one another throughout the project lifecycle, with the objective of influencing the 
actions of another in order to achieve desired project outcomes (Kirsch 1997).  
 
Controls within this theory are primarily based on performance evaluation strategies, 
and how they can be utilised within project settings to align individuals to 
organisational goals and objectives to achieve desired behavioural and outcomes from 
individuals (Wiener et al. 2016).  Controls can thus be conceived of as a cybernetic 
process of monitoring, evaluating and providing feedback to achieve desired behavioural 
and outcomes from individuals (Henderson & Lee 1992). Performance evaluation 
within the IS control theory is behavioural-based as opposed to outcome-based (Henry, 
Narayanaswamy & Purvis 2015). Viewing control in a behavioural sense takes into 
consideration the rules and policies, planning procedures within organisations, setting of 
goals and targets alongside with reward and incentive structures (Henry, 
Narayanaswamy & Purvis 2015), and captures a holistic overview of the forms of 
control mechanisms within the context of IS projects (Kirsch 1997).  
 
Control is conceptualised as the exercising of control by controllers using mechanisms, 
such as devices, tools and techniques with the purpose of regulating the behaviours of 
controlees (Kirsch 1997). Behaviours of controlees are regulated primarily through 
performance evaluations alongside with incentives to align individuals or group of 
individuals (controlees) to the goals and objectives of the project (Eisenhardt 1985). 
The aforementioned tools, techniques, devices used by the controller to exercise control 
can be broadly divided into formal and informal control modes, and can be further 
categorised into behaviour, outcome, clan and self-control mechanisms. The formal and 
informal control modes and mechanisms outlined are summarised in Table 2.1 on the 
following page, and discussed in detail in the following section. 
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2.3.3 Control modes and mechanisms 
Formal control mode consists of behavioural and outcome control mechanisms, and are 
tools that are used to measure performance (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1997). Formal 
controls are typically developed based on established project management (PM) or IS 
development methodologies, or other elements relating to organisational best practices 
(Henry, Narayanaswamy & Purvis 2015; Susilo, Heales & Rohde 2007).  
 
Outcome control articulates specific outcomes, thus paying no attention to the process 
by which the outcomes were achieved. For instance, controllers assessing whether an IS 
project is delivered on time and within the allocated budget (Kirsch 1997). Behavioural 
controls focus on monitoring of the processes within IS projects to achieve desired 
outputs. Within the context of the IS project, a controller will implement behavioural 
control mechanisms such as meetings and conference calls, or rely upon progress reports 
to evaluate the progress of the project (Kirsch 1997).  
 
Clan and self-control is framed under informal control mode, and relates to the cultural 
aspect of the organisation, i.e. the unwritten codes of practice, shared beliefs, values and 
traditions among people or individuals (Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1980). According to 
Ouchi and Price (1993, p. 65), ‘a clan is a culturally homogenous organisation, one in 
which most members share a common set of values or objectives plus beliefs about how 
to coordinate effort in order to reach common goals’. Clan control mechanisms facilitate 
the propagating of common beliefs and goals among individuals and groups in order to 
influence behaviour (Ouchi 1980). Within the context of internal IS projects, clan 
controls posit a reliance on the group members to control themselves (Kirsch 1997).  
 
Self-control mechanisms are controls that are established by an individual, theorised to 
be intrinsically motivated to perform self-monitoring against the achievement of 
assigned goals and targets, and practice self-sanctioning in accordance to clan behaviour 
(Henry, Narayanaswamy & Purvis 2015; Kirsch 1997). Self-control is associated with 
the experience of individuals, i.e. the “know-how” to get things done (Kirsch 1997). 
Self-control is closely intertwined with clan control, i.e. how an individual behaves in 
accordance to the prevailing norms and acceptable practices among peers, where peers 
also exercise clan-control mechanisms to ensure individuals are adhering to social norms 
(Kirsch 1997).  
 
Table 2.1 on the next page, adapted from Kirsch (1997, p. 219) and Remus and Wiener 
(2012, p. 3), provides an overview of the control modes and mechanisms, including 
examples of devices, tools and techniques that are used by controllers within each form 
of control mechanism.  
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Table 2.1: Control modes and mechanisms 
Control 
Mechanism/Mode 
Key Characteristics Antecedent 
Conditions 
Examples of control 
mechanisms 
Behaviour 
(Formal) 
 
 
Rules and procedures 
articulated rewards based on 
following rules and 
procedures 
 
Knowledge of 
appropriate behaviour 
and behaviour 
observability 
! Project plan 
! ISD methodologies 
! Meetings 
! Conference calls 
! Weekly/monthly 
progress reports 
Outcome 
(Formal) 
Outcomes and goals 
articulated. 
Rewards based on 
producing outcomes and 
goals 
 
Outcome measurability ! Project plan 
! Within budget and 
timeline 
! Functional 
specifications 
(scope) 
! Software testing 
specifications 
Clan 
(Informal) 
Common values, beliefs, 
and problem-solving 
philosophy 
Identification and 
reinforcement of acceptable 
behaviours 
Specific task goals evolve 
over life of the task 
 
Appropriate behaviours 
and unknown 
outcomes are not 
measurable 
! Social norms 
! Rituals and 
ceremonies 
! Socialisation 
activities 
! Peer pressures 
! Hiring and training 
practices 
Self 
(Informal) 
 
 
Individuals define tasks, 
goals or procedures 
Individual monitors, rewards, 
sanctions self 
Rewards based, in part, on 
individual’s control skills 
Complex or non-routine 
task 
Performance 
evaluation ambiguity 
Lack of required rules 
or procedures 
Desire to exercise self-
control 
Individual’s ability 
! Individual 
empowerment 
! Setting personal 
goals and rewarding 
self 
! Work autonomy 
! Experience and 
skillsets 
 
The aforementioned is referred to as a portfolio of control configurations (Kirsch 1997). 
Kirsch (1997) suggests that the controllers’ choice of control mechanisms within the 
portfolio is largely determined by role expectations (controllers’ confidence in vendors’ 
performance), characteristics of tasks (knowing what to control and monitor) and 
knowledge and skills of individuals in aligning oneself with project goals and objectives 
(Kirsch 1997). This is referred to as a control situation, where controllers exercise, 
implement and revise their control modes based on the situation at hand (Kirsch 1997).  
 
In the following section, prior research that has extended or adapted IS control theory 
to other forms of project settings will be discussed.  
2.3.4 Extensions and adaptations of IS control theory 
Since Kirsch (1997) introduction of IS control theory, the body of control literature has 
grown substantially (Wiener et al. 2016). It has also been applied to understand how 
controllers structure and use control mechanisms in varying IS project settings, 
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including but not limited to in-house (Chua et al. 2012; Mähring 2002), outsourced 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Gregory, Beck & Keil 2013; Prifling, Gregory & Beck 
2009), and offshored IS projects (Remus & Wiener 2012; Srivastava & Thompson 
2012). The theory has also been drawn on to examine controls in agile software 
development practices (Maruping, Venkatesh & Agarwal 2009; Persson, Mathiassen & 
Ivan 2012), enterprise resource planning (ERP) projects (Chang et al. 2013), 
technology alliances (Tiwana 2007) and outsourcing arrangements (Lioliou et al. 2014; 
Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Tiwana 2007).  
 
Scholars have also approached this topic of interest using a variety of research 
approaches (Wiener et al. 2016). These include surveys (Goo et al. 2009; Gopal & 
Gosain 2009), case studies (Harris, Collins & Hevner 2009; Heumann et al. 2015), 
longitudinal field studies (Gregory, Beck & Keil 2013), and ethnography (Heiskanen, 
Newman & Eklin 2008). The maturity of research efforts also shows through the meta-
analysis and systematic literature reviews that have been conducted to pinpoint 
knowledge and theoretical gaps and the proposal of more sophisticated frameworks 
(Cram 2016; Henry, Narayanaswamy & Purvis 2015; Wiener et al. 2016).  
 
The seminal longitudinal study by Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) that extends the 
control framework to an outsourced IS project, specifically highlighting the client 
(controller) perspective, can be considered one of the most notable studies since Kirsch 
(1997). Focusing on examining the evolution of the portfolio of controls over the 
duration of outsourced IS projects, Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) drew on Newman 
and Robey (1992) in the development of a social process model that highlighted that 
control configurations do not remain stable. Rather, their study found that controllers 
re-evaluate the adequacy and appropriateness of existing control portfolios, and might 
add or revise the use of control mechanisms (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 
1997).  
 
Following Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003), several other studies such as Heiskanen, 
Newman and Eklin (2008) and Susilo, Heales and Rohde (2007) have conducted 
similar studies and concluded that the initial control configurations do not remain 
static, but are revised accordingly based on the performance of controlees at different 
intervals (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008). 
Secondly, research on control dynamics is in agreement that formal controls, in 
particular, outcome controls and self-control are heavily relied upon at the beginning of 
projects (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Prifling, Gregory & Beck 2009; Susilo, Heales 
& Rohde 2007). This is a result of unfamiliarity between the controller and controlee 
and an inability to judge the performance of vendors (Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 
2008; Mähring 2002; Prifling, Gregory & Beck 2009). Controllers also may lack 
knowledge about the behaviours to monitor (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003), and thus 
rely upon controlees’ past experiences and skills at this initial stage (Susilo, Heales & 
Rohde 2007).  
 
In addition to the above body of research, as outlined by recent reviews conducted by 
Cram (2016) and Wiener et al. (2016), existing empirical examinations have been 
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diverse in terms of the issues that have been examined. For instance, Wiener et al. 
(2016) recent literature review identified three primary subsets of literature within the 
body of control literature. The first body of control research, referred to as control 
dynamics, focuses on examining how controllers’ use of control mechanisms evolves 
throughout the lifecycle of a project; (2) how controllers select the appropriate control 
mechanisms for use in different control situations (control choices); and (3) the 
antecedents of control modes. It is not within the scope of this study to examine the 
various subsets of literature in detail. They will however be drawn upon in later sections 
within this chapter.  
 
In spite of the wide-ranging sub-bodies of knowledge, the majority of empirical studies 
still draw on Kirsch (1997) control theory. As Wiener et al. (2016, p. 742) observed in 
their recent review of control literature, ‘… in spite of the increasing range of aspects 
and issues in studies on IS project control, most related IS research relies on a 
conceptual framework which has remained remarkably stable over several decades’. 
Thus, the broad objective in this study is to extend IS control theory to an outsourcing 
arrangement. In doing so, the study is able to bridge several knowledge gaps within the 
body of control research. These will be examined next.  
2.3.5 Identified knowledge gaps 
Four main knowledge gaps were identified within the body of control research that this 
study intends to bridge. Firstly, little attention has been paid to the ‘control experiences’ 
of individuals, i.e. socio and emotional consequences of IS controls on employees, their 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations as well as psychological and cognitive structures 
(Cram 2016; Cram et al. 2016; Wiener et al. 2016). This study does not examine the 
social and economic consequences. Rather this study aims to understand what controls 
mean for individuals. This perspective will show through in the following sections.  
 
In spite of the wealth of knowledge that has been accumulated, the majority of studies 
that have drawn on Kirsch (1997)’s control theory have been focused on examining 
controls within the context of either outsourced or offshored IS projects (Wiener et al. 
2016). As such, little is known about controls in outsourcing arrangements. This gap 
was picked up by Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008), one of the first study within the 
body of control research which has drawn on concepts from the IS control theory to  
understand the antecedents of the amount of formal control 1  in outsourcing 
arrangements. Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008, p. 128) remarked on the ‘relatively little 
evidence about precisely how formal control is exercised in such a setting’, and argued 
for greater understanding of formal controls in outsourcing contexts, as they can 
manifest in more complex ways in outsourcing due to the complexity of contracts, and 
the absence of direct reporting relationships.  
 
                                               
1 Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008, p. 129) referred to this as the variety of mechanisms used by a client  
exercise control over a vendor, and the extent to which each of those mechanisms are used.  
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Their findings have highlighted that clients who have more technical knowledge or 
relationship management knowledge or those who have a higher level of trust in 
vendors use mechanisms of formal control less frequently. These findings align with 
those conducted within the domain of outsourced and offshored IS projects, where trust 
is frequently identified as one of the prerequisite to use of formal controls (Mao, Lee & 
Deng 2008; Piccoli & Ives 2003). However, the quantitative nature of their study 
provided little insights into how controls are exercised by clients in outsourcing 
arrangements. Further, the eight outsourcing arrangements examined by Rustagi, King 
and Kirsch (2008) include application management, business process outsourcing and 
infrastructure management with no clear understanding of the contextual differences. 
Scholars have identified that different outsourcing arrangements or partnerships have 
different characteristics and services (Beulen, Van Fenema & Currie 2005). There 
appears to be a view that applications service outsourcing are primarily project-based 
activities, whereas infrastructure management are based on provision of continuous 
services and with different service levels (Beulen, Van Fenema & Currie 2005). In other 
words, there is a need for more substantive understanding of controls in outsourcing 
arrangements.  
 
Further, Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008) observations of the little insights of controls 
in outsourcing arrangements were highlighted close to a decade ago. To date, empirical 
research that has drawn on the IS control theory to examine controls in outsourcing 
arrangements has been scarce. Majority of literature conducted within the domain of 
outsourcing arrangements have approached the examination of controls through a 
governance perspective, by operationalising formal and informal controls as formal or 
relational governance respectively (Huber et al. 2013; Lioliou et al. 2014) (More details 
in Section 2.4.2). The problem with such an approach is that not all-formal governance 
mechanisms operate as either outcome or behaviour control. Thus, this study aims to 
understand from participants’ perspectives formal controls within the outsourcing 
arrangement that directs or influences their behaviours. To this end, the researcher aims 
to address this gap through the following sub-research question: 
 
 SQ1: What are the forms of formal governance mechanisms 
established between client and vendor, and how do they 
translate to outcome or behavioural controls that act upon 
individuals? 
 
 
Discussion with regards to the first objective can be found in Section 2.4.  
 
Secondly, little is known about how outsourcing controls interface with controls within 
the organisation environment. Literature on IS outsourced projects are in general 
agreement that there will be controls established within the vendor organisation to 
encourage individuals to achieve expected project outcomes (Gopal & Gosain 2009; 
Tiwana 2010; Tiwana & Keil 2009). However, to date, there is a lack of understanding 
with regards to what forms of controls exist within the organisational environment that 
promotes individuals to exercise self-control within the vendor organisation. The 
literature review identified one control-related article that has provided insights into the 
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forms of organisation controls. Cram (2016)’s recent review of 65 journal articles 
relating to control research identified the role of organisation’s strategy, structure, 
process, culture and people.  
 
However Cram (2016)’s study is focused on the context of projects, and takes the view 
of a causal relationship between controls at the organisation environment and project 
controls. For instance, his study placed emphasis on how the strategy of organisations 
influence the choices of project controls; whether the organisation structure influence 
how controls are exercised; and in relation to process - the extent to which clients’ 
ability to measure outcome and knowledge on precisely what behaviours to observe can 
influence how controls evolve throughout project duration. Culture, associated with the 
ideologies and belief systems within organisations, were also posited to influence control 
choices. Similarly, in terms of people, the author called for more understanding with 
regards to how knowing employee characteristics and knowledge can influence choice of 
control mechanisms. While this study has provided useful insights into the forms of 
controls in the organisation environment, it is not focused on how organisation controls 
influence the use of control choices or mechanisms. Rather, the focus is to understand 
how outsourcing and organisation controls interface to exert controls over individuals. 
Thus, the following research question was developed to address the stated objective:  
 
 SQ2: What are the forms of controls present within the 
vendor organisational environment that influence or operate 
in tandem with controls at the outsourcing level to ensure that 
individuals work towards achieving client-specified outcomes?  
 
 
Studies have identified the significance of the clan in contributing towards project 
performances, particularly in terms of the quality of projects (Gopal & Gosain 2009; 
Mao, Lee & Deng 2008; Srivastava & Thompson 2012). The literature on clan control 
has also been examined through a variety of lenses, such as socialisation (Choudhury & 
Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997), psychological contract (Lioliou et al. 2014) and social 
capital perspective (Chua et al. 2012; Chua et al. 2007). Thus far, researchers are in 
agreement with regards to the importance of knowledge sharing, communication, trust, 
quality of the client-vendor relationship, view of vendor as a trusted partner as well as 
commitment (Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017). This study however departs from the above 
subset of knowledge. In this study, the researcher would like to gain an understanding 
as to how controls at both the outsourcing and organisation environment levels can 
exert influence on the clan. This is reflected in the third sub-question: 
 
SQ3: What are the limitations of outsourcing and organisation 
controls and how do they exert influence on the clan? 
 
There is a view within the literature that self-control has been repeatedly and 
purposefully omitted from research examining controls in outsourced project settings. 
One of the arguments pertains to how self-control is distinct from the other three 
control mechanisms, is exercised from the controlee and only partly served as a 
substitute for control exercised by controllers (Tiwana & Keil 2009). Secondly, it is the 
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view of researchers that the exercising of control by the controlee him/herself is 
insignificant in determining project outcomes and is ‘analogous to non-control’ 
(Srivastava & Thompson 2012, p. 120). Thirdly, self-control is also regarded as ‘less of 
a strategic tool in the manager’s toolkit’ (Gopal & Gosain 2009, p. 4), and is difficult to 
assess and influence. Last but not least, within the context of IS outsourcing projects, 
self-control is found to have a negative influence on performance due to an increased 
risk of vendor opportunism (Tiwana & Keil 2009). This study thus aims to contribute 
to self-control by identifying  
 
 SQ4: How do individuals self-sanction in relation to 
performance measurements and incentives? 
 
 
In summary, the broad objectives of this study are as follows:  
 
• Draw on IS control theory to focus on controls that direct or influence the 
behaviours of individuals, rather than on governance.  
• Extend IS control theory to the organisation level of analysis to understand (1) 
the controls established within the vendor organisation that encourage self-
control; and (2) identify controls established within the organisation 
environment that directs and influences the behaviours of individuals working in 
outsourcing arrangements.  
 
The following sections will develop the conceptual framework in this study in 
accordance to the identified knowledge gaps and research questions posed.  
2.4 Controls in outsourcing arrangements 
This section aims to develop the conceptual framework through an understanding of 
controls in outsourcing arrangements. The role of contracts established between client 
and vendor in outsourcing arrangements are outlined and a review of existing literature 
that has examined controls within the context of outsourcing arrangements will be 
presented.  
2.4.1 The role of contracts in outsourcing arrangements 
Controls within the context of outsourcing is different from controls in internal IS 
projects, due to the geographical locations of vendor and client with control often 
exercised from a distance (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003). Outsourcing arrangements 
essentially operate on a market based control strategy (Ouchi 1979; 1980). According to 
Ouchi (1980), in a market control mechanism, such as buyer-supplier relationship, the 
performance evaluation strategy will be largely based on outcomes due to the lack of 
clarity of tasks in the buyer or the supplier organisation environment. Market control 
mechanism can however be used in conjunction with behavioural control if the buyer-
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supplier agreed that certain objectives or tasks must be accomplished throughout the 
establishment of a contract. This brings us to the role of contracts established between 
client and vendor in outsourcing arrangements, as will be discussed next. 
 
Contracts form the main basis for the partnership between outsourcer and outsourcee 
(Goo et al. 2009; Huber et al. 2013; Lacity 2002; Lioliou et al. 2014). Outsourcing 
contracts are essentially complex due to the adversarial nature of the partnership where 
‘every dollar out of the customers’ pocket is a dollar in the supplier’s pocket’ (Lacity 
cited in Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003, p. 31). Kern and Wilcocks (2002, p. 228) added 
on to this adversarial relationship stating that ‘goal [of the vendor organisation] is one of 
profit margins’. Thus, the role of contracts is to balance the power between client-
vendor (Kern & Wilcocks 2002) and prevent vendor opportunism (Lioliou et al. 2014). 
Contracts drafted by legal experts, agreed upon between both client and vendor thus 
becomes a reference point for how both parties relate to one another.  
 
Contracts contain clauses as well as terms and conditions that specify both outcome and 
behaviour control mechanisms. Prior empirical research examining the contract 
structure in outsourcing contracts has highlighted the comprehensive terms and 
conditions agreed upon by client-vendor (Goo et al. 2009; Kern & Wilcocks 2002). For 
example, Goo et al. (2009) seminal study, frequently drawn upon by researchers to 
understand the elements of contract in outsourcing arrangements, identified a total of 
eleven contractual elements that can be grouped into foundation characteristics, change 
characteristics and governance characteristics. Briefly, foundation characteristics include 
provisions that specify the key principles and agreements between parties, key process 
owners as well as the target levels of product and services performance.  
Change characteristics on the other hand include provisions concerning processes for 
resolving unforeseeable outcomes of future demand, processes or implementing 
foreseeable contingencies and changes, processes for introducing new innovations 
coordinated with incentive plans, and processes of feedback and efficient adjustments in 
the contract. Last but not least, governance characteristics of clauses within contract 
specify ways of maintenance of the client-vendor relationship through clear statements 
of measurements, penalties and incentives. It also includes exit options and 
responsibilities, documented communication processes as well as processes for 
identifying and resolving potential disputes.  
In a study of outsourcing organisations in thirteen organisations in the United Kingdom 
(UK), Kern and Wilcocks (2002) literature review synthesising essential contractual 
clauses specified by legal experts within outsourcing contracts identified a total of 
twenty-five terms and conditions. Table 2.2 adapted from Kern and Wilcocks (2002, p. 
247) is reproduced below owing for its simplicity of terms and the inclusion of a brief 
outline of each clause. This table is reproduced below to provide an overview of the 
types of terms and conditions that are listed within contracts.  
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Table 2.2: Essential clauses and issues in outsourcing contracts 
Clauses, i.e. terms and conditions Brief outline 
1. Parties and terms The companies and length of contract 
2. Definitions Explanations and definitions of working 
3. Supporting documentation Any documentation clarifying the clients and 
vendors intentions and objectives, and that can be 
helpful for dispute resolution 
4. Asset transfer Transfer of assets and employees to vendor 
5. Base services, i.e. service supply and testing Description of services to be delivered to vendor 
6. Performing standards, i.e. service level 
agreement 
Description of the service levels vendor is expected 
to provide 
7. Service and equipment location(s) The actual physical locations of services and 
security issues 
8. Additional services and projects Any other services or projects the client may need 
or is considering 
9. Service management and contract monitoring Both parties endeavour to achieve the terms 
stipulated in the contract 
10. Disaster recovery and security Backup and emergency services and other security 
concerns 
11. Obligations and responsibilities of the client  
12. Benchmarking Method of monitoring overall vendors’ performance 
13. Vendor personnel Overview of vendors’ key employees for contract 
14. Payments Describes the base charges and any additional 
charges for services delivered 
15. Payment schedule The time of payment of the different services 
delivered 
16. Taxes Explains the tax situation 
17. Audits Financial control and monitoring 
18. Change control and management Provisions to change services and its management 
19. Dispute resolution Procedures for dispute resolution 
20. Termination fees and assistance Reasons for termination, the fees that may arise 
when client wishes to terminate the contract, and 
the length of assistance the vendor shall perform 
21. Proprietary rights Legal property rights given to the vendor for the 
length of the contract to deliver services of software 
and systems 
22. Confidentiality Confidentiality of information and the effects of 
breach 
23. Damages Liquidated damages in the event the vendor fails to 
meet services level. Also liability for damages by 
the client or vendor to the other party when relating 
to the performance of the contract 
24. Miscellaneous provisions Numerous other contractual terms and conditions 
25. Appendices Exhibits, i.e. schedules 
 
Contract clauses as well as terms and conditions essentially translate to controls 
established between client and vendor in outsourcing arrangements, which will be 
examined in the following section.  
2.4.2 Formal and relational governance 
Previous literature examining controls in outsourcing arrangements have primarily 
examined controls from a governance perspective, where contractual clauses are 
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operationalised as either formal or relational governance (Huber et al. 2013; Lioliou et 
al. 2014). Formal governance, or otherwise the contractual clauses, ‘aims to coordinate 
activities between partners and prevent opportunistic behaviours through the creation of 
a mutually agreed upon and legally binding set of acceptable behaviours’ (Lioliou et al. 
2014, p. 505). Relational governance on the other hand, refers to the softer, more 
“human” aspects of the outsourcing relationship, and serves as a form of social control 
(Huber et al. 2013; Kirsch 2004; Tiwana 2010).  
 
Table 2.3 provides an overview of several forms of formal and relational governance that 
have been examined in previous studies. As evident from the table, formal governance 
has been examined under a variety of labels including but not limited to “formal 
controls” (Kirsch 2004; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Tiwana 2010), “contractual 
governance” (Cao & Lumineau 2015; Huber et al. 2013; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017) 
and “formal contracts” (Li, Poppo & Zhou 2010; Poppo & Zenger 2002) amongst 
others identified by Cao and Lumineau (2015) in their recent review such as “explicit 
contracts”, “legal safeguards” and “legal contract”. Relational governance has been 
operationalized in terms of trust (Cao & Lumineau 2015; Chen & Bharadwaj 2009; 
Goo et al. 2009; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Li, Poppo & Zhou 2010; Rustagi, King & 
Kirsch 2008), mutual dependence (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002), 
communication (Huber et al. 2013; Lioliou et al. 2014; Poppo & Zenger 2002) 
amongst others.  
 
One of the problems with examining controls in outsourcing arrangements from a 
formal governance perspective is that not all contract clauses are operationalised, or 
drawn upon as control over members within the vendor organisation. For instance, the 
study of thirteen outsourcing organisations by Kern and Wilcocks (2002) close to two 
decades ago found that clients’ control over vendors are primarily enforced through five 
main contractual dimensions, namely (1) financial control and monitoring; (2) penalty 
payments; (3) monitoring of service levels and products; (4) performance measurements; 
and (5) selection of key interface points or contact persons in the event of discrepancies 
or disputes.  
 
Additionally, within the literature, there is a general agreement that what directly 
influences the behaviours of individuals in the vendor organisation are that of 
performance metrics, such as service level agreements (SLAs) and penalty for non-
compliance (Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Li, Poppo & Zhou 2010; Lioliou et al. 2014). 
Scholars are also in agreement that dispute resolution mechanisms and conflict 
arbitration processes served to influence the behaviours of individuals by ensuring 
members perform to pre-specified operating procedures (Chen & Bharadwaj 2009; Goo 
et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002). However, clauses relating to formal governance 
such as specification of the roles and responsibilities of outsourcer and outsourcee (Cao 
& Lumineau 2015; Li, Poppo & Zhou 2010; Poppo & Zenger 2002), or future demand 
management and clauses for revision of contract (Goo et al. 2009) do not affect 
behaviour of individuals to steer them towards achieving client-specified outcomes.  
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While prior research have drawn upon a governance perspective in their examination of 
controls, in this study, the researcher draws upon Information Systems (IS) control 
theory developed by Kirsch (1997) to examine controls in this study. Literature have 
demonstrated the efficacy of the IS control theory in understanding how clients 
structure and use control mechanisms in a variety of settings, including internal, 
outsourced and offshored IS projects (More details in Section 2.4.3). More importantly 
and in relation to the domain of this study, researchers have drawn upon concepts from 
IS control theory in their examination of controls in outsourcing arrangements (Lioliou 
et al. 2014; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Tiwana 2007), thus suggesting the efficacy of 
doing so.  
 
Following Table 2.3, the next section will develop the conceptualisations of formal 
controls in this study.  
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Table 2.3: Empirical research on controls in outsourcing environments 
Author Context Perspective 
 
Study focus Methods Formal elements 
(Forms of outcome or behavioural control) 
Relational elements 
(Variations of clan control) 
Poppo and 
Zenger 
(2002) 
285 IS executives in 
either client or 
vendor 
organisations 
Client and vendor 
(not matched pairs) 
Substitutes or 
complements 
between formal 
contracts and 
relational 
governance 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
 
Contractual complexity 
• Business plans 
• Service level agreements 
• Performance indices 
• Specification of each party’s roles, 
performance expectations 
• Dispute resolution mechanisms 
 
• Trust 
• Open communication 
• Sharing of information 
• Dependence 
• Cooperation 
Kirsch 
(2004) 
In-house, custom-
developed 
applications for 
global deployment 
Client and vendor 
(not matched pairs) 
How control 
choices changes 
across project 
phases 
Qualitative 
(Case study 
of two IS 
projects) 
 
Formal controls 
• Output controls 
• Behaviour controls 
Informal controls 
• Clan control 
• Self-control 
Tiwana 
(2007) 
59 software services 
outsourcing 
alliances 
Client-vendor 
matched pairs 
 
 
Complement 
between 
peripheral 
knowledge and 
control 
 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
 
 
Outcome control 
Process control (behaviour control) 
- Not examined - 
(Mao, Lee 
& Deng 
2008) 
      
Rustagi, 
King and 
Kirsch 
(2008) 
Eight large, long-
term, ongoing 
outsourcing 
arrangements 
 
Client-vendor 
matched pairs 
Predictors of 
amount of control 
used – “how 
much control” 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
 
Amount of formal control Trust 
Chen and 
Bharadwaj 
(2009) 
    Contractual provisions for 
• Monitoring 
• Dispute resolution 
• Property rights protection, 
• Contingency 
 
 
Prior interaction 
• Trust 
• Learning 
Goo et al. 
(2009) 
92 executives in 
South Korea 
Client Demonstrating 
that formal and 
informal 
governance 
function as 
complements 
rather than as 
substitutes 
Quantitative 
(Web-
based 
survey) 
 
Characteristics of contract 
• Foundation 
o Service level objectives 
o Process ownership 
o Service Level contents 
• Change management,  
o Future demand management 
o Anticipated change 
• Relational norms 
• Harmonious conflict resolution 
• Mutual dependence 
• Trust 
• Commitment 
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Extends work by 
Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) 
o Planning of innovation 
o Feedback process 
• Governance 
o Communication 
o Measurement charter 
o Conflict arbitration 
o Enforcement 
 
Hoetker 
and 
Mellewigt 
(2009) 
71 alliances in the 
German 
telecommunications 
industry  
Vendor (provider of 
telecommunications 
services) 
Performance of 
alliance in 
relation to 
property-based 
and knowledge-
based assets 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
 
• Business plans 
• Balance sheets 
• Performance indices 
• Profit and loss accounts 
• Internal prices 
• Economic efficiency calculations 
• Reports 
• Service level agreements 
 
• Steering committees 
• Project groups 
• Expert committees, 
• Cooperation managers 
• Face-to-face meetings at the top 
management level 
• Filing of key positions 
Li, Poppo 
and Zhou 
(2010) 
168 foreign 
subsidiaries 
operating in China 
Vendor Impact of 
contractual and 
relational 
governance on 
foreign 
subsidiaries’ 
acquisition of 
tacit and explicit 
knowledge from 
local suppliers 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
 
Formal contracts 
• Task and performance expectations 
• Information provision and requirements 
• Penalties for non-compliance 
• Codify each party’s rights, duties, 
obligations, responsibilities and specify goals 
• Formal operating procedures 
• Performance metrics 
 
Relational mechanisms 
• Indirect ties 
o Brokered access 
• Direct ties 
o Shared goals 
o Trust 
Tiwana 
(2010) 
120 outsourced 
projects in various 
industries (financial 
services, 
manufacturing, retail 
etc) 
 
Client-vendor 
matched pairs 
Complements 
and substitutes 
between formal 
and informal 
control 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
 
Formal controls 
• Output controls 
• Behaviour controls 
Clan control 
Srivastava 
and 
Thompson 
(2012) 
160 recently 
completed offshore 
software 
development 
projects from 8 
vendors working for 
U.S clients 
 
Vendor Complements 
and substitutes 
between formal 
and informal 
controls, and 
impact on 
contract 
performance 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
 
Contract specificity (formal structural control) 
Mechanistic governance (formal process control 
mechanism) 
Relational governance 
(Informal process mechanism) 
Huber et 
al. (2013) 
90 outsourcing 
projects from a 
German bank with 
duration of >1 year 
Client and vendor 
(not matched pairs) 
How 
complements 
and substitutes 
form over time 
between 
contractual and 
relational 
Qualitative 
(Interviews 
and 
documents) 
Contract, formal controls Trust, informal controls 
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governance 
Lioliou et 
al. (2014) 
14 interviews & 14 
follow-up 
discussions 
Client and vendor 
(not matched pairs) 
Illustrate 
conditions where 
substitution and 
complementarity 
can occur 
Qualitative 
case study 
• Formal governance 
o Contract 
o Service level agreements 
o Key performance indicators 
o Measurement charters 
• Psychological contract 
o Trust 
o Commitment 
o Dependency 
o Communication 
Cao and 
Lumineau 
(2015) 
- - 
Ascertain the 
relationships 
between 
contractual and 
relational 
governance and 
factors that 
moderate the 
relationships 
Meta-
analysis 
• Contractual governance 
o Define outputs to be delivered 
o Specification of monitoring 
procedures 
o Detail of duties, rights and 
contingencies 
• Relational governance 
o Trust (confidence in partner’s 
integrity, credibility and 
benevolence in partnerships) 
o Relational norms (shared 
expectations about behaviours) 
 
Lacity, 
Yan and 
Khan 
(2017) 
- - 
Literature review 
summarising 23 
years of research 
on outsourcing 
Literature 
review 
• Contractual governance 
o Prices 
o Service levels 
o Key process indicators 
o Benchmarking 
o Warranties 
o Penalties for non-performance 
• Relational governance 
o Knowledge sharing 
o Communication 
o Trust 
o Relationship quality 
o Partnership view (view of vendor 
as a trusted partner) 
o Relationships  
o Commitment 
o Social capital 
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2.4.3 Conceptualising formal controls in this study  
This study follows Tiwana (2007) work that extended IS control theory to the study of 
controls in technology alliances, as the definitions proposed aligned with the nature of 
outsourcing where outcomes and behaviour controls are pre-specified with contracts. 
Outcome controls in this study are defined as the ‘prespecification of the desired interim 
and final outputs without regard to the process by which the outputs are achieved’. Such 
a conceptualisation of outcome controls is in parallel with those operationalized in 
internal (Kirsch 1997), outsourced (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Gopal & Gosain 
2009) and offshored  (Srivastava & Thompson 2012) IS projects.  
 
Outcome controls are exercised by the controller, or within the context of this study, the 
outsourcee, i.e. client organisation. Prior research conducted on IS outsourcing and 
offshoring projects (Chang et al. 2013; Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003) have observed 
that outcome controls are exercised at a distance in long-term outsourcing 
arrangements, where clients pre-specified desired and final outputs without regards to 
the process by which the outcomes are achieved (Tiwana 2007). There are however 
inconsistent views within literature with regards to how controls are exercised. For 
instance, Tiwana (2010)’s examination of 120 outsourced IS projects maintained that 
clients assess the extent to which vendor adheres to the methods and procedures 
prescribed by the client. Chang et al. (2013)’s study on the other hand, found that 
clients primarily exercise outcome controls whereas behaviour controls are implemented 
with the vendor organisation. Previous TCE-based research conducted within the 
context of outsourcing arrangements have indicated contractual clauses that function as 
outcome controls. They include service level agreements (SLAs) and penalties for 
failing to achieve SLAs (Kern & Wilcocks 2002; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Lioliou et 
al. 2014).  
 
Behaviour controls, on the other hand, refer to ‘pre-specification of the methods and 
procedures to be adopted by the outsourcee in undertaking project activities’ (Tiwana 
2007, p. 625). Examples of behavioural controls identified from prior literature include 
monitoring procedures (Cao & Lumineau 2015), operating procedures (Li, Poppo & 
Zhou 2010; Tiwana 2007); processes for dispute and/or conflict arbitration (Chen & 
Bharadwaj 2009; Goo et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002). Following Choudhury and 
Sabherwal (2003), I include IS (technological system) as outcome and behavioural 
control, as it is expected that there will be technological systems that will serve for 
evaluation of the quality and timing of outputs as well as to facilitate monitoring of 
behaviour. The aforementioned identified mechanisms align with the definition of 
behavioural controls proposed by Tiwana (2007) that is adopted for the study.  
 
Table 2.4 on the following page presents a summary of the discussion in this section on 
outcome and behavioural control mechanisms that have been identified from prior 
empirical research.  
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Table 2.4: Conceptualisation of formal controls in this study 
Control 
mechanisms 
Definition Examples from literature 
Outcome 
control 
Pre-specification of the desired interim 
and final outputs without regard to the 
process by which the outputs are 
achieved  
! Service level agreements (Kern & 
Wilcocks 2002; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; 
Lioliou et al. 2014); 
! Penalties for non-compliance (Kern & 
Wilcocks 2002; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; 
Lioliou et al. 2014); 
! Existing IS that facilitates the evaluation 
of the quality and timing of outputs 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003). 
Behavioural 
controls 
Pre-specification of the methods and 
procedures to be adopted by the 
outsourcee in undertaking outsourcing 
activities that directly influences the 
behaviours of individual in performing to 
outcomes. 
! Specification of monitoring procedures 
(Cao & Lumineau 2015) 
o Frequency of review meetings 
o Reports 
! Operating procedures (Li, Poppo & Zhou 
2010; Tiwana 2007); 
! Processes for dispute and/or conflict 
arbitration (Chen & Bharadwaj 2009; Goo 
et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002); 
! Information systems designed to help the 
client monitor vendor behaviour 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003). 
2.5 Controls in organisation 
This section focuses on examining literature relating to the second objective of the 
study. It was argued in Section 2.3.5 that there is a lack of an organisational perspective 
within the body of control research. This is largely due to the positioning of IS controls 
as being unique and different due to the nature of projects, where they are regarded as 
temporary endeavours and exists independently outside of the organisation (Mähring 
2002; Wiener et al. 2016). Studies conducted on outsourced IS projects are in general 
agreement that there will be controls established within the vendor organisation to 
encourage individuals to achieve expected project outcomes (Gopal & Gosain 2009; 
Tiwana 2010; Tiwana & Keil 2009). However, little is known with regards to what 
forms of controls are established within the vendor organisation. One study by Cram 
(2016) has provided insights to the interface between project controls and organisation 
controls, however the study had identified a causal relationship between the two distinct 
domains of controls.  
 
The researcher is of the view that controls at the outsourcing arrangement are essentially 
inter-organisation focused, while controls within the organisation environment are 
intra-organisation. Prior studies have substantiated the aforementioned argument. For 
instance, the seminal work by Orlikowski (1991) documenting the changes in the forms 
of control and organisation pre- and post-implementation of a computer-aided software 
engineering (CASE) tool in a large software consultancy firm highlighted controls that 
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are exercised both within and external to the organisation.  Three forms of controls 
were examined in her study, including personal, systemic and external controls. Personal 
control is similar to that of hierarchical authority involving supervisors and subordinates, 
where an individual assumes authority over another person, and closely monitors 
behaviours and actions to ensure compliance with orders. Systemic controls are 
embedded within the structural properties of the organisation, and include technology, 
social structure and cultural control. Technology controls exert control over the work of 
individuals through sequences, which enforce the operation of a technical system. Social 
structure is embedded within the firm’s policies, procedures, processes and rules, 
including job descriptions, career ladders and incentive schemes. The cultural aspect of 
the organisation, its norms and values, aimed at shaping and ordering behaviours, and 
influencing of attitudes through the provision of a common belief to achieve goal 
congruence. External controls, on the other hand, are instilled through training of 
employees in professional institutions, schools, and occupational communities.  
 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2004)’s study in a multinational consulting firm highlight the 
interface between socio-ideological (beliefs, meanings, norms and interpretations) and 
technocratic controls, i.e. the hierarchies, standardised work procedures, performance 
evaluations and career paths that target the behaviour of consultants within the 
organisation. Their study offered insights into how consultants are subjected to controls 
from two distinct levels – namely formal commitment to clients through projects, as 
well as from the organisation level. Additionally, their study revealed that the 
complexities and uncertainties of the work of consultants when working towards 
objectives and goals set at both organisation and project domains are tied to formal 
financial control devices and apparatuses, and draws attention to the role of incentives at 
the organisation level which motivates individuals to perform to expectations.   
 
Controls therefore can be exercised from both internal and external domains. In the 
following section, I will examine relevant control theory from the management control 
stream of literature. In doing so, I will conceptualise the controls this study will 
examine.  
2.5.1 Purpose of controls in organisations 
Controls in the organisational setting are not dissimilar to how empirical IS control 
theorists have conceptualised controls. As a fundamental activity in all business 
organisations (Anthony 1965; Merchant 1981), controls establish standards, measure 
performance against standards as well as enable the correction of deviations from 
standards and plans (Merchant 1981). In addition to the facilitation ofplanning in 
organisations, controls also serve the attainment of organisational goals through 
effective and efficient management of organisational resources (Anthony 1965). This is 
achieved through setting of common goals that aim to achieve goal congruence amongst 
individuals or groups in order to influence the behaviours of employees (Abernethy & 
Chua 1996; Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 1985).  
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2.5.2 Relevant control theories and frameworks 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, IS control theory is rooted in the frameworks of 
organisational control theorists such as Ouchi (1980) and Jaworski (1988) as well as 
agency control theorist, i.e. Eisenhardt (1985). However for the sake of clarity in terms 
of labels and terms used, I will draw upon prior management control frameworks to 
present an overview of the types and forms of organisational controls.  
 
The field of management control has been established for close to six decades, and there 
have been different terminologies, concepts and frameworks that have been developed 
for management control system (MCS) analysis in organisations (Merchant & Otley 
2007). A plethora of frameworks exist within the management control literature 
considering its well-established history. Seven seminal control frameworks were 
identified (Chenhall 2003; Malmi & Brown 2008). They include Anthony (1965) 
accounting-based framework, Simons (1995) “levers of control” framework, as well as 
Otley (1999), Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) “object of control” framework among 
many others to Malmi and Brown (2008) contention of examination of MCS as a 
package. Table 2.5 below provides a summary of these management control frameworks 
as well as their various control dimensions and elements.  
 
Table 2.5: Relevant control frameworks and models 
Author Framework Dimensions and control elements 
Anthony 
(1965) 
Accounting-based 
framework 
Strategic planning: Setting the overall strategies and plans to be 
implemented. 
Management control processes: Focused on ensuring that 
resources obtained are used effectively and efficiently to achieve 
organisation’s objectives. 
Operational control: Nonfinancial measures of performance. 
Flamholtz, 
Das and Tsui 
(1985) 
Integrative 
framework of 
organisational 
control 
Core control system, represented by the inner most circle consists 
of the cybernetic structure of six elements: 
• Planning: goal setting and standard establishment for 
individuals; 
• Operation:  
• Outcome: Performance, work attitudes  
• Measurements: management information systems and 
employee appraisal 
• Feedback: Comparing performance to established 
standards 
• Evaluation-reward: Extrinsic rewards based on evaluation 
of work performance.  
 
Organisation structure: The set of rules in organisation and their 
interrelationships. Span of control, functional specialisation, vertical 
and horizontal differentiation, centralisation, formalisation and 
standardisation.  
 
Culture of the organisation:  Values, beliefs, assumptions and the 
patterned ways of thinking that characterises the entity. 
Simons 
(1995)  
 
“Levers of control” 
framework 
Belief systems: Used to inspire and direct the search for new 
opportunities. Refer to the core values of the organisation 
(examples: mission statements and corporate policies) 
 
Boundary systems: Sets the boundaries for which activities and 
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behaviours are appropriate (e.g., compliance, quality control 
systems, codes of business conducts, codes of behaviours 
promulgated by industry and professional associations). Main 
purpose is to ensure accountability. 
 
Diagnostic control systems: Feedback systems used within 
organisations to motivate, monitor and reward achievement of 
specified goals. (1) ability to measure outputs of a process; (2) the 
existence of predetermined standards against which actual results 
can be compared, and (2) the ability to correct deviations from 
standards. 
  
Interactive control: Formal information systems which managers 
use to involve themselves regularly and personally in the decision 
activities of subordinates. Examples include regular meetings, 
monthly reviews of progress and long-term reviews. Able to identify 
risks and enable early warning for when a given strategy is no 
longer appropriate. 
Otley (1999) 
 
 
Performance 
management 
framework 
(Descriptive) 
 
Extended from 
Simons (1995) 
1. Identification of key organizational objectives and the 
processes and method involved in assessing the level of 
achievement in each of these objectives. 
2. Process of formulating and implementing strategies and plan, 
as well as the performance measurement and evaluation 
process associated with their implementation. 
3. Setting performance targets and the levels at which such 
targets are set. 
4. Rewards systems used by organisations and to how these are 
are influenced by achievement or failure to meet performance 
targets. 
5. Types of information streams required providing adequate 
monitoring of performance and learning from experience.  
Merchant 
and Van der 
Stede (2007) 
Object of control 
framework 
Action control: Controls that ensure employees perform or do not 
perform certain actions known to be beneficial or harmful to the 
organisation.  
Results control: Controlling the behaviours of employees in 
organisations through the decentralisation of authority and the 
design of incentive systems to ensure managers do not misuse 
their discretion and are appropriately rewarded. It is a preventive 
type of control that sets well-defined targets to direct employees.  
Personnel control: Build on employees’ natural tendencies to 
control and/or motivate themselves. Examples include self-
monitoring (p.83), selection and placement, training and job design. 
Cultural: Shape organisational behavioural norms and encourage 
employees to monitor and influence each other’s behaviours 
through codes of conduct, group rewards, intra-organisational 
transfers or employee rotations and physical arrangements.  
Ferreira and 
Otley (2005) 
Performance 
management and 
control (PMC) 
framework 
 
Extension of Otley 
(1999) 
performance 
management 
framework 
1. Vision and mission: The broad orientation and overall direction 
than an organisation wishes to develop.  
2. Key factors: Activities and outcomes that need to occur if the 
organisation is to progress towards achieving its vision and to 
be successful. 
3. Strategies and plans: Actions that an organisation’s 
management identified as being necessary for the successful 
development of the organisation.  
 
4. Organisation structure: Influence in the design and operation 
of existing control systems in organisations.  
5. Key performance measures: Financial and non-financial 
performance metrics.   
6. Target setting:  The means by which targets are being set, e.g. 
budgetary control.  
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7. Performance evaluation: Formal performance evaluation 
activities and informal indications.  
8. Rewards: Financial and non-financial rewards that will be 
gained by employees.  
9. Feedback mechanisms: The mechanisms in place that will 
enable the anticipation of future events and allow the 
organisation to response.  
10. Information flows: Types of information streams required 
providing adequate monitoring of performance and learning 
from experience. 
11. Changes in performance management and control systems 
due to change dynamics: changes at the performance and 
control systems as a result of anticipation or response to 
external environment.  
12. Strength and coherence between links of performance 
management and control systems: 
Brown (2005) 
and Malmi 
and Brown 
(2008) 
 
 
Management 
control systems as 
a package 
1. Planning 
• Action planning – goals and actions for immediate 
future 
• Long-range planning – goals and actions for medium 
and long run.  
2. Cybernetic 
• Budgets 
• Financial measures 
• Non-financial measures 
• Hybrids of financial and non-financial measures 
3. Reward/compensation 
• Attaching rewards and/or compensation to 
achievement of goals 
4. Administrative 
• Organisation design and structure 
• Governance structure 
• Procedures and policies 
5. Culture 
• Values-based controls 
• Clan controls 
• Symbols 
 
From the above table, it becomes apparent that prior management control researchers 
have examined identical or similar forms of controls under different labels and 
terminologies. For instance, not all frameworks included culture as a form of control, 
with the exception of (Simons 1995) who examined in under the label of “belief 
systems” and (Malmi & Brown 2008) where culture is conceptualised as composing of 
clan, value and symbols. Processes or workflows that prescribe how activities are to be 
conducted within organisations have also been referred to as rules, policies and 
procedures (Malmi & Brown 2008), action controls (Merchant & Van der Stede 2007) 
or operational control (Anthony 1965). Feedback and performance evaluation within 
organisations has been labelled broadly under “management control processes” 
(Anthony 1965), “diagnostic control systems” (Simons 1995), and “results controls” 
(Merchant & Otley 2007) amongst others. This lack of consistency in terms and labels 
to depict controls at the organisational environment is thus confusing and challenging. 
As pointed out by Simons (1995, p. 5), ‘terminology can cause confusion if not defined 
properly’.  
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Owing to the broad definitions of existing controls and diverse terminologies, and for 
the sake of clarity, this study uses terminologies that are commonly used within IS. 
Consequently organisation structure, process, and hierarchical control were identified 
and examined in this study.  
 
Organisation structure directs employee behaviour through their design and structure 
(Malmi & Brown 2008). Business processes within organisations depict the order of 
work activities, and is a representation of ‘how work is done’ within an organisation 
(Davenport 1993, p. 5). They include but are not limited to standard operating policies 
and procedures (Macintosh & Daft 1987), action controls (Merchant & Van der Stede 
2007), part of an organisation’s internal control systems (Simons 1995), and 
administrative controls (Malmi & Brown 2008) among others. In spite of the variations 
in terms used, a synthesis of the literature indicates that there are several distinctive 
features of process controls. In addition to being the formal guiding procedures that are 
utilised to guide managerial operations (Macintosh & Daft 1987), processes also 
function as behavioural constraints. Processes, either communicated through formal 
means or socially, highlight to employees limits and boundaries of appropriate methods 
to manage and handle daily work activities (Malmi & Brown 2008; Merchant & Van 
der Stede 2007). As a control function in organisations, processes operating as an 
internal control system, or behavioural control mechanism, safeguarding the 
organisation from risks by ensuring complete and accurate record keeping, adequate 
documentation and audit trail, relevant and timely management reporting (Simons 
1995).  
 
 SQ2: What are the forms of controls present within the 
vendor organisational environment that influences or operate 
in tandem with controls at the outsourcing level to ensure that 
individuals work towards achieving client-specified outcomes?  
 
 
In the next section, the focus will turn to the third objective of this study, which is to 
understand how controls can exert influence on the clan.  
2.6 Conceptualising clan control 
Clan control resides in ceremonial forms, is subtle and is difficult to observe. It occurs 
over time through socialisation between new and old, or stable membership. For Ouchi 
(1979), clan control is the cultural aspect of the organisation, where information is 
shared through socialisation that enables sharing of stories, performance of rituals and 
ceremonies that convey the values and beliefs of the organisation. Such socialisation can 
involve the hiring of new employees whereby their beliefs are similar to the 
organisation, or through training procedures that impart the values and beliefs of the 
organisation. According to Ouchi and Price (1993, p. 65), ‘a clan is a culturally 
homogenous organisation, one in which most members share a common set of values or 
objectives plus beliefs about how to coordinate effort in order to reach common goals’. 
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Clan control, as a control strategy is used when it is unclear how behaviours or 
outcomes can be measured (Ouchi 1979). 
 
Within the context of internal IS projects, clan controls posit a reliance on the group 
members to control themselves (Kirsch 1997). However, scholars have argued that clan 
control is difficult to establish between client and vendor in outsourcing and offshoring 
contexts. The argument rests upon how it would be challenging for individuals from 
different organisations to embrace common values and beliefs due to geographical 
distances (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Tiwana 2010; Wiener et al. 2015). For 
instance, Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) seminal study that extended IS control 
framework to the setting of an outsourced IS project found that clan control occurred by 
chance due to shared goals and can be established through frequent interactions. It is 
through frequent interaction such as socialisation activities (social events), regular 
meetings between client and vendor, as well as trainings that lead to fostering of the 
clan.  
 
Prior empirical research are in general agreement with regards to the role of clan control 
in promoting and fostering shared understanding beliefs and values in both internal and 
outsourcing context (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997). Clan control 
facilitates continuous communication and bilateral knowledge transfer thereby building 
relationships between client and vendor (Kirsch, Ko & Haney 2010; Mao, Lee & Deng 
2008). This can promote a collaborative culture and blending of cultures that 
encourages the openly sharing of ideas, issues and questions between clients and vendors 
(Wiener et al. 2015). Within the governance literature, there is also a general agreement 
with regards to the role of trust (Cao & Lumineau 2015; Chen & Bharadwaj 2009; 
Goo et al. 2009; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Li, Poppo & Zhou 2010; Rustagi, King & 
Kirsch 2008), mutual dependence (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002), 
communication (Huber et al. 2013; Lioliou et al. 2014; Poppo & Zenger 2002). Clan 
control mechanisms have also found to be influential in enhancing the quality of 
projects (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Henderson & Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997; 
Srivastava & Thompson 2012).  
 
Researchers examining the complementary and substitutive relationship between formal 
and informal controls have highlighted that certain contractual clauses in outsourcing 
contexts, such as workshops can facilitated frequent social interactions between client 
and vendor, and led to the development of more trusting relationships (Huber et al. 
2013). This is what Poppo, Zhou and Li (2016) conceived of as  relational trust, which 
is anchored in the past, and derived from repeated social interactions where there are 
strong beliefs about the goodwill, honesty and good-faith efforts of others, and is 
aligned through core values and beliefs.  
 
The discussion above has highlighted research findings regarding clan control. In this 
study, the aim is to examine long-term and stable outsourcing arrangements. Thus, it is 
expected that there will be a certain degree of relation trust in order not to terminate the 
contract. This study in the examination of clan control, aims to depart from prior 
research, in that the researcher argued of the need to understand how formal controls, 
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alongside with organisation controls (research question two, Section 2.5) can exert an 
influence on the clan.  
 
A recent study by Lioliou et al. (2014) provides perspective on this issue. Their study 
identified that service levels (outcome controls) were not defined in line with 
expectations, and were secondary to the relationship. Additionally, their study found 
that the supplier might be performing to SLAs, but clients were dissatisfied due to 
different expectations. As a result, this might impede the building of the clan due to 
unsatisfactory vendor performances. However, researchers have observed that the clan 
can alleviate the aforementioned problems through open communication. There is thus 
a need to extend this finding and obtain insights into how outsourcing and organisation 
controls interface and exert influence (positive or negative) on the clan. Insights from 
prior studies have identified that organisation structure can pose collaboration problems 
(Quattrone & Hopper 2006), processes can lead to issues with responsiveness. 
Specifically, this insight will contribute to the body of control research by not only 
identifying limitations of formal controls, but also how it intertwines with organisation 
controls and impact on the clan.  
 
In this study, the researcher thus aims to examine from individuals’ perspectives their 
current working relationship with the client, and it is expected that forms of relational 
trust will be evident. This study will also examine the limitations of controls and how 
they can further impact on the clan.  
 
 SQ3: What are the limitations of outsourcing and 
organisation controls and how do they exert influence on the 
clan? 
 
 
The next section will proceed to conceptualise self-control in order to contribute to the 
knowledge gap identified.   
2.7 Conceptualising self-control 
Kirsch (1997) draws from and incorporated Jaworski (1988) conceptualisation of self-
control within her proposed framework. Following Jaworski (1988), the formulation of 
self-control in IS control framework sees agents as intrinsically motivated to perform 
self-monitoring, self-sanction and perform self-adjustments when deviating from the 
existing cultural norms. Self-control can be conceived of as self-management, where 
individuals are believed to be intrinsically motivated to self-monitor against the 
achievement of assigned goals and targets, self-reward and practices self-sanctioning 
(Henry, Narayanaswamy & Purvis 2015; Kirsch 1997). The incorporation of self-
control is based upon the idea an individual will creatively and actively assume 
responsibility for their actions under the conditions of the unpredictability of a task at 
hand. Self-control is associated with the experience of individuals, i.e. the “know-how” 
to get things done, as well as how one behaves in accordance to prevailing norms, and 
perform self-monitoring, and self-rewards.  (Kirsch 1997).  
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Self-control has been repeatedly omitted from prior research within the context of 
outsourcing projects owing to claims of its relative non-influences in facilitating desired 
project outcomes (Gopal & Gosain 2009; Mao, Lee & Deng 2008; Srivastava & 
Thompson 2012; Tiwana 2007). There are three primary reasons for the exclusion of 
self-control. One of the arguments pertains to how self-control is distinct from the 
other three control mechanisms, is exercised from the controllee and only partly served 
as a substitute for control exercised by controllers (Tiwana & Keil 2009). Secondly, it is 
the view of researchers that the exercising of control by the controllee him/herself is 
insignificant in determining project outcomes and is ‘analogous to non-control’ 
(Srivastava & Thompson 2012, p. 120). Third, self-control is regarded as ‘less of a 
strategic tool in the manager’s toolkit’ (Gopal & Gosain 2009, p. 4), and is difficult to 
assess and influence. Last but not least, within the context of IS outsourcing projects, 
self-control is found to have a negative influence on performance due to an increased 
risk of vendor opportunism (Tiwana & Keil 2009). 
 
However, related streams of research examining in-house IS projects have observed 
significant association between self-control and quality of projects, in particular 
application development projects due to the creativity nature of the task (Henderson & 
Lee 1992). Through socialisation, clans functions as behavioural influencing 
mechanisms, and serves as a guide for individuals to perform to accepted standards and 
practices. Further, theoretically, self-control has been argued to at the core of the 
organisational controls – ‘persons may exercise self-control even when they choose to 
acquiesce to external demands, as acquiescence still implies choice’ (Manz, Mossholder 
& Liuthans 1987, p. 5).  
 
In this study, to examine self-control, I follow Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) and 
examine the ‘contradictory experiences’ of individuals in relation to rewards. To draw 
from Alvesson and Wilmott (2002, p. 622), ‘mechanisms and practices of control – 
rewards, leaderships, division of labour, hierarchies, management accounting, etc – do 
not work ‘outside’ the individual’s quest(s) for self-definition(s), coherence(s) and 
meaning(s)’. Self-control is intrinsically tied to rewards and performance measurements 
within organisations (Merchant & Otley 2007).  Prior studies have highlighted that 
failure to comply with organisational policies might result in punishment and negative 
consequences for the individual (Lerner & Tetlock 1999; Merchant & Otley 2007), 
including but not limited to mediocre performance appraisal, lost opportunities for 
promotions, or demotions. On the other hand, compelling justifications by individuals 
in organisations will result in rewards (Lerner & Tetlock 1999).  
 
Thus, in this study, the objective is to examine from individuals’ perspectives how they 
contest against performance measurements, and how in spite of contradictions, 
individuals still self-sanction in accordance to performance measurements.  
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2.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the rationale behind examining the domain of 
outsourcing industry. Practically, there is a need to understand from the way things 
operate within the vendor organisation in order to improve outsourcing performance. 
Recent shifts within the industry has augmented the need for a more thorough 
understanding of the constraints and limitations within both outsourcing and 
organisation environment in order to gain insights into avenues for improvements. To 
do so, this study draws on IS control theory developed by Kirsch (1997).  
 
Theoretically, this study aims to contribute to the knowledge base by extending IS 
control theory to an outsourcing arrangement. To recall, IS control theory sees controls 
as consisting of formal and informal modes, which can be further categorised into 
outcome, behaviour, clan and self-control (Refer Table 2.1). This study departs from 
prior research and takes the view that controls over individuals within outsourcing 
arrangements are exercised at two distinct levels, namely inter-organisationally through 
the outsourcing arrangements, and within the organisation. The nexus between both 
domains of controls need to be bridged. To understand this, this study thus focus on 
examining controls from the perspective of individuals. The overarching research 
question is:  
 
 RQ: How might extending IS control theory to an 
outsourcing arrangement contribute to our understanding on 
how outsourcing and organisation controls interface with one 
another to limit the ability for individuals to attain client-
specified outcomes? 
 
 
Chapter Three will discuss and justify the interpretative multiple-case study approach 
utilised to examine controls of two outsourcing teams within the vendor organisation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
   
3.1 Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the appropriate research method for this study. 
This chapter begins by outlining the research objectives, followed by a consideration of 
the research paradigm the researcher has adopted for the purposes of this study. 
Following this, the use of a multiple case study research approach is discussed and 
justified. An overview of the research design and strategy will then be outlined, 
including criteria for site selection, as well as the sampling strategy used to recruit the 
research participants. This chapter also include a discussion of the data collection 
techniques employed for the purposes of achieving the research objectives, and how data 
was collected in the field. Following this, the chapter will outline the data analysis 
procedures in accordance to the thematic framework developed based on the literature 
review that was conducted. Last but not least, this chapter will focus on the ethical 
aspects integral to the conduct of this research, and judging of the research approach by 
addressing the confirmability, credibility, transferability and dependability of the study.  
3.2 Research Objectives  
This thesis aims to examine the intertwining relationship between outsourcing and 
organisational controls in the context of an outsourcing arrangement.   
 
The primary research question for this study has been specified as: 
 
 How might extending IS control theory to an outsourcing 
arrangement contribute to our understanding on how 
outsourcing and organisation controls interface with one 
another to limit the ability for individuals to attain client-
specified outcomes? 
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To facilitate this research investigation, the following four sub-questions were 
developed: 
 
 SQ1: What are the forms of formal governance mechanisms 
established between client and vendor, and how do they 
translate to outcome or behavioural controls that act upon 
individuals? 
 
SQ2: What are the forms of controls present within the 
vendor organisational environment that influence or operate 
in tandem with controls at the outsourcing level to ensure that 
individuals work towards achieving client-specified outcomes?  
 
SQ3: What are the limitations of outsourcing and 
organisation controls and how do they exert influence on the 
clan? 
 
SQ4: How do individuals self-sanction in relation to 
performance measurements and incentives? 
 
 
The next section provides a discussion on research paradigms. In doing so, I will justify 
the use of an interpretivist paradigm to address the research questions in order to 
achieve the objectives of the study. 
3.3 Research Paradigms in Information Systems 
Scholars have stressed the importance of identifying one’s research paradigm, or 
worldview, as it can have implications for the conduct of a study. ‘Paradigm’ represents 
differing philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge, and can 
influence the design of a research (Neuman 2011). How researchers view the world and 
the nature of reality can influence how they perceive the role of technologies 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991), or controls in organisations. This contrast in perspectives 
is evident within literature with scholars adopting a negative view of control and 
attempts to understanding the associated negative impact on employees (Braverman 
1998; Sennett 1998), while the majority of control research sees control as neutral 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997). For some commentators, worldviews are 
contradictory to one another, but for others, these worldviews simply bring different 
understandings to a topic of interest (Guba & Lincoln 1994).  
 
Creswell (2007) proposed that the formulation of the research design must consider 
several philosophical assumptions. These assumptions relate to how a researcher views 
reality (ontological), the relationship between the researcher and the researched 
(epistemological), recognition of biases and the role of one’s values in the interpretation 
of data (axiological position), the language used (rhetorical) and the process of the 
research (methodological). There are a plethora of paradigms that offer different 
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understandings during inquiries. For example, Creswell (2007) following Guba and 
Lincoln (1994, p. 109) suggests four underlying paradigms for research, namely 
positivism, postpositivism, critical theory and constructivism. Others include but are not 
limited to postmodernism (Neuman 2011), advocacy/participatory, pragmatism 
(Creswell 2007), and critical realism (Mingers 2001; 2004; Mingers, Mutch & 
Wilcocks 2013).  
 
The following discussion on paradigms follows the three-fold classification commonly 
utilised within the researcher’s discipline - Information Systems (Chua 1986; 
Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991); namely positivism, interpretivism and critical research, 
discussed below. Following this, the choice of interpretivism is justified. 
3.3.1 Positivism 
Researchers who embrace a positivist (empiricist) approach to the conduct of studies 
hold the view that social reality is knowable, can be agreed on through objective, 
rigorous and quantifiable measurements in order to predict and control events 
(Esterberg 2002). From the perspective of positivists, knowledge about society can be 
gained through objective and rigorous measurements. Positivists are therefore regarded 
as ‘hard’ scientists (Denzin & Lincoln 2008, p. 10), as they reflect their axiological 
position by maintaining a distance from research subjects, which they believe transcends 
opinion and personal bias (Guba & Lincoln 1994).  
 
Studies of research approaches within the discipline of IS have shown, that in general, 
positivist research has dominated (Chen & Hirschheim 2004; Orlikowski & Baroudi 
1991; Richardson & Robinson 2007). Commonly used research methods include polls 
surveys, questionnaires, experiments, or the manipulation of pre-existing datasets. 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) proposed four criteria to classify studies as positivist. 
According to the authors, there need to be formal propositions and quantifiable 
measurements of variables. Hypothesis testing is performed, and the results are inferred 
from the sample to the wider population. Empirical investigations on controls in 
outsourcing arrangements that satisfy the aforementioned criteria, include but are not 
limited to Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008) examination of the antecedents of formal 
controls use, Tiwana (2007) inquiry into whether vendors’ domain knowledge influence 
the choice of controls, as well as Goo et al. (2009)  study on complementary or 
substitutive effects of controls.  
3.3.2 Interpretivism 
While Positivism holds that the nature of reality is objective, Interpretivism, commonly 
associated with Constructivism holds that every person’s reality is experienced in the 
same ordered world in different ways (Creswell 2007). This challenges positivists’ 
beliefs that social reality can be captured in hypothetical deductions and mathematical 
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models (Esterberg 2002). Esterberg (2002) adds that pure objectivity through positivism 
is impossible as social beings express themselves through varying channels, body 
language, speech, art or literature, and so on.  
 
Interpretivists hold that human actions are based on meanings that arise out of social 
interaction, and different interpretations of things that exist in social reality (Neuman 
2011). In this sense, interpretive research attempts to understand phenomena through 
accessing the meanings that participants assign to them (Myers 1997). An Interpretivist 
approach therefore goes beyond a Positivist approach to understand social meanings, as 
it treats people’s ideas as more important than actual conditions (Richardson & 
Robinson 2007). 
 
Examples of empirical research that have utilised the Interpretivist approach are Myers 
(1994), Mitev (2000), Bartis and Mitev (2008). The common traits of these 
Interpretivist studies are that they show through empirical evidence the social and 
political context surrounding the development, adoption and implementation of IS with 
descriptive detail without pre-defined variables. 
3.3.3 Critical Research 
Whereas an Interpretivist may show and describe how people adjust to use in 
organisations, a critical social science researcher on the other hand, recognises that 
people may be constrained by institutional arrangements. For instance, Markus (1983) 
shows through a case study how a team may influence the design of an IS in order to 
obtain power over another department.  
 
Within a social science perspective, a critical process of inquiry goes beyond surface 
illusions and exposes the real structures in the material world (Neuman 2011). That is, 
the ultimate purpose in using this approach is ‘not simply to study the social world, but 
to change it’ (Neuman 2011). In this sense, critical theorists set out to question the 
status quo (Neuman 2011), and apply a sceptical approach in their world view, i.e. 
changing the status quo (Marshall & Rossman 1989). Examples of empirical work in 
the field in addition to Markus (1983) examining the politics in project team include 
Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) and Hirschheim and Klein (1994).  
3.3.4 Locating this Study 
Ontologically, the world I see is inherently complex, and social reality cannot be agreed 
upon through objective, rigorous and quantifiable measurements. Epistemologically, I 
am sceptical that objective knowledge can be found in the social world, as events in life 
and how individuals feel about these events cannot be predicted. To recall, the aim of 
this study is to understand from the perspective of individuals how controls within both 
outsourcing and organisation environments directs and influences their behaviours and 
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actions in the course of achieving client-specified outcomes. This study also aims to 
investigate the limitations of controls in relation to attaining client-specified outcomes.  
Control in this study is therefore viewed as socially constructed in line with its 
significance in studies of IS as social systems.  
 
A critical lens will therefore not facilitate the intended examination in this study, as I do 
not aim to expose the underlying social structures. Neither am I trying to change 
existing norms or question the status quo. Rather, I acknowledge the presence of social 
constraints posed on individuals as a result of controls (Nandhakumar & Avison 1999; 
Robey & Markus 1984).  
 
As noted in the literature review, even though the body of control research as a whole 
does not exhibit any particular methodological bias and is not dominated by a particular 
method, there is still a relatively larger proportion of studies that have utilised survey 
methods (Wiener et al. 2016, p. 754). Moreover, the literature review conducted 
indicated the dominant use of survey methods within the context of outsourcing 
arrangements (Goo 2010; Goo et al. 2009; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Tiwana 
2007), even though there are exceptions such as Lioliou et al. (2014).   
 
As noted in Chapter Two, firstly, this study aims to contribute to the body of control 
research by firstly understanding how formal governance mechanisms operate as 
outcome and behaviour controls and act upon individuals. Secondly, the study aimed to 
gain insights into how outsourcing and organisation controls interface with one another 
to ensure individuals work towards achieving outcomes. Thirdly, to contribute to the 
body of control research, there is a need to understand the limitations of controls on the 
clan considering previous research has exemplified the importance of the maintenance 
of the clan in achieving outcomes. Lastly, the study aimed to exemplify that in spite of 
contests against performance measurements, that individuals still exercise self-control in 
relation to outcomes. 
 
With the aim of the study being to understand how outsourcing and organisation 
controls interface with one another to limit the ability for individuals to attain client-
specified outcomes, there is a need to construct an account through participant’s 
perspectives and their lives experiences. A positivist lens will thus be not appropriate 
owing to the need to understand reality from the perspective of participants. This study 
can thus be classified as being interpretivist in spirit as I seek to understand participants’ 
experiences of controls, their perceptions, beliefs and views on controls and how it 
impacts on their ability to achieve client-specified outcomes. As Gibbs (1989, p. 215) 
states, ‘interpretivists are best qualified to remedy defects in the present 
conceptualisation of control’. 
 
The next section will outline the various approaches considered for the purposes of this 
study. In doing so, I will provide justification for the use of a multiple case study 
approach for the purposes of the conduct of the empirical examination.  
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3.4 Research Approach 
Research approach refers to ways by which one can go about a research study, and may 
utilise varying research methods (Galliers 1992). Creswell (2007) identified five 
distinctive qualitative research approaches for non-positivist studies; narrative inquiry, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and case studies. In the selection of an 
appropriate research approach, there is a need to assess the characteristics of each 
approach, as each approach has a different focus, target problem, unit of analysis, data 
analysis strategies as well as how the report is to be presented (Creswell 2007). Further, 
it is crucial to consider the nature of the research questions and problem at hand, as well 
as the philosophical assumptions.  
 
I needed an approach that would enable me to identify the set of outsourcing and 
organisational controls established within the case organisation - Genius Technologies 
(GTECH) in order to achieve the research objectives. The overall research strategy is to 
formulate questions that will help uncover the impact of controls on the conduct of 
work, in order to exemplify how individuals exert self-control in spite of contradictions 
and dilemmas at work. This research therefore uses a multiple case study to understand 
the research topic by obtaining first-hand knowledge and subjective accounts from 
personnel in Team ALPHA and Team BETA at GTECH. The following sections 
discuss why the case study approach was chosen rather than another qualitative 
approach.  
3.4.1 Narrative  
Narrative research is the ‘study of the ways humans experience the world’ (Connelly & 
Clandinin 1990, p. 2). Using a narrative approach to research is therefore a way of 
telling the stories of an individual, or a small number of individuals (Creswell 2007). 
Within IS research, narratives have been used to tell stories between organisational 
members and system developers, sharing the ways in which communication occurs and 
the meaning of this communication (Myers 1997). Examples of work that has utilised 
narrative inquiry are Fincham (2002) and Bartis and Mitev (2008) which both 
documented stories of IS implementation in project teams. However, the researcher was 
interested in looking at the phenomenon of outsourcing and how control operates at the 
outsourcing and organisational level.   
3.4.2 Phenomenology 
Similarly the focus of phenomenology does not address the research interest or 
questions since it aims to describe ‘the meaning for several individuals of their lived 
experiences of a concept or a phenomenon’ (Creswell 2007, p. 57). Essentially, 
phenomenology studies aim to understand and describe “what” and “how” experiences 
are like for individuals, whereas this study is interested in how outsourcing is managed.   
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3.4.3 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory study is an approach to theory development (Creswell 2007). It is an 
approach that is utilised if a study is focused on the generation or discovery of a theory 
that is grounded in the views of participants (Strauss & Corbin 1998). Theories can be 
generated through study of ‘a process, action, or interaction among many individuals’ 
(Creswell 2007, p. 78). Grounded theory research is data-driven, and requires the 
researcher to set aside theoretical ideas and notions, and allow the data to speak for 
itself and enable the emergence of substantive theories (Corbin & Strauss 1990).  
 
Within IS, grounded theory approaches have been useful in moving beyond describing 
phenomenon by describing and explaining contexts and processes relating to the item of 
study (Myers 1997). Grounded theory is not selected for this study, as existing empirical 
studies and domain (outsourcing) related concepts have informed investigation of the 
research topic.  
3.4.4 Ethnography 
Ethnography is ‘field research that emphasizes providing a very detailed description of a 
different culture from the viewpoint of an insider in the culture to facilitate 
understanding of it’ (Neuman 2011, p. 381). Ethnography research is used when there 
is a need to learn about, understand, or describe a group of interacting people. 
Ethnography studies have often provided many insights into understanding the sort of 
minutiae that people do not usually take note of and which may be important for 
understanding the intricacies of work. It requires extended periods of immersion in the 
field. 
 
Conventional ethnography studies aims at providing ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973, 
p. 3f) to achieve an innate understanding into a current state of affairs. As noted in 
Chapter Two, this study aimed at understanding the interaction between outsourcing 
and organisation controls, and the limitations of the ability of individuals to attain 
client-specified outcomes.   It was also not feasible to spend a prolonged period in the 
field, both in terms of the time frame of the study and the difficulty of gaining long-
term.    
3.4.5 Case Study 
According to Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987, p. 370), a case study ‘examines a 
phenomenon in its natural setting, employing multiple methods of data collection to 
gather information from one or a few entities (people, groups, or organisations)’.  Miles 
and Huberman (1994) add that a case refers to some form of phenomenon happening 
within a distinct temporally, socially, or physically bounded context. According to 
Merriam (2009), case studies may be particularistic, descriptive and heuristic, as 
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research focuses on a particular event or situation (particularistic), provides a rich 
understanding of phenomenon (descriptive), and enables issues to be highlighted and 
contribute to existing knowledge (heuristic).  
 
The strengths of using case studies, as pointed out by MacNealy (1997) lies in the 
ability to develop key insights and the provision of rich understanding of events, 
situations, behaviours through detailed descriptions owing to the investigation of 
research problems that are not well understood. The richness of the case studies has 
been attributed to its robustness in enabling the utilisation of both qualitative and 
quantitative data in illustration of events, situations in a variety of settings (Yin 2014). 
 
The case study approach is an accepted method in IS research, to explore complex 
phenomenon within organisational settings, such as the implementation of IS in 
organisation (Cresswell, Worth & Sheikh 2012; Hill, Stewart & Ash 2010; Markus 
1983; Myers 1994).  
 
Case study research can be utilised for both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It 
involves studying ‘a bounded system (single-case) or multiple bounded systems 
(multiple cases) over time’ (Creswell 2007, p. 73). In qualitative studies, the data 
collected would be in the form of words and text, including but not limited to 
observations, interviews, audio-visual material, and documents and reports (Yin 2014). 
 
A case can be defined in various ways. There are single and multiple-case designs, 
which can be further distinguished, based on the unit of analysis, into holistic or 
embedded designs (Yin 2014). The primary difference between holistic and embedded 
designs is shown in Figure 3.1 below, which illustrates how the context of the analysis, 
and the phenomenon under investigation determine which design to utilise. In the 
selection of an appropriate case study design, it is useful to consider the boundary and 
intent of the study (Stake 1995). It is also critical to identify the unit of analysis that is 
being examined (Yin 2014). The unit of analysis may be an individual, a program, a 
situation or an event (Yin 2014). According to Yin (2014), such bounding determines 
the scope of the data collection process. Secondly, it distinguishes the data that is 
collected based on context and phenomenon.  
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Figure 3.1: Basic types of case study design 
 
 
An example of a holistic single-case design is Markus (1983) examination of the design, 
development and implementation of an IS in an organisation in the manufacturing 
industry. In this study, the unit of analysis is the IS project, deeming it as the case under 
examination. A single case study, according Yin (2014), must satisfy five criteria. The 
single case study (1) represents the critical test of an existing theory; (2) it represents an 
extreme or unique case; (3) it is representative of a typical case; (4) it serves a revelatory 
purpose where there has not been the opportunity to study the phenomenon in the past; 
(5) or that it serves a longitudinal purpose where the same phenomenon is studied over 
a period of time.  
 
Embedded case design is utilised when there is more than one unit of analysis. Using 
Markus (1983) study as an example, if the study extends to another department with the 
intent to gain an organisation-wide overview of IS project practices, it will then assume 
the form of a single-embedded case design. If examination of IS projects was 
undertaken across different divisions to gain both a departmental and organisation-wide 
view, it will then assume the role of an embedded multiple-case study design. 
Essentially, the primary difference between a single and multiple case studies lies in the 
ability for comparison and investigation of the phenomenon in diverse settings.  
 
The robustness of using a case study approach shows through the various types of case 
studies, that can be used to target difference research problem (Yin 2014).  
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Table 3.1: Types of Case Studies 
Types of Case Studies  Definition Practical Implications 
Exploratory Exploring of situations with 
no clear single set of 
outcomes Markus (1983). 
 
Used as a preliminary step 
to descriptive or 
explanatory case studies in 
order to gain an initial 
understanding of 
phenomenon and validity 
into constructs.  
Case studies need to be 
properly and purposefully 
selected that subscribes to 
a replication logic, where 
similar outcomes can be 
observed in different case 
studies (Baxter & Jack 
2008). 
Descriptive Describing real-life 
occurring phenomenon or 
events. 
Requires strong theory to 
illustrate similarities and 
differences in multiple case 
studies. 
 
Development of rival 
theories or alternate 
scenarios. 
Explanatory Explain causal links in real-
life interventions, i.e. ‘how 
or why some condition 
came to be’ (Yin 2014). 
Show that events occurred 
(why) as a result of other 
mitigating influences (how), 
and that generalisation can 
be achieved 
 
Due consideration led to the adoption of a descriptive, holistic, multiple case study 
approach. This is further justified in the next section.  
3.4.6 Selection of a Case Study Research Approach 
The case study research approach was selected through a consideration of the purposes 
of this study and how a case study approach might facilitate in achieving them. Yin 
(2014, p. 9) recommends the use of case study research approach when a research 
question is concerned in understand “how” and “why” questions, which is reflected in 
the overarching research question developed in this study. 
 
Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987) draw upon Roethlisberger (1977) and Bonoma 
(1983) and recommend the use of case study research approach in two scenarios. Firstly, 
where the research and underlying theory is at the early, formative stages. And secondly, 
where the problem is complex, has implications for practice, and where both the 
experiences and context of action are significant.  
 
Thus, following Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987), a case study approach will 
facilitate research in its early formative stages to understand the complex forces and 
relationships in outsourcing arrangements. Further, as suggested by Walsham (1995) 
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and Walsham (2006), interpretive case studies will facilitate the documentation of a rich  
description of the complex and intertwined structures within the organisation to 
understand connections, make sense of complexities and render them intelligible to 
readers.  
 
A holistic, descriptive multiple-case design was chosen over the single-case design in 
this study. Utilising a multiple case study design will serve to overcome issues of validity, 
reliability and rigour as the research will be considered more robust.   
3.5 Research Design 
Research design can be conceived of as the blueprint of a study (Yin 2014). It refers to 
the process of conducting the research in its entirety, from conceptualising the problem 
to writing up of the results. It also includes the methods, including data collection, 
analysis and report writing (Creswell 2007). As Kvale (1996) points out, the design of 
the study needs to be clear prior to fieldwork as opposed to considering what to do after.  
 
However, scholars have different views about how the case study should be designed. 
For instance, according to Yazan (2015, p. 140), Yin (2014) advocates for a more ‘tight 
and structured’ approach to conducting case study research which is grounded in 
positivism, while Stake (1995) believed that the key consideration in conducting case 
study research should be the issues and research questions that were developed and that 
the research approach can be flexible. Merriam (2009) on the other hand, offers a more 
balanced approach, but leans towards structure while allowing flexibility.  
 
Taking into account the view by Marshall and Rossman (1989, p. 15) that ‘real’ research 
tends to be confusing, incredibly frustrating, often messy and primarily nonlinear, 
reflecting the complexity of the real world. Thus in this study, the data collection, while 
following a structured procedure, also takes into account the need for flexibility and 
unforeseen circumstances that might occur during an interview. Also, data analysis used 
a hybrid of thematic and inductive approach using pre-developed priori codes, while 
also allowing codes to emerge from the data. The procedures undertaken are discussed 
in the following sections accordingly.  
3.5.1 Gaining access to the site 
It is crucial that the site selected will fit the purposes of the study (Neuman 2011), 
including the industry setting and the nature of work activities. The site should also 
make available for investigation ‘a web of social relations, a variety of activities, and 
diverse events over time’ (Neuman 2011, p. 386). Further, the site should be an 
unfamiliar setting, as it will allow the researcher to see cultural events and social 
relations in a new light.   The following will outline how the site was selected and the 
assessment performed in determining the site for the conduct of the study.   
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The site selected for the conduct of the study is a multinational corporation based in the 
technology industry in Victoria, Australia. The organisation is GTECH in this study 
for privacy and confidentiality reasons. GTECH provides a wide range of products and 
services, including but not limited to hardware, software, and maintenance services, 
outsourcing solutions as well as consulting services. The organisation primarily conducts 
business dealings with corporate clients, rather than the consumer market. Based on 
official records and media and academic reports, GTECH has been very successful with 
government and other major IS projects in all of the countries it operates in, as well as 
globally in terms of providing outsourcing services to corporate clients.  
 
There were also pragmatic reasons for approaching GTECH due to a pre-existing 
working relationship between the Senior Manager at GTECH and the Social 
Informatics (SI) Group of the School of Information and Business Analytics (SIBA) at 
Deakin University 2 . This was very helpful since the researcher is an international 
student who has had no business contacts within Victoria, Australia.   
 
Recognising there could be potential bias in the selection of the organisation due to the 
leveraging of the Senior Manager at GTECH, as well as the potential pressure exerted 
on participants recruited, extreme care was taken to ensure participants were not coerced 
into participation (Refer to Section 3.5.8 for an outline on the data collection process). 
To overcome issues with potential site-selection bias, an additional assessment was 
made to ensure the site was appropriate for the purposes of the study, as discussed in the 
following section. 
3.5.2 Site assessment 
To assess whether the site, the nature of the domain and the work activities of the 
participants fit with the intended objectives of the study, a criteria checklist was 
developed as shown Table 3.2 on the next page.  
                                               
2 The researcher is unable to disclose the nature of the working relationship as this might lead to the 
identification of the Senior Manager from GTECH. 
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Table 3.2: Site-Selection Criteria 
Criteria Description Rationale Study Objective 
Industry Preferably 
technological 
organisation 
This study in rooted in the 
discipline of Information 
Systems (IS). Preference is 
thus given to an organisation 
that is based in the 
technology industry.   
Facilitate access to 
understand from 
the perspectives of 
IS professionals the 
type of controls 
within the 
organisation.  
Domain Preferably an 
organisation that 
provides outsourcing 
services, i.e. a vendor, 
or an organisation that 
had outsourced 
existing business 
functions to an 
outsourcing vendor.   
Access to a provider 
organisation will enable 
understanding of how 
controls are exercised by 
clients from the vendor 
perspective. On the other 
hand, access to a client 
organisation will facilitate rich 
insights into specifically how 
controls are exercised as 
well.  
Understand how 
controls are 
exercised in an 
outsourcing 
arrangement, from 
either outsourcer or 
outsourcee 
perspective. 
The type of 
outsourcing 
arrangement 
Any form of 
outsourcing 
arrangement, call 
centre, enterprise 
management, 
applications 
management, business 
process outsourcing or 
infrastructure 
management 
The study is to extend IS 
control framework to an 
outsourcing arrangement. 
Thus any form of outsourcing 
arrangement will be fruitful to 
the examination.  
Extend IS control 
framework to an 
outsourcing 
arrangement.  
Relevant 
personnel 
IS professionals or any 
other members that 
work within the context 
of an outsourcing 
arrangement.  
Specific inclusion of 
Operations members or 
support staff to gain an 
understanding on how 
controls are exercised on the 
work of IS professionals.  
All relevant 
personnel  
 
Two meetings were scheduled with the Senior Manager from GTECH. The first 
meeting sought to gain initial consent, while the second meeting aimed to provide the 
senior manager with an overview of the interview schedule, and conduct a trial interview 
to obtain feedback on the interview questions.  
 
The first face-to-face meeting was organised with the Senior Manager at GTECH 
through email in September 2014, to provide him with a brief on the intended research, 
and obtain initial consent. This meeting was conducted in an informal setting at a café 
near GTECH’s office. After a discussion of the intent of the study by the research 
team, the senior manager expressed consent and very readily proceeded to outline the 
work activities of members he intended to recommend for participation in this study - 
the Strategic Outsourcing arm of GTECH. Members within this functional group are 
responsible for responding to Request for Services (RFS) received from corporate clients 
who have currently outsourced business functions to GTECH. Work activities 
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performed in the team include but are not limited to consulting services, gathering and 
refinement of requirements documented in the RFS, as well as the proposal of solutions 
in the form of Statements of Work (SOW). These members work is time-critical, i.e. 
they have to respond to RFSs, by submitting an SOW to the client within a certain 
number of business days.  
 
Further, it was found during this first meeting that members within the Strategic 
Outsourcing arm of the business frequently collaborate across within and across 
divisional lines to produce the SOW, as well as to make use of existing processes and IS 
in the management of incoming, on-hold and outgoing RFSs. This collaborative nature 
of their work activities as described by the Senior Manager of the organisation, is 
indication of the complex social web necessary for interpretivist analysis.  
 
Since the organisation has had a track record of provision of outsourcing services in the 
over 150 countries in which it operates, an understanding how things work within 
GTECH will serve to enable insights into controls in a large and complex technological 
organisation, and the controls at the outsourcing arrangement. This will facilitate the 
research objective of understanding the interface between outsourcing and organisation 
controls, and identify their limitations and influence on individuals.  
 
Following this meeting, a brief of the study in both Microsoft Word and PowerPoint 
format (Appendix A) was forwarded via email to the Senior Manager for his review. It 
was also agreed between the research team and the senior manager that the study would 
commence in December 2014. From the period between September and December 
2014, the researcher proceeded with the ethics application required for the study to 
commence (see Section 3.10). Following University ethics approval (BL-EC-57-14) in 
November 2014, the senior manager was contacted via email to request participant 
referral. The Plain Language Statement (PLS) (Appendix B) was forwarded to the 
senior manager and a trial interview was conducted with him in order to gain his 
perspective and feedback on the interview questions (Appendix C).  
3.5.3 Development of the Interview Schedule 
The original interview guide (Appendix C) was purposefully designed in order to 
explore the themes identified within the literature review. As a result of the trial 
interview, certain wordings of questions were revised, and the interview guide became 
more targeted towards the work activities of the participants. The revised questions are 
in Table 3.3 below. 
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Table 3.3: Revised Interview Schedule with Targeted Questions 
Theme *Question Purpose of Question 
Introduction Can you tell me about your roles and 
responsibilities in the organisation? 
Understand perceptions of Job titles 
and roles 
How long have you been working in 
organisation? 
A gauge of experience and seniority in 
organisation. 
Have you moved through the organisation 
taking on different roles and 
responsibilities? 
A gauge of how well the participant 
might understand the business, the 
innate workings of the organisation 
Process control 
and the impact 
on work 
Can you recall a smooth situation at work 
where a business process or a system 
actually helped with your work? 
Understand the contrast between a 
well-conceived business process and a 
poorly designed process. 
Can you try to recall a difficult situation at 
work where you feel a certain process or 
a system actually complicates how you 
“get things done”?   
[Meaning you will do things in a different 
way] 
 
How will you improve this process? 
Understand the contrast between 
formal and informal process.   
 
 
Can you try to recall a difficult situation at 
work where you feel a certain process or 
a system actually complicates how you 
“get things done”?   
Understand how work is actually made 
complicated due to enacted procedures 
and processes. 
Performance 
evaluation and 
the impact on 
work 
Can you recall any situations you have 
experienced since you started work at 
[Organisation] in terms of how doing your 
work becomes difficult because of 
different KPIs, goals or interests of team 
members? 
Understand from the perspective of 
employees how they feel about their 
work, in order to draw out examples 
that can illustrate the possible 
disconnect between measurements and 
what he/she does. 
Information 
systems and the 
impact on work 
What systems do you use on a daily 
basis? And what are the difficulties when 
using such systems.  
Understand from the perspective of the 
participant systems that are used, and 
whether there are any difficulties in 
using them. 
 
The interview was chosen as the primary method of data collection to access individuals’ 
perceptions of how they go about their work and how they perceive control. 
 
The next section will outline the sampling strategy for the recruitment of participants. 
3.5.4 Sampling Strategy 
A combination of purposive and snowball sampling strategy was utilized in the 
recruitment of participants. Purposive sampling is defined as sampling for a specific 
purpose and picking a group who fits a profile, while snowball sampling allows 
identification of other participants through a referral process (Neuman 2011). Purposive 
sampling was made in two ways, firstly through assessment of the nature of work 
                                               
* Questions may not be asked in a procedural fashion, but rather slipped in during the conversation to gather participants’ perspectives.   
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performed as detailed in Section 3.5.2 and secondly by requesting the Senior Manager 
to refer participants who had pre-existing collaborative relationships with him.  
 
Further, with regard to the replication logic required for multiple-case design, I also 
requested access to another Senior Manager in charge of a different team (Senior 
Manager B) who were performing similar work activities. Names and contact details of 
five participants were provided to the researcher. As shown in Figure 3.2 on the next 
page, four of the participants (red) frequently interact with the senior manager, while 
one of the five participants occupies a similar role to the senior manager from another 
team. Interviews were then arranged with these initial five participants through phone 
calls and emails. It was anticipated that securing interviews with these five participants 
would assist in obtaining referrals to other potential participants via the “snowball 
sampling” method.   
 
The sampling strategy led to the recruitment of fifteen participants. Nine of the fifteen 
participants belonged to Team ALPHA and formed the first case study (highlighted in 
red in Figure 3.2 below). The remaining six participants formed the second case study, 
referred to as Team BETA (highlighted in blue in Figure 3.2). This clear segregation 
into two cases was made possible due to the difference in the Strategic Outsourcing 
Client that each of the teams service. The nine members in Team ALPHA are 
dedicated to working on RFSs from Client Advanced Energy Corporation (AEC), 
while the six members in Team BETA are dedicated to Client Best National Bank 
(BNB). Pseudonyms are used to protect client confidentiality. 
 
Figure 3.2 on the following page depicts the outcome of the purposive and snowball 
sampling strategy. The representation below does not outline the reporting or 
collaborative relationships between participants; each arrow simply indicates the 
referral(s) obtained through the snowball sampling strategy.  
 
Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
 
 
 
Page 55 of 249 
Figure 3.2: Outcome of purposive and snowball sampling strategy 
 
 
An overview of the two cases is given in the next section. 
3.5.5 The Cases 
 The outsourcing functions at GTECH include but are not limited to applications 
development, helpdesk support, and maintaining of data centre. In this study, two 
teams dedicated to two different strategic outsourcing clients formed the two cases. 
These two cases are represented as Team ALPHA and BETA respectively, and are 
further differentiated by outsourcing functions of each client. As shown in Table 3.4, 
the two clients leveraged on GTECH’s expertise differently therefore requiring 
expertise in different areas.  
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Table 3.4: Differentiation between Team ALPHA and BETA 
Team Strategic 
Outsourcing 
Client 
Outsourced 
Functions 
Division with 
expertise 
Number of 
participants 
recruited 
Total 
for 
each 
team 
ALPHA Advanced 
Energy 
Corporation 
(AEC) 
Applications Applications 
Services Division 
(APPS) 
7 9 
Infrastructure Infrastructure 
Services Division 
(INFRA) 
2 
BETA Best National 
Bank (BNB) 
Infrastructure INFRA 6 6 
 
Team ALPHA is dedicated to serving AEC, and consists of members from two 
divisions from INFRA and APPS respectively due to its applications and infrastructure 
needs. In other words, Team ALPHA is made up of sub-teams. Nine members from 
Team ALPHA were recruited for this study. Team BETA is aligned to BNB and is 
only responsible for the client’s infrastructure needs, and therefore consists of members 
from a single division, i.e. INFRA. Six members from Team BETA were recruited for 
the purposes of this study. All members within each team have pre-existing 
collaborative relationships with one another. More details on the teams can be found in 
Chapter Four.  
3.6 Data Collection Techniques 
This section details the methods for collecting the sources of data for the multiple case 
studies adopted. The advantages of utilising a case study approach lies in the ability to 
collect multiple sources of evidence (Merriam 2009; Stake 1995; Yin 2014). Yin (2014) 
outlines six sources of evidence that can be collected. They include (a) documentation 
such as letters, emails, minutes of meetings, news clippings or articles in the public 
domain; (b) archival records such as organisational records, maps and charts of a place; 
(c) interviews from informants or field notes; (d) direct observations such as 
observations of meetings, work activities, behaviours; (e) participant-observation which 
involves immersion of the researcher within the environment and occupying the role of 
an insider; (f) lastly, physical artefacts such as a device, a tool or a work of art.   
 
The data collected in this study include in-depth interviews with the fifteen 
participants, complemented by field notes taken during interviews, as well as physical 
artefacts that provided insights into the operations and organisation structure of 
GTECH.  Although the team environments were visited, observations were not feasible 
given the time frame and the nature of the organisations’ work (the need to protect 
client confidentiality and proprietary project information). 
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3.6.1 Interviews 
Due to the interpretivist grounding of the study, the main sources of data collected are 
‘in the form of text, written words, phrases, or symbols describing or representing 
people, actions and events in social life’ (Neuman 2006, p. 457). Conversations form the 
basis for human interactions (Kvale 1996). Therefore, in order to understand how 
people think, feel, and learn about their experiences and constructions of reality, 
conversations/interviews will provide the opportunities to uncover rich and complex 
information from individuals. As Punch (2005, p. 168) describes, ‘interviews are… a 
very good way of accessing people’s perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations and 
constructions of reality… one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding 
others’. Interviews are usually the main source of evidence in interpretive case studies 
(Walsham 1995; 2006) as they offer an opportunity to uncover rich and complex 
information from individuals (Neuman 2011). 
 
Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured in nature (Corbin & 
Morse 2003), depending on the amount of control the interviewer will possess during 
the interview, as well as the use of pre-formatted questions.  
 
Structured interviews rely on pre-formatted questions that would be used to guide the 
interviews with pre-set response categories. Implementing this interview model will 
therefore not facilitate the gathering of rich insights from the respondents’ perspectives 
(Punch 2005). On the other hand, unstructured interviews are not controlled by the 
interviewer as no planned structure is predetermined (Punch 2005), and rely on trust 
between the interviewer and interviewee, which cannot usually be gained for a first-time 
meeting (Corbin & Morse 2003). Both structured and highly unstructured interviews 
were therefore not considered appropriate for this study.  
 
Semi-structured interviews, according to Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte (1999), are 
a combination of flexible unstructured interviews with characteristics of structured 
interviews that would attain focused, qualitative data, which makes them an appropriate 
choice for this study. Using a prepared but incomplete script, semi-structured interviews 
will allow improvisation during the interviews, and enable the researcher to ‘delve more 
deeply into the social situation’ (Myers & Newman 2007, p. 12).  
 
However, interviews may not be so straightforward and can be problematic in practice. 
Myers and Newman (2007) caution against conducting the interviews under time 
pressure, implementing elite bias where only certain groups of people are interviewed, 
and the need to understand potential Hawthorne effect which results in changes in 
behaviours of participants during the interview. In addition, it is necessary to cope with 
different behavioural patterns of individuals that may arise during interviews (Myers & 
Newman 2007). Details on how the interviews were conducted can be found in Section 
3.7. 
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3.6.2 Field Notes 
Field notes are typically used as a complementary data collection technique alongside 
interviews. Field notes are essentially accounts describing experiences and observations 
the researcher has made (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw 1995). Field notes may be in the 
form of maps, diagrams, photographs, interviews, tape recordings, video tapes, memos, 
object from the field, notes jotted in the field and detailed notes written away from the 
field (Neuman 2011). Field notes can be used to capture the form and content of verbal 
interactions between participants and with researcher; any non-verbal behaviour; as well 
as patterns of action and non-action (Wilson 1977). Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995) 
encouraged the writing of field notes immediately after leaving the setting, due to the 
ability to recall more details. These field notes are essentially data collected, and 
therefore should be treated with care and confidentiality. The author also suggests that 
pseudonyms be used instead of the real names of participants to protect their 
confidentiality.  
 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) suggested that every observation, however minute, should 
be captured, in spite of how such observations might not make sense at the beginning of 
the data collection process. The underlying reason, according to Latour and Woolgar 
(1979) rests upon how notes taken would start to unravel themselves and begin to make 
sense at a later stage during the data analysis process. Following Latour and Woolgar, 
notes were taken after every interview to jot down any “interesting” or “peculiar” 
incidences as well as memorable comments that were made by participants. In 
particular, I noted reactions of participants that could not be captured on the audio 
recording device. Some examples of this were reported in Chapter Five and Six, where I 
described participants as exhibiting “strong reactions” or speaking in a “concerned tone”. 
I also noted comments or remarks that participants made prior to the interview and 
after the recorder has been turned off. These notes were not coded but facilitated the 
data analysis process, helping the researcher to recall what a certain participant felt 
about issues and challenges encountered, and key impressions of the participant. An 
excerpt of a field note is reproduced below, followed by an explanation as to the purpose 
of jotting field notes in the study. The entirety of this field note can be found in 
Appendix D.  
 
 
Respondent started talking a lot about what he does. He explained he 
moved back here not too long ago. And he preferred seating at the 
client’s site. After the interview started, he commented his single most 
motivating factor at work was to actually bring a project to go-live status, 
meeting customer requirements. And he was able to understand 
customer requirements better if he was seated there. 
In this case, could it be he knew the customer better than he knew his 
fellow colleagues from GTECH? A mixed-identity of where he belongs? 
If the concept of work-identity is placed here to analyse, could it be a 
scenario whereby his motivating factor at work, i.e. to deliver and satisfy 
requirements, may have been reduced due to simply his location – his 
inability to interact with clients on a daily basis. Interaction according to 
Respondent is the key to understanding their requirements better. 
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Could he then be ‘gloomy’ because he has more to talk to customers 
about? As he would have interacted more with them over the years he 
has been with the client.  
 
This point can be further substantiated with what he said later about a 
possible less fulfilling work life if there’re no interactions with others. 
[listen to interview] 
 
As noted in the field note above, I have purposefully documented interesting comments 
and incidents that were perplexing to me. In this instance, the participant was 
particularly interesting, as he had made a comment with regards to how “gloomy” the 
office environment was before the interview started. However, at the time of the 
interview, the weather had just turned warm, and it was an exceptionally beautiful 
spring day.  The comment thus struck me, and was in the back of my head during the 
data collection process. The participant also indicated that the team had moved back to 
GTECH’s office building recently during the time of the interview, and that he 
preferred being seated with the client. As I wrote in paragraph 2 of the field note, 
“could it be he knew the customer better than he knew his fellow colleagues from 
GTECH?” A mixed-identity of where he belongs?” 
 
It was only at a later interview with another participant that these comments did begin 
to unravel, as per Latour and Woolgar (1979)’s suggestion. Apparently, certain 
members of the team used to be seated at the client’s site as part of the outsourcing 
agreement, which facilitated easier communication with clients. This is significant 
during the analysis as it reveals the relationship between team members at ALPHA and 
Client AEC. This finding also ties back in with comments made by other ALPHA 
participants of forging a strong relationship with the client. In relation to control 
theory, this finding aligns with prior studies that have drawn on the social capital 
perspective to illustrate the role of structural ties in building relationship. From another 
perspective, it also helps understand why the participant felt the importance in daily 
correspondence with clients in order to facilitate the requirements gathering process. 
This also further explains why one participant believed that Client AEC had a negative 
impression of the INFRA division, and why she had the ability to try to overcome this 
perception – due to the strong relationship that had been forged. This finding is 
reported in Section 5.5.2 in Chapter Five.  
 
In the next section, I will proceed to discuss the documents or physical artefacts that 
have been collected in this study.  
3.6.3 Artefacts  
Another source of evidence collected in this study is artefacts. According to Yin (2003), 
physical artefacts do not hold much relevance to the case study. However, these 
evidences may become important component of the study. In this study, physical 
artefacts or documents collected include a hand-drawn business process workflow by a 
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participant (Appendix E), and an organisation chart drawn up guided by a participant 
(Appendix F). A RFS template was also provided by one of the participants upon 
request (Refer to Figure 4.2 in Chapter Four for the RFS template). All these artefacts 
have provided important insights into the forms of control within both outsourcing and 
organisation environment, such as the existing organisation structure, existing 
workflow, and are therefore regarded as key pieces of evidence. These physical artefacts 
were also analysed in parallel with the interviews.  
 
Publicly available information available on the Internet in relation to the case 
organisation was also drawn upon to facilitate the development of the case context and 
description. Information such as the organisation’s status as the one of the Fortune 500 
Company, its organisation structure, and mission statement, as well as accreditations 
obtained were used to develop the case context. This finding is reported in Chapter 
Four of this thesis.  
 
The following section will report on the data collection procedures and how each form 
of data documented in this section was collected.  
3.7 Data Collection in Retrospect 
As indicated in Section 3.5.2, a pilot interview was conducted as part of the process for 
gaining access to the site and to refine the interview questions. A total of sixteen semi-
structured interviews (excluding the pilot interview) were conducted with the 
consenting participants. One of the fifteen participants was re-interviewed, as I believed 
the openness of the participant enabled the elicitation of more insights into the 
organisation. Each interview lasted an average of around 50 minutes, excluding 
formalities or time taken to chat, which were not recorded.  
 
Prior to the commencement of each interview, great care was taken in order to ensure 
that the participants knew they were under no obligation to participate in the study, 
even though the implicitly agreed by attending at the agreed time and venue. It was also 
necessary that to ensure they understood the research objectives, as well as their rights as 
a participant. This adheres closely with discussion of ethical issues during the interview 
process, which highlighted that consent must be further sought to counteract any 
potential undue influence and coercion (Kvale 1996). This was also a way to overcome 
potential bias in site selection and participant recruitment. In this study, the initial five 
participants referred to the researcher might feel obligated to participate due to the 
involvement of the Senior Manager. As such, consent was sought again prior to the 
commencement of the interview.  
 
In order to ensure that each participant felt at ease and comfortable with the exchange 
that was about to take place, care was taken to inform them regarding the conduct of 
the researcher and the purpose and topic of discussion. I also highlighted that they were 
free to not answer any questions they felt uncomfortable answering and I pointed out 
the withdrawal and the complaint clauses in the PLS.   
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I took great care to ensure the participants felt comfortable during each interview. I 
maintained eye contact, gave cues and listened to what the participant was saying 
without much interruption. Other strategies employed during the interview were to 
enable the participant to lead the interview at times, sharing with me how they 
experienced the world through their lived experiences at work. This allowed me to form 
a perspective on how “open” the participant was to sharing, and how I tailored my 
interview questions in my mind while I listened. This was done through active listening 
skills, and taking notes in my mind on what the participant was saying, while at the 
same time, finding critical insights that were revealed that would allow me to steer and 
regain control of the interview.  
 
This practice was assisted by my previous corporate sales experiences; where I had to 
speak to Chief Information Officers (CIOs) in global conglomerates to gain insights 
into their strategic initiatives, understand the organisation structure, the influencers 
within the organisation, and the decision-making process. I also had to maintain close 
contact with gatekeepers in organisations, in order to gain insights into competitors’ 
representatives who were competing for business. I personally found this tactic useful to 
gain the trust of people I was interacting with. In other words, each interview can be 
described as a ‘friendly conversation exchange’ (Kvale 1996, p. 112) even though it was a 
method of eliciting information.  
 
Body language as well as tone of voice played a major role in the course of the 
conversation that took place. For instance, a participant in this study was observed to 
lean back and relax his body posture, signifying a welcoming position. My interview 
questions became more direct, as he was open to the questioning, and this shows 
through the interview transcripts. In another interview, the participant was observed to 
be shaking his wrists, after which I assured him before posing my next interview 
question that I only had a couple of questions to go before we ended, and whether he 
had time. There was another interview in which the participant went from giving 
detailed answers to short answers, and I duly complimented him on his efforts in 
providing me with such great perspectives to encourage him further. As a result, the 
participant felt more secure telling me his thoughts about the topics in the study.  
 
Each participant was also briefed on the data analysis process, and provided with an 
estimated timeline of when they would be provided with the results of the study. They 
were assured once again of their privacy and confidentiality, and that their opinions and 
feedback would not be revealed to any third party external to the research team. The 
participant was also debriefed. This debriefing process usually takes place after the 
recorder has been turned off, where the participants are asked if they have any issues or 
concerns with the exchange. This according to Yin (2014, p. 112) may assist in bringing 
to light any issues that participant may have if the recorder was still turned on. In this 
study, one participant retracted a statement that was made, which was duly removed 
from the analysis, and a copy of the transcript was sent to the participant seeking 
confirmation of the statement to be withdrawn.  
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All participants were also asked if they could be further contacted for any other 
questions that may arise as a result of the data analysis. There were no objections noted 
from any participants. Several participants were contacted via email for clarifications, 
and as indicated previously one participant was reinterviewed. These clarification emails 
were included as part of the analysis. 
 
After leaving each setting, I undertook a reflection process to make sense of each 
exchange, jotting down the learning and main takeaways. These jotted notes were then 
typed out, and constituted the field notes mentioned above. Certain micro expressions 
of participants, or observed body language not captured on audio were also duly 
recorded within the field notes (Section 3.5.2). These minute observations may assist in 
forming perspectives during the data analysis at a later stage.  
 
The data analysis strategy is outlined in the next section.  
3.8 Data Analysis 
Bailey (2007) describes data analysis as a multipronged process that involves making 
sense of the data through reduction, examination and interpretation of its meanings and 
significance for the research question. Prior to analysis, data is essentially a ‘bunch of 
words’ that do not reveal any meaning (Bailey 2007). In order to understand the 
meaning of the data, codes described as ‘tags or levels for assigning units of meaning’ 
would be assigned to the ‘descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study’ 
(Miles & Huberman 1994, p. 56). In other words, coding of the data is a process of 
assigning meaningful labels to catalogue data during the process of analysis (Morse & 
Richards 2002).  
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe the analysis of qualitative data as a series of 
sequential activities. According to the authors, it begins with coding of text, recording 
of initial reflections; this will be followed by going through the data to find themes, any 
similarities or differences in data, as well as comparing the findings to existing and new 
data. In this study, the transcribed interviews were studied carefully in parallel with the 
field notes containing reflections noting the learning from each interview. The artefacts 
collected also played a critical role during the analysis and facilitated the recall of details 
during each interview. Through the detailed reading of the data, re-listening to the 
audio recordings of the interview in order to understand and recall the interview setting 
and the tone of voice, alongside with the field notes, initial themes were identified.  
3.8.1 Transcribing the Interviews 
In order to remain close to the data, I chose to transcribe all fifteen interviews myself. 
To facilitate the transcription process, several applications were downloaded and 
evaluated on their functionalities and ease of use. InqScribe was eventually chosen as the 
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transcribing tool, as it offers the functionality of loading of the audio within the 
program, assigning keystrokes that enable pausing and restarting of audio, and allow the 
automatic insertion of a timestamp and the speaker during transcription. As such, the 
simplicity and ease of use of the program creates little to no disruptions to the 
transcription process.  
 
All transcribed interviews were then exported into a Microsoft Word document, and 
saved in accordance to the case and pseudonym assigned to each participant. At this 
point, all interview transcripts and each participant’s associated audio recording, field 
notes as well as other collected artefacts formed the case study database in the form of a 
folder on my computer. The creation of the case study database helps maintain a chain 
of evidence that will increase the reliability of the study Miles and Huberman (1994), as 
it will enable an external researcher to follow how the conclusions were eventually 
derived based on the data collected. 
3.8.2 Data Analysis in Retrospect 
A number of data analysis techniques were considered at the beginning of the study. 
These include grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss 1990), inductive analysis (Thomas 
2006), meaning interpretation (Kvale 1996), and thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 
2006) amongst others. Most of these were discarded early in the investigation of 
analytic methods, as I believed they did not suit the goals of the study and my research 
philosophy.  
 
There were several considerations during the process of choosing a data analysis 
technique. I needed an analysis approach that would facilitate both coding to pre-
developed thematic framework, while at the same time allowing themes and categories 
to emerge from the data. Both thematic and inductive analysis suited the goals of the 
study. According to Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 81), thematic analysis ‘can be a method 
that works both to reflect reality and unpick or unravel the surface of reality’. Thematic 
analysis requires adhering to coding according to pre-developed codes. An inductive 
analysis approach on the other hand would allow the ‘core meanings evident in the text, 
relevant to evaluation of research objectives’ (Thomas 2006, p. 241), deeming it an apt 
method for the study. Fereday and Elimear (2006) had demonstrated the ability to use a 
hybrid of both thematic (theory-driven) and inductive (data-driven) in thematic 
analysis. For the aforementioned reasons, the researcher utilised a hybrid of thematic 
and inductive analysis techniques to fulfil the objectives of the study. That is, while a set 
of codes had been pre-developed based on prior research, the researcher still allows new 
meanings to emerge from the analysis process.  
 
To start the process, a thematic framework was developed in accordance with the 
thematic analysis approach, where codes would be assigned to pre-developed concepts 
identified from the literature review. The thematic framework provided a logical 
approach to sift through the data, while the inductive analysis approach would cater for 
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unexpected discoveries from the data. The thematic framework outlining possible 
discoveries from the data are summarised in Table 3.5 below.  
 
Table 3.5: Thematic Framework 
Dimension Key terms and definitions Potential discoveries based 
on literature 
Outsourcing controls Contractual agreements or 
formal governance 
mechanism: The set of 
agreement agreed upon 
between outsourcer and 
outsourcee at the onset of the 
outsourcing partnership.  
Outcome controls 
! Service level agreements 
(SLAs) (Goo et al. 2009) 
! Penalties for failing SLAs 
(Lioliou et al. 2014) 
! Workshops (Huber et al. 
2013) 
Behaviour controls 
! Provisions for monitoring 
(Lioliou et al. 2014) 
! Provisions for dispute 
resolutions (Lioliou et al. 
2014) 
 
Organisation controls The set of controls at the 
organisational level 
established with the purpose 
of attaining client-specified 
outcomes.  
! Organisation structure 
! Rules, policies and 
procedures 
! Performance evaluation 
! Hierarchical authority 
! Culture of the 
organisation (clan, values 
and symbols) 
 
Clan control Controls that aid the sharing 
of beliefs and common goals 
between client and vendor 
! Relationship between 
client and vendor 
! Limitations of controls 
towards maintenance of 
the clan 
Self-control Individuals self-sanctions and 
self rewards 
! Contests against 
performance 
measurements 
! Self-sanction in 
accordance to 
performance 
measurements 
! Workarounds (any form of 
creativity) 
 
In the initial phase of the analysis, I chose not to use a computer program to aid with 
the analytic process.  I felt I was already close to the data as I had chosen to transcribe 
all interviews myself (Refer Section 3.6.1 for the transcription process). Further, the 
thematic framework (Refer Table 3.5) had been developed prior to the study would aid 
with sorting of data into initial categories based on the high-level control categories. 
However throughout the conduct of the analysis, I felt myself being constantly 
overwhelmed by this process even though there were only sixteen interviews (one re-
Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
 
 
 
Page 65 of 249 
interview), field notes and several physical artefacts (Refer Section 3.6 and 3.7). Firstly, 
even though there was a pre-developed thematic framework to guide the coding 
process, the discovery of the inner workings of the organisation exposed from the data 
led to many options for coding of the data. This became problematic during the 
multiple passes of the data, where I found I could assign several codes to a single 
statement due to the interrelationships between the various levels of control outlined in 
the conceptual framework.  
 
Additionally, the analysis of the data did not begin only after data collection was 
completed, but continued through from the entering into the field through to the end 
of the writing phase. Miles and Huberman (1994) describe data analysis as an iterative 
process, where researchers typically collect, analyse and interpret data simultaneously. I 
therefore found it increasingly impossible to separate the preliminary analysis written in 
the field notes from the data collection and the analysis during the data analysis process. 
I also found myself hindered by the inability to properly organise the data in Microsoft 
Word and Excel, and the inability to capture the evolvement of interpretations also 
added on to the process. It was then decided that I require an organisation tool.  
 
NVivo10 was subsequently adopted in this study to facilitate the analysis. Firstly, its 
license was available within the university, and it was a program that the supervision 
team was familiar with. Additionally, and more significantly, NVivo10 provided me 
with a single repository for the analysis. The visualisation techniques available in 
NVivo10 also enabled the depiction of relationships and linkages between concepts. 
Creswell (2007) also reported significant advantages of adopting NVivo10 over the use 
of manual analysis methods due to the ability to review transcripts in detail and the ease 
in which I could assign multiple codes to a single statement. The adoption of NVivo10 
resolved the challenges in capturing the codes that have been assigned to one statement.  
 
Scholars have pointed out that there are little to no differences in the process by which 
data is analysed using manual methods or programs (Zamawe 2015). This is explained 
by Miles and Huberman (1994) who argued that it is not the computer that interprets 
the text but the person. Gibbs (2004) asserted that using the program still requires him 
to undertake a similar process to the manual analysis method where data is broken down 
through assignment of codes. More detail on the coding process is available in Section 
3.6.3. 
 
Plausible concerns have been raised with regards to how using programs may result in 
distance between the researcher and the data (Bazeley & Jackson 2013; Kelle 1997). 
Concerns have also been raised with regards to how technology may not be the best way 
to proceed with data analysis, but ‘qualitative researchers might start working in this 
manner… because technology makes it easy for them to work this way’ (Seidel 1991, p. 
115). To avoid this issue, Seidel (1991) suggests that computer programs can be treated 
as a repository tool, where ideas are developed, recorded and easily retrievable, rather 
than an analysis tool.  The issues were kept in mind during the analysis process. 
 
The next section will outline the coding process within NVivo10.  
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3.8.3 Coding Using NVivo10 
The imperative to understand how coding should be performed for different research 
approaches in NVivo has been highlighted by Bazeley and Jackson (2013) who 
suggested templates for coding for multiple case studies research approach. The 
template suggested by Creswell (2007, pp. 170-172) that has been adapted for this 
study is reproduced as Figure 3.3 below.  
 
Creswell (2007) suggests that case context and case description should have codes or 
nodes attached to them. This is followed by a within-case theme analysis for each case; 
in this study, Team ALPHA and Team BETA. A cross-case analysis advocated by 
Creswell (2007) which is applicable for multiple case studies would then be performed. 
This step will identify the similarities and differences in the cases. This is followed by 
codes that should reflect assertions and generalisations that arise from the study. 
 
Figure 3.3: Template for Coding of the Data 
 
 
Two Sets were created in Collections, essentially grouping of project items within 
NVivo10. The Collections created contain Sets, with each Set containing the interview 
transcripts and field notes for members belonging to Team ALPHA. The same applies 
to Team BETA. A separate Nodes folder was also created named “People”, which 
further categorises each participant based on their Job Roles – IS Professional or 
Operations, as well as Past Working Experiences. The categorising of participants was 
performed during the data collection phase where it was discovered that there were 
different perceptions about existing structural arrangements between the two categories 
of participants. Turning back to the literature for guidance, I found that this segregation 
needed to be included in the analysis as scholars have suggested that the current way of 
designing and developing caters to developing for the “blunt” end of work activity 
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(operations and administrative work) as opposed to the “sharp” end (where the real 
action happens).  
 
Coding of data in NVivo10 involves the use of nodes. A node can be defined as a 
collection of references about a specific theme, place, person or other area of interest 
Creswell (2007). NVivo10 enables the creation of different types of nodes, such as free 
nodes, parent nodes that contains free nodes, case nodes, relationship nodes and 
matrices. Nodes are created through the coding process, which is similar to the manual 
method of analysis, which requires the reading through of interview transcripts, field 
notes or any other sources collected during the data collection.  
 
Free nodes are typically stand-alone nodes that have no linkages with other nodes. 
These are typically generated when one begins coding within NVivo. Case nodes are 
nodes with attributes, such as participant type, age, occupation and duration in clinical 
practice. These can represent people, institutes, sites or other entities involved in your 
research. Relationships are nodes that define the connection between two project items, 
such as a doctor and nurse, or between two tree nodes, such as symptoms and diagnoses. 
Lastly, matrices are the result of a matrix-coding query and the matrix cells created are 
nodes that can be used to explore and further code on the data. 
3.9 Coding in Retrospect 
The analysis essentially consists of a three-step process, which is outlined in this section. 
The thematic framework outlined in Table 3.5 has provided a summary of the 
mechanisms to be identified at each distinct domain of control. The following sections 
review the steps taken in the analysis procedure. 
3.9.1 Step One: Identifying outsourcing and organisation controls 
With the thematic framework (Table 3.5 and 3.6) guiding the initial coding process, the 
first step consists of identifying and grouping data into either Formal Governance 
Mechanisms or Organisation Controls. These were created as two high-level free 
nodes.  
 
For outsourcing controls, I particularly looked for statements in relation to formal 
governance mechanisms (as outlined in Table 3.5 and 3.6). I began reading each 
interview transcripts and proceeded to code broad passages in nodes, as opposed to 
fragmenting and reducing them statement-by-statement. This addresses the concern 
raised by Kelle (1997) and Bazeley and Jackson (2013) on how distancing of the 
relationship between researcher and data may be established, and that highly 
fragmented and reduction of data may wrench data segments out of context (Seidel 
1991). Creswell (2007) also warns of ‘slicing’ up the data too much within NVivo that 
may lead to less-defined nodes and lead to difficulties in interpretation. Further, this 
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enables better interpretation of the context in which the statement was made. This 
strategy, I believe, allowed me to exercise analytic and reflective skills while reviewing 
nodes and facilitate the interpretation process.  
 
The initial coding also involved the use of text searches. For instance, within the field 
notes, I had noted that a particular participant spoke about certain contractual 
agreement when discussing the relationship with client. I thus search for the particular 
term “threshold” that the participant had articulated during the interview, and saved it 
as a node named [Number of RFSs per month]. This text search query is reproduced in 
Figure 3.4 on the next page.  
 
Figure 3.4: Text search query for “Threshold” in NVivo10 
 
Other text search queries include searching for terms such as “SLA”,  “RFS”, “contract”, 
as the reflection process after every interview led to the identification of common 
themes across all sixteen interviews conducted. Another example of a text search is 
reproduced in Figure 3.5 below.  
 
Figure 3.5: Text search query for “RFS” in NVivo10 
 
NVivo has a tendency to pick up on matching words, for instance, the results after 
searching for service level agreements (SLAs) and its variation of labels such as “service 
level” or “service level agreements” indicated that NVivo10 could pick up on words 
relating to “service” only. As such, the researcher will go through every text search in 
order to uncode irrelevant nodes. This initial coding, involving reading of the transcripts 
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and sorting all statements and passages to their respective categories based on the 
thematic framework led to the identification of a total of twelve governance mechanisms 
across both ALPHA and BETA. These governance mechanisms were then categorised 
into outcome and behaviour controls.  
 
Categorising formal governance mechanisms is based on the participants’ view as to 
what they identify with as outcome control. In this study, the results indicate that SLAs 
served as an outcome control (More details on this result can be found in Chapters 4 to 
6). Identification of clan control followed prior research of identifying socialisation 
events and other instances aimed to promote shared values and beliefs between 
outsourcer and outsourcee. A screenshot of the nodes identified at the outsourcing level 
of analysis is reproduced in Figure 3.6 below. 
 
Figure 3.6: Identified formal governance mechanisms and outsourcing controls  
 
The above steps were repeated when identifying controls at the organisational level of 
analysis. After this broad-brush coding approach, all child nodes (nodes that cater for 
specific topics) within each parent node were then reviewed and analysed. This process 
follows Morse and Richards (2002) proposed analytic strategy of direct interpretation, 
where meanings from data are being extracted and questions are being asked of the data 
to make it meaningful. I continually asked myself questions, including the meaning of 
the data, why would the participant make this statement, what is the learning etc. 
throughout the process. 
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3.9.2 Step Two: Questioning and clarifying the data 
These child nodes were continually revisited throughout the analysis, and revised 
accordingly to reflect the meaning of the statements. For instance, the child node 
processes guides work was eventually changed to processes are institutionalised as the 
meaning of the data was reflected upon. It was eventually changed to processes –
mandatory participation. A continual reflection process was undertaken, and questions 
continually emerged throughout the analysis process.  
 
In order to document all the questions, a codebook was developed to guide the analysis. 
The purpose of the codebook was to provide an outline of each node that was coded 
within NVivo10, including brief definition of the code, a full definition of the code 
(what participants’ beliefs were in relation to controls), as well as examples. Excerpts of 
the codebook are produced in Figure 3.7 and 3.8 below.  
 
Figure 3.7: An excerpt of the codebook in relation to process control 
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Figure 3.8: An excerpt of the codebook in relation to organisation structure  
 
 
For instance, it was noted throughout the analysis that there were varying 
conceptualisations of organisational processes. Participants were discussing processes in 
terms of challenges faced in the use of IS, meetings to attend as well as formal business 
processes. As a result, a separate parent node was created to cater for these varying 
conceptualisations, which led to reviewing the analysis of relevant data. In another 
instance, I wanted to understand how participants describe existing organisational 
processes (rule, policies and procedures) and the terms used. As a result, another parent 
node was created to document this. Examples of these parent nodes created as a result 
of this iterative process is outlined below. Throughout this process, data was fragmented 
further in order to identify linkages and relationships between codes. 
 
   
Parent Nodes Further Development Description 
   
PROCESSES PROCESS - 
CONCEPTUALISATIONS 
Outline the different ways in which 
processes are being understood by 
participants 
 
 PROCESS – TERMS USED Outline the terms used to describe 
existing organisational processes. 
Further categorised into Positive, 
Negative and Neutral terms 
 
 PROCESS - WORKAROUNDS Statements outlining workarounds to 
existing processes  
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The above processes were repeated for all the initial identified parent nodes. At the end 
of this process, there were hundreds of nodes being coded. Each child node was 
revisited in order to ensure the meaning of each node is reflected in the naming of the 
child node. There were many overlapping concepts and nodes, which were further 
segregated based upon the focus of the study. Unused nodes were then coded to a 
parent node named Old Nodes and relevant nodes were retained. This process also 
proved arduous, as cleaning up the codes was required after coding of every transcript. 
The amount of data generated was huge, due to the evolution of my interpretations and 
ongoing investigation of literature in the domain throughout the analysis process.  
3.9.3 Step Three: Development of case context and findings chapters 
At this stage I also began to look through the codes for the case context and description, 
examining the codes in conjunction with the workflow diagram and the organisation 
chart drawn up for me by one of the participants (Refer Section 3.6.3 with regards to 
documents collected). It was at this point where a story began to emerge from the data. 
Recall from Section 3.5.5 that participants from two divisions, namely INFRA and 
APPS, were represented in both cases in this study. The analysis of the data found that 
participants from INFRA in both Team ALPHA and BETA were using the same 
systems, and were subjected to similar workflows within the division. On the other 
hand, participants from APPS did not report using the same systems and processes as 
INFRA. The significance of the organisation structure began to show through the data. 
The results of the analysis of the case context regarding the existing outsourcing and 
organisational controls can be found in Chapter Four, while the findings re participants’ 
views, beliefs and perceptions of controls discussed in Chapters Five and Six.  
 
Owing to the initial segregation of transcripts into Sets (a way of grouping sources 
within NVivo), matrix coding can be performed in order to gain an overall picture of 
the similarities and differences in both cases (Team ALPHA and BETA). To achieve 
this, a matrix-coding query was performed within NVivo10. This query essentially 
presents the codes that have been assigned to statements across both cases in a table 
format. This facilitated an easy overview of the codes that were for example, present in 
Team ALPHA and not BETA.   A systematic comparison was performed section by 
section from Chapters Five and Six, in order to gain insights into any differences 
between the cases. During these procedures, NVivo10 was utilised as a verification tool. 
The result of the cross-case analysis is outlined in Chapter Seven. 
3.10 Ethical Considerations 
All research studies will lead to ethical issues arising as a result of the complexity of 
human relationships and the revealing of viewpoints on potentially sensitive topics. In 
the conduct of this study, issues of informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality and 
protecting and potential harm to the participants were kept in mind. Stringent methods 
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were devised to adhere to the standards maintaining an ethical and morally responsible 
researcher. This section outlines the measures in place.  
 
At the onset of designing the study, I purposefully designed an interview schedule to 
guide each interview I conducted. This interview schedule is designed to elicit answers 
from the participant in with regards to their work, and allow participants to freely 
discuss what was important to them in terms of their daily activities. Targeted questions 
were then asked to direct participants to the control dimensions of the study, which is 
developed based on the literature review conducted in Chapter Two.  
 
Prior to the commencement of the data collection, an ethics application, including the 
PLS (Appendix B), the interview schedule developed (Appendix C) and results of the 
Research Integrity Training, as well as the data collection and analysis methods were 
submitted to Deakin University Ethics Committee for review. Approval was provided 
under the BL-EC 57/14.  As part of the ethical requirements, all participants including 
organisations, the cases under examination in this study as well as the individual 
respondents were de-identified throughout the entirety of the research.  
 
The data collection also followed stringent guidelines, and is documented in Section 
3.5.7. At the beginning and at the end of each interview all participants were referred to 
the withdrawal form attached within the PLS in order to assure them they were entitled 
to withdraw from the study at any time. My personal contact number and email was 
also provided to ensure I could be approached should any issue or concerns arise as a 
result of the study.   
3.11  Judging the Research Approach 
Validity and reliability of the research findings are important in order to contribute to 
the existing knowledge base. Validity relates to the authenticity of the research findings, 
where trustworthiness of the data is deemed to be of utmost importance. What can be 
derived based on the discussion and debate within the literature on the variations of the 
three measures to judge a research design is largely dependent on the epistemological 
assumptions of the researcher.  
 
This study adopted an interpretivist stance on research design enabling the complexities 
of the research to unfold in a real world context. The underlying premise for the study is 
to understand participants’ construction of reality by gaining insights into their 
attitudes, beliefs and experiences. Considering the naturalistic inquiry, the assessment of 
this study is based upon Guba (1990) recommendations for assessing and judging 
interpretive case studies. The four measures are namely, confirmability, credibility, 
transferability and dependability (reliability), and is analysed in accordance with the 
design of this case study.  
 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), credibility refers to the plausibility to the 
audience and people under examination in the study. Guba and Lincoln (1989) viewed 
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this as compatibility between the constructed realities of the respondents and the 
reconstructions enacted by the researcher. To establish credibility in this study, the 
details of the research sites, the demographics of the participants including their job 
scope and responsibilities were included. Sources of the data collected and the period in 
which the research is conducted were discussed in the respective sections in order to 
establish credibility.  
 
Confirmability, which refers to the tracking and judgement of data were also achieved 
through proper documentation of the data analysis procedures, development of 
codebooks and detailed description of codes. The use of the logic model as well as the 
thematic framework served to maintain credibility and uphold confirmability in the data 
analysis procedures. Clarifications that occurred during the interviews and post-
interviews between participants and myself were noted and used to enhance the 
confirmability of the study.  A chain of evidence was also established to facilitate 
changes to the study, or provide support for emerging insights.    
 
Through this proper documentation, dependability is also achieved through tracking of 
changes during the coding process. For instance, proper records were kept of the 
changes in codes and interpretations within the codebook that was developed. As part 
of the coding process, a member of the supervisory team provided independent 
verification of the coding. This member was provided with samples of the de-identified 
transcripts with sections of the text highlighted and were also provided with a list of the 
codes developed. The result of the independent researcher was then compared to the 
principle researcher. Where differences in coding were identified, a discussion the usage 
and meaning of the codes and interpretation of the transcript was carried out.  
 
Transferability refers to the ability for external researchers to apply the findings to other 
contexts. For this study, the demographics, work role, job responsibility and the work 
activities performed were documented. The ways in which processes and IS are utilised 
are also detailed. Further, the context of the organisation, its background, core products 
and services were also well documented. The process by which the case study site was 
selected, and the sampling strategies used were also based on criteria and assessment of 
the feasibility in relation to the research questions asked.  
3.12 Judging the Research Approach 
This chapter has justified the overall research strategy adopted for this study. An 
interpretivist paradigm was selected, since the aim of the study is to understand 
participants’ attitudes, beliefs and experiences regarding structural aspects of the 
organisation, and to obtain a team perspective into how work is performed towards a 
common goal. In doing so, the researcher believe that insights into the intersection 
between work and the structural arrangements of the organisation can be drawn and 
enable significant contribution to the body of control research.  
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To understand the issues, a descriptive, holistic multiple case study was selected, 
considering the need to understand the contrast and causal mechanisms between formal 
and informal controls when conducting work activities. It is imperative to gain insights 
through a descriptive approach in order to understand the complexities of the modern 
organisation and work.  
 
Data was collected through the use of interviews complemented with field notes, and 
artefacts. A hybrid of thematic and inductive analysis was used to analyse the data. A 
thematic framework was developed from the literature review in order to provide 
structure during the data analysis, adhere to the objectives of the study, and ensure 
analysis was conducted in accordance to the research questions asked. The inductive 
approach enabled new themes and insights to emerge from the study. NVivo10 was 
adopted to support the analysis, and the cross-case analysis performed involved the use 
of a systematic comparison of the findings using NVivo10 as a verification tool.  Four 
criteria (credibility, confirmability, transferability and dependability) were utilised to 
judge the trustworthiness of the study.  
 
The next chapter contains an overview of the case organisation GTECH, as well as the 
description of the case and participants. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OVERVIEW OF THE 
ORGANISATION & THE 
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING UNIT  
   
4.1 Overview 
Chapter Three has outlined the interpretivist multiple case study research approach 
adopted to answer the overall research question: 
 
 How might extending IS control framework to an outsourcing 
arrangement contribute to our understanding on how 
outsourcing and organisation controls interface with one 
another to limit the ability for individuals to attain client-
specified outcomes? 
 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the case organisation known as Genius 
Technologies (GTECH) and the specific department – the Strategic Outsourcing Unit 
- selected for this study.  The role of the Business Office in the management of 
incoming Requests for Service (RFS), and the procedures for dispatching the RFS to 
the team responsible for handling the request will be outlined accordingly. The work 
activities performed by members within the Strategic Outsourcing unit after receiving 
RFSs from the Business Office are also explained. Finally the two cases (Teams Alpha 
and Beta) within the outsourcing division, and the fifteen individual participants will be 
introduced.  
4.2 Genius Technologies 
In this section, an overview of case company, i.e. GTECH (pseudonym) is provided. 
The information presented in this section was gathered through a synthesis of 
interviewees’ comments on the organisation, the organisation’s corporate website, and 
publicly available information on the Internet. All references to public information on 
GTECH were intentionally suppressed to protect the identity of the organisation, and 
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prevent the identification of the participants of this study. The information that was 
provided by interviewees in this study will be specified. 
4.2.1 Background of the organisation 
Headquartered in the United States (US), GTECH is an established Fortune 500 
Multinational Corporation based in the technology industry, and has operated in more 
than 150 countries for over five decades. The organisation primarily conducts business 
dealings with corporate clients of different sizes and from a wide range of industry 
sectors. GTECH has a large number of competitors in the industry, and asserts their 
competitive edge through innovative values in the creation of new technological 
products and solutions, and is considered as a trusted service provider through the 
strong ethical conduct of its employees enforced through business conduct trainings and 
guidelines3. Products and service offerings include the sale of infrastructure solutions, 
such as networking equipment, servers, storage; the provision of software applications; 
as well as hosting, outsourcing and consultancy services. 
4.2.2 Mission statement 
The website of GTECH4 outlines its values and mission statement that exhibits a frame 
of reference to guide the decision, actions and behaviours of employees. GTECH’s 
corporate values reads along the line of provision of optimal customer services, building 
long-lasting relationships with clients, as well as being a dedicated and trusted service 
provider to contribute towards the success of its clients.  
4.2.3 Accreditations and wider legislative requirements 
Within the technology industry, GTECH is widely recognised as a trusted and 
excellent service provider. The operational excellence shows through the attainment of a 
level five maturity level under the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 
accreditation in Victoria, Australia and in many other countries in which it operates5. 
The maturity level indicates how well key process areas of an organisation are well 
documented, repeatable, measured and continuously improving (CMMI Institute 
2017). Achieving a level five CMMI accreditation is a suggestion that an organisation is 
focused on continuous performance and innovation, which is beneficial to both internal 
and external stakeholders. In relation to provision of products and services, the 
                                               
3 One participant in this study pointed out the use of business conduct trainings [Donald_BETA].  
4 Reference intentionally suppressed to prevent identification of the organisation and the participants as 
required by the ethics process. 
5 One participant in this study highlighted that GTECH has achieved a level five CMMI accreditation 
[Rachael_ALPHA_APPS].  
 
Chapter Four: Overview of the Organisation  
and the Strategic Outsourcing Unit 
 
 
 
Page 78 of 249 
documented and predictability of processes will for instance, enable defects to be 
reduced early in the software development stage; improve productivity; cost-savings; 
increased predictability and reduced business risk (CMMI Institute 2017).  
 
Additionally, as a publicly listed company on the Securities Exchange Commission in 
the US, GTECH Victoria, Australia is also subjected to wider legislative requirements 
in both countries (Hall & Liedtka 2007). For example, one participant 
([Donald_BETA]) referred to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), a U.S. law that was 
implemented in 2002. Briefly, SOX was enacted as a result of infamous cases of fraud 
due to overinflating of earnings in US in recent decades; including Enron, Tyco, 
Lehman Brothers and Worldcom, which have as a whole shaken investors’ confidence 
(Coates 2007). To counter the low confidence of investors and shareholders, SOX holds 
organisations accountable for their internal controls pertaining to financial reporting, 
corporate governance, and external audit quality (Hall & Liedtka 2007). SOX consists 
of eleven sections that addresses a spectrum of issues such as the establishment of 
accounting and auditing practices, disclosure rules and regulation, corporation 
governance, and criminal penalties (Coates 2007, p. 97).  
 
More significantly, it requires management to annually assess and assert to the 
effectiveness of the organisation’s internal controls and procedures for financial 
reporting (Hall & Liedtka 2007; KPMG 2017). As one participant puts it in his 
discussion of technologies that facilitate financial reporting within GTECH, “[SOX] is 
about business controls, numbers, financials, how the corporation actually operates, and 
the checking of those to make sure that the data is correct and is a fair and true 
representation of the real performance of the company” [Donald_BETA]. This is a 
suggestion of wider institutional requirements that impact financial controls within 
GTECH.  
4.2.4 Scope of GTECH study  
The scope of this study is limited to GTECH’s operations in Victoria, Australia, and 
does not represent operations in any other locations in which the organisation operates. 
For instance, I did not examine the collaboration between the recruited participants and 
their colleagues located in other geographical locations. This is even though several 
participants (three out of fifteen) identified the need for collaboration efforts, such as 
working on debugging applications, or how offshoring operations involve the 
integration of data. The reason for this rests upon the focus of the study, which is to 
examine how outsourcing and organisation controls interface to limit the ability for 
individuals to achieve client-specified outcomes. Nonetheless, this is a potential 
limitation and will be examined in Chapter Eight.  
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4.3 The Strategic Outsourcing unit in GTECH 
Like many large organisations, GTECH currently maintains a matrix organisation 
structure, where employees are managed across different business functions and 
products. It was noted in the literature review (Section 2.2) that organisations 
outsourced business functions for reasons such as improving internal costs, and 
leveraging on vendors’ expertise and technical knowledge (Ghodeswar & Vaidyanathan 
2008; Hall & Liedtka 2007; Hirschheim & Dibbern 2009).  At GTECH, the main 
function of the strategic outsourcing unit is to manage and service corporate clientele, 
who for reasons outside the scope of this study have outsourced their business functions 
to GTECH. Some of the expertise provided by GTECH (identified via the 
organisation’s website and media publications) include but are not limited to helpdesk 
functions, data centre hosting services, business process outsourcing, infrastructure, and 
applications management.  
 
This study focuses on the outsourcing unit within GTECH, which comprises of 
members from divisions with expertise in the provision of key services. Figure 4.1 below 
provides an outline of the structure of the organisation and will point out where the 
outsourcing unit lies. 
 
Figure 4.1: Matrix organisation structure 
 
 
As identified in grey in Figure 4.1 above, the two teams studied consist of staff from 
two divisions, namely Infrastructure Services Division (INFRA) and Applications 
Services Division (APPS). Applications outsourcing is largely a project-based form of 
outsourcing arrangement (Beulen, Van Fenema & Currie 2005), and consists of work 
activities that involve new development, maintenance, enhancement of clients’ 
applications portfolio and can include the transfer of staff to the clients’ site (Gartner 
2017a; 2017b).   
Chapter Four: Overview of the Organisation  
and the Strategic Outsourcing Unit 
 
 
 
Page 80 of 249 
 
In the case of infrastructure outsourcing, the service provider takes on the operation and 
maintenance of the service of client’s technology systems, and is responsible for the 
clients’ communication systems and data centre (Braun & Winter 2005). Examples of 
services include the provision of service desks, data centre, network infrastructure, 
managed security operations or cross-functional services (Accenture 2017), which can 
also involve consultancy work as organisations transform their existing infrastructure 
(Martorelli et al. 2015).  
 
A summary of the services provided and type of work involved in relation to each form 
of outsourcing described above can be found in Table 4.1 below.   
 
Table 4.1: Work activities involved in technology outsourcing arrangements  
Type of technology 
outsourcing 
Services provided/Type of work involved 
Applications 
outsourcing 
• New development of applications 
• Management of packaged applications 
• Offshore programming 
• Ongoing maintenance, management, conversion, enhancement 
of clients’ portfolio of applications. 
• Staff augmentation (where staff is transferred to clients’ location) 
• Can involve consultancy work 
Infrastructure 
outsourcing 
• Management of service desks, data centres, existing network, 
security operations and cross-functional services.  
• Can involve consultancy work 
 
In this study, members from INFRA are engaged in the provision of infrastructure 
outsourcing services, and are responsible for provision of products and services relating 
to infrastructure management, maintenance and support, such as networking 
equipment, servers, and storage etc. APPS, on the other hand, provides application 
outsourcing services, including maintaining clients’ existing applications, providing 
continual enhancement to existing applications, as well as testing and development of 
new functions.  
 
The next section will provide an outline of the two cases, namely ALPHA and BETA, 
describing the clients they service, the services they provide as well as an introduction to 
the nature of the work of outsourcing.  
4.4 Introducing the Cases 
The two teams in this study are named Team ALPHA and BETA respectively, and are 
differentiated by the client they serve. For reasons of confidentiality, aliases are used for 
the client’s name. ALPHA is dedicated to serving Advanced Energy Corporation 
(AEC), and consists of members from INFRA and APPS respectively. In this study, 
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seven members from APPS and two members from INFRA were interviewed from 
ALPHA.  
 
BETA is contracted to Best National Bank (BNB) and is only responsible for the 
client’s infrastructure needs, i.e. all members are from INFRA. Six members from 
BETA were recruited for the purposes of this study.  
 
The aforementioned arrangement of APHA and BETA is depicted in Figure 4.2 
below.  
 
Figure 4.2: Situating ALPHA and BETA within GTECH’s structure 
 
 
The preceding sections will introduce Team ALPHA and BETA respectively. 
4.4.1 Team ALPHA 
AEC (pseudonym) is a private Australian organisation that provides natural gas, 
electricity and water for residential and commercial business throughout Australia. The 
organisation has had a strong outsourcing relationship with GTECH, and has 
outsourced core infrastructure and applications functions to GTECH for close to a 
decade. There are currently several thousand employees within ALPHA based in 
various states in Australia, as well as overseas dedicated to managing and handling work 
requests by stakeholders at AEC. In this study however, the focus is limited to the 
outsourcing unit located in Victoria, Australia.  
 
Nine members from Team ALPHA, two of which are from INFRA and seven from 
APPS were interviewed for this study. All members within Team ALPHA collaborate 
frequently on RFSs sent in by AEC. This is fundamentally a result of the outsourcing 
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relationship, where AEC has outsourced both their infrastructure and applications 
needs to GTECH.  
 
The demographics of the participants are presented in Table 4.2 below, including the 
number of years they have worked in GTECH, their roles and responsibilities and how 
they joined the organisation.  
 
Table 4.2: Demographics of Participants from Team ALPHA 
 Pseudonym Years in 
Org 
Roles & Responsibilities Joined org through… 
IN
FR
A
 
Ed 20 Infrastructure Team Lead Merger + Promotion 
Jason 2 Infrastructure Solutions 
Architect 
External hire.  
(Currently still a contract staff.) 
A
PP
S 
Robert 8 Senior Executive 
 
External hire. Hired into the position.  
 
Keira 5 Program Manager  
 
External hire + promotion 
Patrick 18 Team Leader for Programs 
 
Merger + promotion 
Brad 5 Program Manager 
 
External hire + promotion 
Rachael 13 Project Coordinator Management trainee program + 
promotion 
Leonard 2 Designer/Developer 
 
External hire. 
Geena 7 Pre-Sales Specialist 
 
Merger 
 
As shown in Table 4.2 above, the nine participants have been with GTECH for a 
period of between two to twenty years, and perform different roles in the servicing of 
Client AEC. The following section introduces each participant by describing their roles 
and responsibilities and how they interact with one another. Allocated roles are 
described in the following section. 
4.4.1.1 Details of Participants in Team ALPHA 
Ed, Infrastructure Team Lead has been with GTECH for the past twenty years, and 
has assumed various roles within the organisation. Ed’s current responsibilities as a team 
leader include putting a solution together based on AEC’s requirements. This requires 
him to gather and refine client requirements. Describing himself as a “gatekeeper”, Ed 
ensures all requirements that AEC requests are of “reasonable quality” prior to working 
on the solution.  
 
An infrastructure architect he collaborates with is Jason. Jason’s responsibilities are to 
understand the requirements of Client AEC, and “put in a proposal that meets their 
(client’s) requirements, and help them achieve their requirements by doing the right 
design, the right scope, the right recommendation”.  
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Robert has been with GTECH for the past eight years, and currently occupies the 
position of a Senior Executive within APPS. Robert finds joy and excitement in 
running a team, and equates this to playing football and winning the grand prize as a 
team. Robert is a well-respected member running the team, and an extremely generous 
person. In Robert’s ideal world, GTECH will be “one organisation” where there will be 
no divisions or overly complicated business processes and objectives that may jeopardise 
teamwork. He envisions a team that exists to service the client, where people 
communicate in order ‘get things done’.  
 
Robert’s second in charge is Keira, whose main responsibility is to maintain a 
relationship with AEC, in the hope to “get more work” done on the maintenance of 
AEC’s applications system. This work may relate to enhancements on the existing 
systems, or responding to AEC’s request for new functionalities etc.  
 
According to the organisational chart, Patrick is a team leader who reports to Keira. I 
however learnt that such reporting structures while formally established do not translate 
to real-life, as Patrick and Keira maintain a collaborative relationship. Patrick manages a 
team of designers/developers that works on AEC’s proposed solution once the job gets 
accepted at AEC’s end.  
 
Another person Robert depends on in APPS is Brad. Brad currently occupies a Project 
Manager position with APPS, and joined GTECH from a competitor’s firm. Brad 
shared with me many instances in which he finds over complication of existing business 
processes. His position on KPIs concurs with that of Robert, Keira, and Patrick, and he 
has personally witnessed members of the team being penalised for performance KPIs 
which were largely out of their control.  
 
Rachael joined GTECH fresh out of university and has been in GTECH for the past 
thirteen years. She currently occupies a Project Coordinator role within GTECH, 
tracking availability of project resources, current job statuses, invoicing and maintaining 
an accurate view using Microsoft Excel spread sheets and translating the data into 
PowerPoint presentations for different Executives during the weekly meetings.  
 
Leonard occupies the role of a developer, and was recruited by Robert into GTECH. 
Leonard finds that existing business processes defining how INFRA and APPS 
collaborate, do not necessarily further the interest of the business. The only issue he has 
with existing system is the need to plan his future hours within the timesheet, which he 
sees as a rather long-term view when he prefers to work within a daily plan.  
 
Geena occupies a Request Coordinator role within APPS, and has to interact with 
Leonard to understand the amount of work/effort that goes into a job. Geena will then 
come up with an appropriate pricing proposal for ALPHA to review. Geena takes care 
of the workflow of each job from AEC, and tracks them through the workflow process. 
She can be considered to be the contact point for RFSs coming in through the formal 
process in place.  
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4.4.2 Team BETA 
Members in Team BETA are dedicated to serving BNB, a multinational corporation 
based in the financial industry. BNB has had an outsourcing relationship with GTECH 
for a little over a decade. GTECH is currently responsible for maintaining the 
infrastructure capabilities of BNB. Due to the single business function that has been 
outsourced, BETA therefore only comprised of members from INFRA.  
 
Table 4.3 below presents the participants from INFRA that were interviewed for this 
study. A more detailed overview of participants from BETA can be found in Table 6.1 
in Chapter Six.  
 
Table 4.3: Demographics of Participants from Team BETA 
Pseudonym Years in 
Org 
Roles & Responsibilities Joined organisation through 
Donald 20 Account Executive Merger + promotion 
Kate 17 INFRA Team Manager Internal transfer from an overseas branch + 
promotion 
Dave 4 Solution Specialist Internal transfer from an overseas branch + 
promotion 
Hugh 8 Infrastructure Solutions 
Architect 
External hire. 
Felicity 14.5 Business Performance 
Manager 
External hire + promotion 
Meryl 15 Business Analyst External hire. 
Contract converted to permanent position. 
 
Six members from INFRA, four in Client-Facing positions and two in Operations 
positions are the participants from Team BETA in this study. Two of the four 
members in Client-Facing positions currently occupy a managerial position. Only one 
of the two in the operational role is a manager.  
4.4.2.1 Details of Participants in Team BETA 
Donald has been with GTECH for the past two decades. Donald finds existing 
business processes and collaborating across the “silos” (across divisional lines) has 
contributed to slow customer response, and are impacting existing client relationships. 
Even though Donald sits in the INFRA division as an Account Executive, he has no 
one reporting to him. Donald has since left the organisation due to a worldwide 
restructuring exercise.   
 
Kate joined GTECH at 22 as an external hire in GTECH’s terms. She has worked in 
the United Kingdom branch prior to joining the Australian counterpart. Having worked 
through the ranks, Kate now occupies a managerial position within GTECH, Victoria, 
Australia. Kate observes a “preoccupation with business processes” in the GTECH 
world to the extent that adhering to processes “becomes a job in itself”. Kate alludes to a 
belief that “time-based measurements” on work do not facilitate an environment where 
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quality work can be performed. Both Dave and Hugh report to Kate, while Felicity 
attends the same weekly meeting to go through the status of RFSs.  
 
Dave has been with GTECH Australia for the past three years, and has worked as an 
Infrastructure Solutions Architect before being promoted to the role of a Solution 
Specialist. Dave finds it “extremely frustrating” working within GTECH’s business 
processes, as they have a tendency to “hobble” the architects trying to respond to client 
requests. He feels lucky that he is measured by client satisfaction in his current role, 
which allows him more leeway to provide quality solutions for clients, as that is his 
utmost priority – to solve business problems for clients.  
 
Hugh has had diverse working experience as a baker, a storeman and a sales 
representative. It was a chance encounter that led him into the technology industry. 
Hugh finds it imperative to understand the needs of personnel in other divisions, be 
familiar with the inner workings of other departments in order to get things done. He 
attributes his current mindset to past experiences and “scar tissues” from making waves 
in organisations.  
 
Felicity was a Mathematics and Science teacher before joining GTECH in a business 
performance role. She has now been in GTECH’s employment for close to fifteen 
years, and manages the business performance team. Felicity acknowledges the 
intensiveness of processes within GTECH. From Felicity’s perspective, some processes 
do “go way over the top”, but she understands the need for them. Felicity’s greatest 
concern lies in the use of IS by personnel she requires information from.  
 
Meryl had been in three different roles within GTECH as a contract staff for 11 years 
before being converted to a full-time position. This is her fourth year in a permanent 
role as a Business Analyst. Her current role as a Business Analyst requires her to 
consolidate reports from Infrastructure Solutions Architects, such as Hugh. Meryl often 
encounters different date formats, fonts used, and inaccuracy of data at times when 
reports are received from Client-Facing personnel. She however does not take this 
personally, and will make corrections where she sees fit in order to allow her teammates 
to focus on their work. She enjoys working at GTECH as she feels a sense of belonging 
with the team she currently works with. Both Dave and Hugh report their RFS deals to 
Meryl who will consolidate them accordingly for management reporting purposes. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of GTECH, the case organisation under 
examination in this study. The primary role of the outsourcing unit is to service clients 
who have outsourced business functions to GTECH.  
 
This chapter has also introduced the two cases, namely Team ALPHA and BETA, 
within the Strategic Outsourcing functional unit under examination in this study, which 
are differentiated by the outsourcing clients they serve. Team ALPHA is dedicated to 
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AEC, based in the natural gas and electricity industry that has outsourced both 
infrastructure and applications functions to GTECH. Team BETA, on other hand only 
maintains the infrastructure needs of BNB.  
 
Information on the fifteen participants, including the length of time they have worked 
in GTECH, how they joined the organisation as well as how they achieved their 
current role is outlined in this chapter.  
 
Chapters Five and Six will discuss the results of the analysis of the data collected from 
Team ALPHA and BETA respectively in accordance to the research questions posed.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS FROM TEAM ALPHA 
 
5.1 Overview              
This chapter reports on the findings of the data collected from Team ALPHA. Recall 
from Chapter Four that Team ALPHA consists of nine participants belonging to two 
different divisions, namely Infrastructure Services Division (INFRA) and Applications 
Services Division (APPS). All nine members in this team are dedicated to servicing the 
strategic outsourcing client – Advanced Energy Corporation (AEC). Table 5.1 provides 
a brief summary of participants, as well as their roles and responsibilities within the 
outsourcing team. Team ALPHA is made up of six male and three female participants 
who had been employed at GTECH for a period of between two to twenty years.  
 
This chapter firstly highlights the collaboration between APPS and INFRA, outlining 
the responsibilities of each division, and the ways in which joint collaboration would be 
required (Section 5.2). Secondly, the chapter will present the findings on formal 
governance mechanisms identified at ALPHA, including classification of the 
mechanisms into outcome and behaviour controls (Section 5.3).  Following this, 
findings in relation to controls established at the organisation level will be examined 
(Section 5.4). Subsequently, the findings in relation to how controls can influence the 
clan will be examined (Section 5.5). Finally, the chapter will present findings in relation 
to self-control (Section 5.6).  
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Table 5.1: Summary of participants from ALPHA 
Division Pseudonym M/F Years at 
GTECH 
Role Responsibility Classification Manager 
(Y/N) 
Recruitment 
into GTECH 
INFRA Ed M 20 Solutions 
Architect 
Ensures all requirements that come in 
from clients are sufficiently 
comprehensive for solutioning. 
IS 
professional 
N Merger + 
Promotion 
Jason M 2 Solutions 
Architect 
Understand clients’ requirements and 
provide a proposal/solution based on 
their requirements. 
IS 
professional 
Y External hire.  
(Currently still a 
contract staff.) 
APPS Robert M 8 Account 
Executive 
Manages the APPS division and 
maintains a relationship with the client. 
Maintain a relationship with client to 
bring in more business for GTECH. 
IS 
professional 
N External hire. 
Hired into the 
position.  
 
Keira F 5 Project 
Manager 
Manage the enhancement releases for 
clients’ applications.  Maintain a 
relationship with client to bring in more 
business for GTECH. 
IS 
professional 
N External hire + 
promotion 
Patrick M 18 Team Leader Manage designers and developers and 
the work to-be-delivered to clients. 
IS 
professional 
N External hire + 
promotion 
Brad M 5 Project 
Manager 
Manage a program and individual 
projects within the program.  
IS 
professional 
Y External hire + 
promotion 
Rachael F 13 Project 
Services 
Coordinator 
Supporting Program Managers from 
invoicing and resources management 
perspective. 
Operations N Management 
trainee program + 
promotion 
Leonard M 2 IS developer Designer/Developer 
Develop, design enhancements to 
applications based on ALPHA’s 
requirements. 
IS 
professional 
N External hire 
Geena F 7 Request 
Coordinator 
Coordinate and consolidate proposals 
to be delivered to clients. 
Operations N Merger 
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5.2 Description of the work conducted for AEC 
The aim of this section is to provide a high-level understanding of the nature of work in 
ALPHA. The overall objective of the work activities conducted is to produce a 
Statement of Work (SOW), a proposal that outlines the details of the solution, services 
provided and the cost of the solution. One of the participants described the components 
of the SOW.  
 
 “A SOW is a contract, which has a price in it, and agreement 
that we will provide these services for this much money. It is a 
signed contract, a legal document” [Patrick_APPS]. 
 
 
It is important to note that collaboration between members of INFRA and APPS is key 
to achieving client-specified outcome, i.e. service level agreements (SLAs) (Specificity 
of client outcomes will be discussed in Section 5.3.2). Four out of the nine participants 
outlined the nature of collaboration between members in the two divisions, which 
provided insights into the roles and responsibilities of each division within the 
outsourcing arrangement.  The aforementioned findings will be discussed accordingly to 
provide a picture on the nature of collaboration between members in the two divisions.  
 
One participant explicitly described the working relationship between APPS and 
INFRA, which provided perspective to the various responsibilities of each division. As 
Robert_APPS, the Account Executive puts across the differing nature of the divisions 
and the service provided,  
 
 “Within APPS, we look after all the application-led 
environment. We develop the environment, test 
environment, small environment, big environment 
[with] lots of data, little data, specific data, fast-clock 
environments [of the client].  
 
INFRA takes case the infrastructure, hardware and 
communications only. They look after everything up to 
the operating system, up to and including the operating 
system. That is how it is sort of structured in GTECH” 
[Robert_APPS]. 
 
 
One participant further outlined the three different ways by which collaboration 
between APPS and INFRA will be initiated. One way in which joint effort is required 
is when client submits a request for service (RFS). Another channel by which 
collaboration might occur is through what is referred to as unsolicited proposals (USPs) 
which are essentially proposals for solution(s) clients have not requested, but is initiated 
by members of the vendor organisation.  
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 “The client can submit an RFS, or called Request for 
Service. Or we internally, can submit an unsolicited 
proposal where we, decide that this is a good 
opportunity that the client might want, and we put 
together a solution and quote, and give it to the client 
and say, "you know, we think this is something you 
need." And they may or may not choose to go ahead” 
[Patrick_APPS]. 
 
 
The third way of collaborating is through internal contracts, i.e. the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) established between APPS and INFRA.   One interviewee, in 
his discussion of previous projects, related that the responsibility of INFRA was to build 
technical products that will interface with existing applications at Client AEC. Another 
respondent stated that partnership between APPS and INFRA can occur when “part of 
the application project is to put a server in” [that supports the functionality of the 
application [Keira_APPS]. A third participant further corroborated the collaborative 
nature as well as roles and responsibilities of each division, where “customer might want 
a server with an application on it” [Patrick_APPS].  
 
One of the nine interviewees also discussed more complex projects that can involve 
third party vendors with specialisation in certain technical infrastructure or equipment. 
Citing an example of requiring the need for a new firewall port, Patrick_APPS 
described how he had to engage members at INFRA, who will then engage third-party 
providers with a speciality in that solution. Additionally, there was also a need to 
understand the network design and components in order to develop the solution in the 
form of a Statement of Work that meets AEC’s requirements and expectations. 
However, the focus in this study is to examine collaboration within the vendor 
organisation and the form of controls in place to achieve client-specified outcomes. 
Examining the working relationship between members at ALPHA, GTECH and 
third-party vendors will thus be outside the scope of the study.  
5.2.1 Section Summary 
The findings discussed in this section have outlined the collaborative nature between 
APPS and INFRA, exemplifying why collaboration is needed as part of the outsourcing 
arrangement by depicting how the different components each division is in charge of. 
The findings have also outlined the different ways whereby collaboration can occur 
between APPS and INFRA. To summarise, firstly, collaboration may occur when 
clients’ requirements documented within the RFS require both application and 
infrastructure. Secondly, through the use of USPs where the team proposed innovative 
solutions that the client has not requested for. Thirdly, collaboration can occur when 
there is a need as part of applications project for a technical component (infrastructure) 
that supports the application. It was also found that participants might need to 
collaborate with third party vendors. However, this was not examined specifically due to 
the scope of the study. Nonetheless, this section has established how APPS and INFRA 
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work in conjunction to provide application and infrastructure services to support the 
outsourcing client.  
 
The focus of the next section is to present findings in relation to respondents’ views of 
the in relation to the outsourcing arrangement between the client and vendor.  
5.3 Formal controls 
A total of twelve formal governance mechanisms were identified at ALPHA, which 
were further categorised into outcome or behavioural control. Table 5.2 below 
summarises the identified governance mechanisms, a brief description of each 
mechanism, and classification into outcome or behaviour controls, as well as the number 
of participants who discussed the specific mechanism.  
 
Table 5.2: Outsourcing controls identified at ALPHA  
Formal 
governance 
mechanisms 
Description of mechanism based on 
participants’’ interview transcripts 
Number of 
instances 
(out of 9) 
Classification 
1. Contractual 
details 
Miscellaneous contractual clauses, terms 
and conditions.  
1 
INFRA: 0 
APPS: 1 
Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
2. Business 
Office  
Functions as the “bridge” between 
outsourcer and outsourcee, which manage 
all incoming request for services (RFSs), 
and dispatch the requests electronically via 
systems in place to the respective 
outsourcing team.  
3 
INFRA: 1 
APPS: 2 
 
Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
3. Request for 
service 
document 
A document initiated by the client that is 
used to communicate to the outsourcing 
team through specifying the background of 
the business problem, requirements, 
complexity of the requirements, as well as 
other pertinent information such as the 
contact details of the requestor.  
4 
INFRA: 2 
APPS: 2 
 
 
Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
4. Procedures 
for receiving 
RFSs 
Participants’ description of how RFSs are 
received. 
2 
APPS: 2 
 
Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
5. Service level 
agreement 
with different 
levels of 
complexities 
The number of days required to turnaround 
a request for service that corresponds to 
different levels of complexities. 
6 
INFRA: 2 
APPS: 4 
 
Specification 
of the days 
5 
INFRA: 2 
APPS: 3 
Outcome 
control 
6. Penalties for 
failing service 
levels 
Financial penalties payable to outsourcee 
(client) should service levels not be met.  
2 
INFRA: 1 
APPS: 1 
Outcome 
control 
7. Requirements 
assessment 
The process following the receipt of RFSs 
that primarily aimed at clarification of 
requirements sent through from Client AEC.   
2 
INFRA: 1 
APPS: 1 
Behaviour 
control 
8. Procedures Procedures for resolving disputes and 1 Behaviour 
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for escalation 
and dispute 
resolutions 
managing of situations. INFRA: 1 
APPS: 0 
control  
9. Procedures 
for extension 
of SLAs 
Procedures for extension of SLAs when 
need arises. 
2 
INFRA: 1 
APPS: 1 
Behaviour 
control 
10. Consulting 
workshops 
Initiated by members within client or vendor 
team that aims to understand and propose 
solutions to business problems. Includes 
clarification of requirements, understanding 
of requirements, or generation of 
requirements. 
4 
INFRA: 2 
APPS: 2 
 
Behaviour 
control 
11. Frequency of 
monitoring 
and review 
Meetings that are used to monitor vendors’ 
performance against pre-specified 
standards.  
2 
INFRA: 1 
APPS: 1 
 
Behaviour 
control 
12. System for 
management 
of RFSs 
Specification of the type of systems in place 
between Business Office and client. 
2 
INFRA: 1 
APPS: 1 
 
Outcome 
control 
 
Behaviour 
control 
 
The following sections discuss the findings presented within Table 5.2; formal 
governance mechanisms will be discussed followed by the findings on outcome controls 
and then behaviour controls.  
5.3.1 Formal governance mechanisms 
As indicated above, twelve formal governance mechanisms were identified based on the 
data. Three of them were classified as contractual clauses that were not drawn upon by 
client to (1) effect control over clients; (2) specification of desired outcomes; as well as 
(3) influence the behaviour of individuals with the outsourcing arrangements. They thus 
remain as contractual clauses that, based on participants’ comments, were not 
considered as being drawn upon during the duration of the outsourcing.  
5.3.1.1 Contractual details 
One participant [Robert_APPS] in his discussion of the contractual relationship 
between Client AEC and the team pointed to a threshold written into the contract that 
the team should not be handling more than twenty RFSs on a monthly basis. However, 
due to progress in the working relationship over the years, Robert_APPS estimated that 
the team is turning around between thirty to forty RFSs monthly, which have led to a 
strain in the process of developing solutions.  
 
However, this specific contractual clause does not directly influence the work of 
members within the outsourcing arrangement. Consistent with existing research, it thus 
remains as a formal governance mechanism.  
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5.3.1.2 Business Office 
Three of the nine participants related the presence of a Business Office, with one 
participant [Patrick_APPS] describing that this unit functions as a vendor management 
office established for outsourcing governance. For two of the three participants that are 
from APPS [Patrick_APPS and Geena_APPS], the discussion around the business 
office revolves around how RFSs are received and the subsequent procedures. The 
remaining participant [Ed_INFRA] added to this discussion by briefly discussing 
procedures established within the business office that prevents employees from altering 
data and information.  
5.3.1.3 Request for service document 
Four out of the nine participants indicated the use of a request for service (RFS) 
document (Refer Table 5.3 for representative quotes). Two out of the nine participants 
related that the RFS document served as the primary means by which requirements are 
communicated to members within APPS. As part of the contract, one of the 
interviewees indicated that responding to RFSs or proposing solutions through 
unsolicited proposals (Refer Section 5.2) formed the backbone of how services are 
provided to Client AEC. As part of the data collection process, the RFS template 
Microsoft Word document collected from a respondent provided further perspective on 
the fields that clients are required to fill in with details prior to sending them through to 
the Business Office. Figure 5.1 below presents the layout of the anonymised RFS 
template. As evident from the template, clients will need to select the form of services 
required. Members within the client organisation are also required to indicate the 
complexity level and the urgency of the request. The requestor also has to input their 
contact information, followed by a description of the services required.  
 
Figure 5.1: Request for Service 
Template 
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Table 5.3: Representative interview quotes on RFS 
Division Pseudonym Representative interview quotes on RFS 
INFRA Ed “For my role at the front end, it's pretty simple. It is the Word document that 
comes through from the customer that outline their RFS, initial RFS 
requirements” 
Jason “My responsibility is to interact with the customer, understand their 
requirements. Their requirements as part of the RFS (Request for Services) 
processes, or for services. And to put a proposal through that meets their 
requirements, and help them to achieve their requirements by doing the right 
design, the right scope, the right recommendation.” 
APPS Robert “We have received RFSs, or we have created a proposal back to AEC… close 
to 120 for the year, which form the backbone of our commercial mileage”. 
Keira  
Patrick “The client can submit an RFS, or called Request for Service.” 
Brad - 
Rachael - 
Leonard  
Geena  
 
A small number of participants further described how, as part of the governance 
process, the RFS document gets sent through to the Business Office (Section 5.3.1.2), 
which provide perspective to how RFSs are received from INFRA or APPS. This will 
be examined in the following section. 
5.3.1.4 Procedures for receiving RFSs 
Two out of the nine participants described the mechanics by which the governance 
details operate at a high-level, i.e. how it gets sent through to the Business Office and 
how they are dispatched electronically to either APPS or INFRA via ReqMgmtSystem 
in place. One interviewee described,  
 
 “The Business Office reviews those RFS. They look at it, and 
they just make a decision on whether it is Infrastructure or an 
Applications request. If it is an infrastructure request, it goes 
to INFRA. If it is applications, then it goes to APPS.  It can 
also be a combination of both. For example, clients might 
want a server with an app on it” [Patrick_APPS]. 
 
 
There are conflicting viewpoints with regards to how RFSs are received. For instance, 
Geena_APPS, the Request Coordinator who is the main contact point for receiving 
RFSs indicated that she had no access to the ReqMgmtSystem and she frequently 
receives RFSs via email from the Business Office.  
 
 “I use a different system from our Business Office. Our 
Business Office uses ReqMgmtSystem. So I don't have access 
to that. This is just different system. At INFRA, they use the 
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same system as Business Office. Our request comes by email 
anyway” [Geena_APPS]. 
 
On the other hand, email verifications sent to Robert APPS highlight that APPS do 
receive RFSs via the ReqMgmtSystem in place. This might be attributed to an access 
issue due to job role. In spite of conflicting statements with regards to the channels by 
which RFSs are received, it is without a doubt that RFSs would be received by APPS 
and INFRA that might or might not require collaboration.  
 
A synthesis of the aforementioned formal governance mechanisms suggest that they are 
part of the governance process and depict at a high-level the procedures by which RFSs 
should be sent through to APPS and INFRA. The next section will present the findings 
on the identified outcome controls. 
5.3.2 Outcome controls 
As indicated in Table 5.2, respondents identified that they were performing to SLAs 
and that there would be financial penalties payable to Client AEC should the SLAs not 
be met. In accordance with prior literature, these were classified under outcome 
controls, and will be discussed in this section.  
5.3.2.1 Service level agreement 
Seven of the nine participants explicitly pointed out the presence of SLAs that set a 
time-limitation to respond to the client upon receipt of request for service (RFS). Five 
of the seven participants explicitly indicated the number of days. The seven participants 
were however discussing SLAs in differing contexts. Both participants from INFRA 
pointed out that the purpose of SLAs was to ensure IS professionals “[will not be able 
to] take as long as [they want]” [Ed_INFRA]. A second participant expressed the view 
that SLAs were in place to “see that the seller is performing, is immediately reacting to 
the requirement, and trying to achieve their requirement as soon as possible” 
[Jason_INFRA].  
 
Three of the participants from APPS discussed SLAs as simply a matter of fact of the 
need to turn around an RFS within a certain number of days. For the sixth participant 
[Leonard_APPS], SLAs were merely commented on when the researcher queried 
whether time-based limitations might influence his work activities. The last participant 
brought up the risks of failing SLAs due to potential collaboration difficulties 
[Robert_APPS]. The above discussion is summarised in Table 5.4 below.  
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Table 5.4: Representative interview quotes on service levels at ALPHA 
Division Pseudonym Representative interview quotes on service level agreements (SLAs) 
INFRA Ed “Service levels are different on different accounts. But they're there to keep us, 
from the client's point of view… Having no service levels, [clients] just feel that 
we can take as long as we want.  
Jason “It is our responsibility as part of our SLAs to try to go with, work with them, try 
to understand their complete requirements, ask them to provide whatever 
questions or requirements that we don't know or we have questions about. And 
then from there, start [to come up with a solution for the client].” 
APPS Robert “If we miss the SLA, because we have to go to INFRA. So not only do we have 
to say "here's a piece of work we'll like you to do as part of our piece of work". 
But before we submit the proposal back to the customer, we have to put an 
agreement in place with INFRA that will do the work at this price, this is the 
scope.” 
Keira “We have to get Statement of Works out to the client within certain SLAs, 
certain service level agreement” 
Patrick “We actually have a certain number of days turnaround time for this process.” 
Brad - 
Rachael - 
Leonard Mentioned, but discussing in the context of performance measurements. Not 
judged by SLAs. 
Geena “Our constraint… is that we've got an SLA, we've got to try, we've got to get the 
work done within a certain number of days.” 
 
It also emerged from a synthesis of the data re the “the number of days”, that there are 
three different service levels6 that correspond to different complexity of the requests. As 
depicted in Table 5.5 below, the SLA for a request with medium level of complexity 
will be 14 days, while a RFS with high complexity will be 21 days.  
 
Table 5.5: Service level agreements between ALPHA and Client AEC 
Service level agreements 
Level of complexity Low Medium High 
Number of days (SLAs) 7 14 21 
 
What also emerged from the data is that the specification of SLAs is not determined by 
the IS professionals within ALPHA. Instead, the level of complexities is determined by 
members at Client AEC based on their assessment of how complicated the solution 
might be (Refer Figure 5.1). The sole participant who discussed this procedure was in 
charge of managing incoming RFSs at APPS [Geena_APPS]. She highlighted that the 
“clock” starts ticking after members at the business office referenced the complexity level 
specified by the client, and input it into the system. This triggers the SLA and sets the 
time-limitation on each request. This procedure gives suggests how clients exercise 
outcome control from a distance in a long-term outsourcing arrangement.  
 
                                               
6 The service levels have been intentionally altered in order to ensure that ALPHA team, and its members 
cannot be identified. 
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Service levels, as an outcome control is made apparent through participants’ viewpoints 
on how they were pressured for time. Two out of the nine participants identified that 
SLAs were the main driver behind their work. Comments by the first participant 
suggest the importance of achieving the SLAs. As the interviewee shared, “because we 
only have a certain number of days to respond, we need to make sure that anything that 
is given to us allows us to hit the ground running straight away, with minimal 
clarification, and be able to go and quote [Ed_INFRA]”. SLAs directly determine the 
amount of time and effort one can put into provision of a quality solution, as the 
interviewee continued,  
 
 “The double edged sword is if the service level that’s too 
short, then you get exactly the amount of effort that is 
allowed within the timeframe” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
The second respondent differentiated between the time and effort for a simple and a 
complex request. For Jason_INFRA, a simple request “can be solutioned in one hour, or 
in no time”, whereas a complex request on the other hand “will require a lot of time to 
understand the requirement in order to come up with a solution”. For the participant, 
complex requests, for the architects to perform to the best of their ability to come up 
with a solution that works, require the understanding of the clients’ “pain points”, the 
business case, as well as the members of the business members from whom the requests 
came. As a result of the SLAs, architects is driven and constrained by the time-
limitation, and instead of providing an optimal “best, effective solution”, the focus is on 
coming up with a solution to achieve SLAs. Jason_INFRA described the challenges of 
achieving the SLAs, 
 
 “So in these 14 days, you will have to quote, trying to 
understand their requirements and even before that, 
understand the business case. Why are you asking for 
such requirements? Ensure that the requirements are 
complete, and maybe work with the customer to 
complete it. And if it is not clear, try to make it clear - 
the requirements. And then after that, you can start 
understanding what solution is required, and then you 
then can start working on a proposal.  
 
There are multiple of people that can influence the 
requirement, so you need to interact with the different 
levels. You need to understand the organisation, the 
decision hierarchy within the organisation and see who 
are the people who influence the specific RFS, and try 
to meet them and gather their requirements from them 
to make the requirements complete, and try to come up 
with best solution that fit also the different level of 
people in the organisation. So, two weeks might be 
challenging as I have stated” [Jason_INFRA].  
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5.3.2.2 Financial penalties 
Two of the nine participants highlighted the potential financial penalties payable to 
Client AEC should SLAs not be met.   Representative interview quotes on financial 
penalties are given in Table 5.6 below. Following this, the findings will be discussed. 
 
Table 5.6: Representative interview quotes on financial penalties at ALPHA 
Division Pseudonym Representative interview quotes reflecting financial penalties 
INFRA Ed “[We have to] make sure we don't fail the service level… you know if they fail 
service level and we end up failing service levels for the month, because we 
miss that one or two deal, you know, [management are] not very happy 
[because we need to pay a fine]”. 
Jason - 
APPS Robert - 
Keira “We have to get Statement of Works out to the client within certain SLAs, 
certain service level agreement. If one of the approver isn't there, sick for the 
day or something like that, then we don't get out on time. We get a fine you 
know.” 
Patrick - 
Brad - 
Rachael - 
Leonard - 
Geena - 
 
One participant [Keira_APPS] spoke in a concerned tone when she explicitly pointed 
out the consequences of failing to achieve the time-based measurement agreed upon at 
the contractual level, stating “we get a fine you know. Another participant 
[Ed_INFRA] did not explicitly state financial penalties but hinted that management 
will “not [be] very happy” should SLAs not be met.   However, none of the participants 
indicated the amount of penalties that will be payable. 
5.3.3 Behaviour controls 
This section reports on the findings on behaviour controls. Identified behaviour controls 
include (1) requirements assessment; (2) provisions for extensions; (3) provisions for 
dispute resolutions; (4) consulting workshops; and (5) frequency of monitoring and 
review. They will be discussed accordingly. 
5.3.3.1 Requirements assessment 
Review of requirements is part of the workflow following the receipt of RFSs received 
electronically via the Business Office. Two out of the nine participants, one from 
INFRA and the other from APPS provided insights as to how the requirements 
assessment works.    
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As one participant from INFRA described,  
 
 “We receive the RFS, and the RFS is sent to either APPS or 
INFRA. And both divisions work similarly, where we will 
perform a review of requirements just to assess the 
requirements” [Patrick_APPS]. 
 
 
Another participant reiterated the same point when describing his role as a gatekeeper 
of requirements that is received.  
 
 “My role at the front end is pretty simple. It is a Word 
document that comes through from the customer that 
outlines their RFS, initial RFS requirements. I am pretty 
much a gate. I will make sure the information that comes 
through to the team is, hopefully, within the constraints of 
time and everything, are of reasonable quality, so that they 
can go and produce a proposal” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
However, four participants highlighted that requirements documented within the RFS 
document are usually not clear. One participant [Ed_INFRA] indicated that 
requirements are frequently in the form of “one-liners” or written in “big, long flowing 
literary paragraphs” which adds on to the challenge of understand what the client wants. 
The remaining three interviewees (Jason_INFRA, Patrick_APPS and Geena_APPS) 
were all in agreement with regards to the issue of unclear requirements. One of the four 
respondents further indicated of the need to go through recursive rounds of 
requirements clarification with members at the client organisation in order to achieve a 
common ground, and enable the team to move forward with coming up with a 
technological solution. This interviewee, Patrick_APPS also provided perspective on 
this issue. As he described,  
 
 “If they have a very clear business requirement document, 
and it is all very clear, then we can just do a requirements 
assessment and move on. If there is some ambiguity, or 
when it is a clarification, which is usually the case, then we 
actually send emails back and forwards. Or we would 
actually sit down like this (referring to me and him), and ask 
"what are you really after?", "what do you really want?" So it 
really depends” [Patrick_INFRA]. (emphasis added) 
 
 
Analysis of the participants’ insights shows that requirements assessment influences and 
directs the behaviours of individuals who have had to participate in this process. It 
forms part of the workflow and guides individuals on what activities should be 
conducted after receiving RFSs from clients. There is thus strong evidence to classify 
requirements assessment as a behaviour control.  
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5.3.3.2 Provisions for extensions  
Provisions for extensions to SLAs, as part of the contractual agreement, can be drawn 
upon by IS professionals to “stop the clock” to request for more time. There are also 
procedures for extension of SLAs in situations when the IS professionals, based on their 
professional judgement and assessment of the requirements, deemed that a request is 
more complex than what the client has perceived it to be. One of the two participants 
related,  
 
 “In our current contract, we have to mount the case, 
[explain to the client that] you know, for these reasons, 
we require more time because you have not given us good 
quality requirements, and we spend a lot of time 
validating requirements. We will need the time extended 
by this amount” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
This will be discussed in the following section. 
5.3.3.3 Provisions for dispute resolutions 
Provisions for dispute resolutions are drawn upon in instances when clients do not grant 
extensions to RFSs. Only one out of the nine participants at ALPHA highlighted the 
dispute resolution process. Remarking that the power is with the client (as indicated 
previously), Ed_INFRA described past situations where extensions were not granted, 
which resulted in the need to rely on provisions for dispute resolutions in order to be 
relieved from potential failure to meet SLAs. The participant highlighted how a “solid 
case” must be made for why there was a need to extend the time on RFSs, and further 
identified that a typical reason for seeking extensions is to clarify the requirements.   
 
 “We have to make sure that we have got a solid case. So 
we talk to our Project Executive, Deputy Project 
Executive, and our Project Director that we are at risk of 
failing the service level. We think we got a really good 
case for extending it, and customer does not want to 
extend it. We then take it through the vendor 
management in escalation, and then the account brings it 
up it the commercial forms.  
 
It may end up that we fail the service levels because the 
agreement has not been met, but tabled in certain forms 
that there is a dispute… and we get relieved from that 
failure” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
Even though only one out of the nine participants discussed how provisions for disputes 
can be drawn upon, the above analysis indicates a certain procedure that must be 
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followed by members of the vendor organisation should a dispute arise. Thus, provisions 
for disputes can be classified as a form of behaviour control mechanism, as it directly 
guides the actions and behaviours of individuals.  
5.3.3.4 Consulting workshops 
Three out of the nine participants related the need to provide consultancy services as 
part of the contractual agreement. This is only applicable in situations where 
stakeholders within the client organisation might decide to tap into the technical 
knowledge and experience of members from ALPHA to explore certain business 
solutions. Clients may also request what is referred to as an Order of Magnitude 
(OOM), which is essentially a consulting workshop, where the client’s objective is to 
gain an estimation of the costs with regards to a certain business idea they would like to 
explore. One interviewee explained this process,  
 
 “The client might want to do something consulting with 
us, they want to have a workshop to talk about a certain 
idea or a certain piece of work. They may also request us 
to perform an OOM, which is probably a quicker 
process as all the client wants to obtain is a ballpark 
figure of the solution, and how it fits within their 
budget” [Patrick_APPS].  
 
5.3.3.5 Frequency of monitoring and review 
Two out of the nine participants (one from APPS and the other from INFRA) 
identified the need for daily review meetings, where reports would be generated on a 
daily basis from ReqMgmtSystem. A participant from INFRA mentioned the need to 
update the status of RFSs within the ReqMgmtSystem, and further highlighted how 
management reports were being extracted from systems for tracking of SLAs. As he 
related,  
 
 “We have a daily review within the team to go through 
what is due in the next 7 days, how we are managing our 
dates and things like that” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
Email verifications with Robert_APPS indicate that RFSs are similarly tracked on a 
daily basis with members at APPS. Members within APPS would have to update 
statuses of RFSs within ReqMgmtSystem on a daily basis. Subsequently, a consolidated 
report would be sent electronically to Client AEC.  
 
At INFRA, a review meeting is also scheduled with clients on a weekly basis to review 
all RFSs that are currently work-in-progress.  
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 “So I have a weekly meeting with the client where we go 
through all the solutions that are on our plate. The 
purpose of this forum is to prioritise them. In many 
cases, we get a whole lot of requests that are all marked 
as high priority. So we have this forum where we go 
through them requests to understand which requests are 
really high priority, and decide whether resources should 
be dedicated to this request or another request. So we go 
through that, and at the end, we come up with what is 
actually the client's priority at the end” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
Referring to the RFS template (Figure 5.1), the above finding indicates that clients 
would be able to indicate a request as being of low complexity (7 days turnaround time) 
and marked as high urgency. This suggests that members within INFRA or APPS 
would have to consider the urgency when responding to RFSs, even though complexity 
dictates the service levels associated with each request.  
5.3.4 Information systems as outcome and behaviour control 
Two out of the nine participants identified the Request Management System 
(ReqMgmtSystem) as the primary vehicle by which requests are received from clients. 
Ed_INFRA stated as a matter of fact how requests “goes on the system that is called 
ReqMgmtSystem”, while Geena_APPS related that “requests have to be registered at 
ReqMgmtSystem”. The researcher was directed to the Business Performance Analyst 
for APPS for further enquiries regarding ReqMgmtSystem and SLAs. The analyst 
confirmed the above. (The Business Performance Analyst was not further contacted for 
interview in this study as the data collection period has ended).  
 
Three out of the nine participants at ALPHA related the tracking functionalities of 
ReqMgmtSystem. One respondent highlighted how the system function as an outcome 
control in that “the clock starts ticking as soon as the team receives a request from the 
client [E_INFRA].” The interviewee further related that the system is relied on for 
tracking of outcomes on a daily basis, where he remarked that the “ReqMgmtSystem 
reports on how we are tracking to SLAs [Ed_INFRA]”. In relation to reporting back to 
the client, one participant indicated that clients do not have access to the system, and 
reports sent to clients served as the primary form of assessing the performance of the 
vendor. As Ed_INFRA put across,  
 
 “ReqMgmtSystem is an internal system to reflect how we are 
delivering to the customer, and all the customer see is the 
report that we produce out of that and give them” 
[Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
In this view, the system serves as an outcome control as it facilitates the generation of 
reports for tracking of client-specified outcomes. The third respondent described the 
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tracking functionalities of the system, highlighting the specificities that are tracked. The 
researcher can only speculate whether this information will be presented with the 
reports that are generated. As the third respondent stated,  
 
 “In ReqMgmtSystem, it might have the request number, the 
title, it will say who the business person is requesting it, who 
was allocated. For example, what status is the request at, has it 
been registered, are we waiting on a Statement of Work, has it 
been submitted to the client, therefore waiting their approval. 
All this kind of tracking is done in ReqMgmtSystem” 
[Geena_APPS]. 
 
 
The system thus indirectly functions as a behaviour control mechanism through reports 
generated from the system, and the mandated daily meetings within the vendor 
organisation. One of the three participants stated that reports generated from the 
systems are regarded “as the source of truth for how individuals and the team as a whole 
are tracking to SLAs and projects [Ed_INFRA]”. Thus, behaviour controls are not 
exercised directly through the tracking functionalities of the system in place. Rather, as 
one participant related, it is through the daily meetings, which aimed at providing 
management with a view on the statuses of RFSs. 
 
The representative quotes of the above findings are summarised in Table 5.7 on the 
next page.  
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Table 5.7: Representative interview quotes on ReqMgmtSystem at ALPHA 
Division Pseudonym Facilitating the receipt of 
requests 
(Formal governance 
mechanism) 
Tracking of requests 
(Outcome control) 
Generation of reports for reviews 
(Behaviour control) 
Meetings 
INFRA Ed “From the point that we accept a 
request from the customer, it goes 
on the system that is called 
ReqMgmtSystem” 
 
“ReqMgmtSystem tracks the progress of 
solutions” 
 
““ReqMgmtSystem reports on how we are 
tracking on service levels.” 
 
 
“ReqMgmtSystem is an internal system to 
reflect how we are delivering to the customer 
alright. And all the customers see is the 
report that we produce out of that and give 
them.” 
“They have various phases and that's essentially 
the source of truth for how we're tracking services, 
our projects. Umm... the management system, the 
management pulls various reports out of that to 
see how we go, how we're tracking to our service 
levels. Ummm so there's a lot of focus on keeping 
that up to date, and making them reflect reality.” 
 
“I think with any statistical kind of analysis, you 
can make the figures say what you want. Umm... 
but I think we're only doing ourselves a disservice 
if we do that. Umm... so...I know personally 
there's been err.. the information coming out of 
the systems at the moment pretty much reflects 
how things are. So we know what our account 
with err.. failed service levels.. for uh.. we have a 
lot of constraints around that, because service 
level doesn't make sense. So that's not fit for 
purpose with any.. in a lot of cases. But it's what 
we've got. And given those facts, the system is 
considered reporting how we are tracking on 
those.” 
 
“We get daily meetings 
to review what is due 
in the next 7 days. The 
purpose of the 
meetings is to 
understand how we 
are managing our 
dates and things like 
that.” 
Jason - - -  
APPS Robert  [From email verification]: “Yes I track 
achievement of SLAs for APPS on a daily 
basis. Using data from ReqMgmtSystem and 
my own local tracking spreadsheet”  
[From email verification]: “APPS reports status 
into ReqMgmtSystem where consolidated 
reporting from both APPS and INFRA can go to 
the client.” 
 
Keira - - -  
Patrick “We have a team at vendor 
management that reviews those 
RFSs. They look at it and they 
just make a decision as to 
whether it is INFRA or APPS. Or it 
could be a combination, and it 
gets sends to both teams.” 
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From comments by other 
participants, it can be deduced 
that requests is sent electronically 
to either APPS, INFRA or both 
teams. 
Brad - - -  
Rachael - - -  
Leonard  - “I think it's driven by the customer's desire to have 
traceability and accountability. But at the same 
time, I feel like we're wasting more time and 
energy sort of proving that traceability whereas if 
there's a trust between the customer and the 
company, we can save whatever we spend on 
that resource on providing value for them. So it is 
understandable from a contractual perspective, 
but I feel like it's a sign of a relationship that's not 
where it could be.” 
 
Geena “Our Business Office uses 
ReqMgmtSystem… At the INFRA 
side, they use ReqMgmtSystem”. 
 
 
“In ReqMgmtSystem, it might have the 
request number, the title, it will say who the 
business person is requesting it, who was 
allocated. For example, what status is the 
request at, has it been registered, are we 
waiting on a Statement of Work, has it been 
submitted to the client, therefore waiting their 
approval. All this kind of tracking is done in 
ReqMgmtSystem.” 
 
“The Business Office are using 
ReqMgmtSystem for anything that we 
currently do. But they pretty much are only 
tracking the status of Statement of Work and 
not the whole pack” 
 
“Our business office uses ReqMgmtSystem”. 
“Requests have to be registered at 
ReqMgmtSystem because I think there are 
management level, reports are done there.” 
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5.4 Interface between outsourcing and organisation controls 
The previous section has focused on reporting the findings at the level of the 
outsourcing arrangement. This section reports on how controls established at the 
outsourcing arrangement interface with controls within the organisation environment. 
Participants in ALPHA identified several workflows that they have to adhere to in the 
course of submitting a proposal to clients, namely the need to establish a memorandum 
between the APPS and INFRA when collaborating on RFS, as well as the need to put 
the proposal through the approval and review process at their respective division prior to 
submitting the proposal to the client.  
 
In the course of doing so, as noted from the interview transcripts, they too collectively 
identified various forms of controls established within the organisation environment. 
The analysis found the presence of organisation structure, standardised work 
procedures, and performance measurements. This finding is summarised in Table 5.8 
below.  
 
Table 5.8: Procedures identified at ALPHA 
Procedure  Description 
Collaborating on 
RFSs 
To collaborate on RFSs, a MoU (contract) (rule, policies and 
procedures) has to be established between INFRA and APPS 
(organisation structure) to formally document the collaboration.  
Approval process Each division (organisation structure) has its own approval process 
(rules, policies and procedures). Approval process is based on clip 
levels and goes through different hierarchies.  
Performance 
measurements 
Each division (organisation structure) has its own set of performance 
measurements.  
 
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, APPS and INFRA are essentially two 
different divisions within the GTECH that consist of members contracted to provide 
applications and infrastructure services to GTECH.   
5.4.1 Collaborating on RFSs 
The unwritten rule within GTECH on requests that require collaboration, as outlined 
by one out of the nine participants highlighted, is that “the division with the bigger 
amount of work owns the request [Patrick_APPS]”. Paraphrasing an example provided 
by the interviewee, a request might be valued at AUD$100,000, with APPS requiring 
to do 70% of the work and INFRA at 30%. In this case, members within APPS are 
responsible for the request and will officially lead the request.  
 
Four participants highlighted the need to establish a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between APPS and INFRA, to formalise the collaboration. For instance, one 
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participant described the MoU as “contracts between INFRA and APPS 
[Patrick_APPS]”. APPS and INFRA, from one participant’s point of view, are very 
different and their collaboration is similar to procuring of services from a different 
company.    
 
 “If you are a Project Manager at APPS, and for whatever 
reason you get a Project Manager role at INFRA, it is 
different. They have their own processes and we have our own 
processes. It is just the way that the organisations are 
different. Like I said, it seems like almost two separate 
organisations [Patrick_APPS]”.  
 
 
There is however a certain purpose for the MoU, which further augments the role of 
the organisation structure. Because of the differences in processes at APPS and INFRA, 
and that collaboration between the two divisions appears to mimic that of the 
procurement of services from a third party, the MoU has utility when compiling the 
SOW to be returned to the client. As one participant explained it,  
 
 “I think the MoU is a good thing to have. Because at least 
that, you know that the information that has been put into 
that document has been reviewed by someone on the INFRA 
side, the pricing side, it has all been approved. It is all 
finalised. It is all about me then taking that information, 
knowing that it is effectively finalised and just inserting that, 
and merging it with the documentation that I have 
[Geena_APPS]”.  
 
 
There were however contests and disagreements with regards to the establishment of 
the MoU. For instance, the third participant related that he felt like the MoU “defines 
the teamwork [Leonard_APPS]” between APPS and INFRA. Recalling a previous 
project he had worked on, which involved members from APPS, INFRA as well as the 
HARDWARE and SOFTWARE group, the participant highlighted how they had to 
start splitting the revenue for each component on the project so each division gets 
credited for their component. As he related, 
 
 “I worked on a project where the consulting team was 
implementing a software in the Cloud. So obviously, 
APPS did a lot of work to get it running, to set up. So 
basically, the plan was to get a product that you can 
take to a customer and say "here's your software. It is 
ready to go."  
 
So we did a lot of consulting work around business 
process, umm and configuration, stuff like that. But, 
we would not have been able to do it, if we did not 
have the software. So, the software group delivered the 
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software, we added on top of that. And the end of the 
project we had to break that down, who gets what, so 
basically it is where the credit and revenue goes 
[Leonard_APPS]” 
 
From the participant’s point of view, the MoU is thus an agreement that defines the 
teamwork in that, “if there is no agreement, that sort of leads to conflict… because 
everybody wants all the revenue from the contract [Leonard_APPS]”. Further, the 
fourth participant while contesting the role of MoU, citing it as a constraint, indicated 
that the existing rule within GTECH is that no proposals should be submitted to the 
client without having the MoU in place. 
 
This section has outlined how collaboration between APPS and INFRA is essentially 
bounded by a “contractual agreement” that defines how the team collaborate. As 
outlined by one participant who worked on the Cloud project, members within 
GTECH had to present themselves as one single organisation working on a request. 
However, due to the organisation structure as well as the underlying rules and 
procedures, collaboration has to be formalised between divisions. Next, I will turn to the 
approval process identified by participants to be the next process within GTECH they 
have to navigate through prior to submitting the SOW to the client.  
5.4.2 Approval process 
Six out of the nine participants reported the need to put a developed technological 
solution through the respective approval process established at each respective division 
prior to submitting a completed SOW. A selection of relevant interview quotes 
reflecting this is provided in Table 5.9 below. Following this, the findings regarding the 
approval process will be discussed. 
 
Table 5.9: Representative interview quotes on approval process 
Division Pseudonym Representative interview quotes on approval process 
INFRA Ed “For any solution that goes through, a certain business process needs to be 
ticked off, and they need to go through many hands. So even for very simple 
solutions we have to touch, we have to talk to 6 or 7 people to get their review, 
to get their pricing approval, and to get it formally submitted.” 
Jason “In the past, we used to have to go into quality assurance for anything more 
than 500K. Now, they have moved that to anything beyond 2 million or more.” 
APPS Robert “The thing is, our approval processes would not let us submit back to the 
customer that we're going to do this piece of work until we have got this 
Document of Understanding in place between APPS and INFRA.” 
Keira “So every Statement of Work that we do, we put a cost plan together, and then 
it has to be approved.” 
Patrick “If the price is over a certain amount, it requires different levels of approvals.” 
Brad - 
Rachael - 
Leonard - 
Geena “There are approvals to go before it all get submitted to the client” 
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As noted previously, APPS and INFRA have different approval processes. This will be 
further explained below.   
 
At INFRA, one of the two participants reported that there were certain clip levels and 
assessments that aimed at assessing the number of approvals the solution (SOW) has to 
go through. Ed_INFRA provided perspective to the demanding nature of putting 
through a solution through the approval process,  
 
 “For any solution that goes through, a certain business process 
needs to be ticked off, and they need to go through many 
hands. So even for very simple solutions we have to touch, we 
have to talk to 6 or 7 people to get their review, to get their 
pricing approval, and to get it formally submitted. At time, we 
also need specialised people to put it together. And sometimes 
it is only for very low value and very low-risk piece of work. In 
our situation, we have to make sure we have to tick a lot of 
boxes [Jason_INFRA]”.  
 
 
However, it appeared that the clip levels for approvals have been revised recently 
(during the time of interview), and has been increased from AUD$500,000 to 
AUD$2,000,000. That is, only solutions that are above AUD$2,000,000 would have to 
go through the quality assurance process.  
 
 “In the past, we used to have to go into quality assurance for 
anything more than 500K. Now, they have moved that to 
anything beyond 2 million or more. Anything less than that, 
you do not need to go through all the delivery process, which 
is consume lots of time, and sometimes going into quality 
assurance process for a low-value RFS might consume all the 
profits that might come out of this [Jason_INFRA]”.  
 
 
Ed_INFRA identified the Global Approval System as the primary system that 
facilitates the approval process at INFRA, where the system is designed to make sure 
the solution design phase adheres to existing rules and procedures. Ed_INFRA further 
remarked that the stringent review system made it such that there is “no chance of 
bypassing any processes”. While he did not identify specific feature and properties of the 
system, what becomes apparent is that there might be no workarounds to escalate the 
approval process in order to ensure a solution gets submitted to the client within the 
stipulated timeframe.   
 
At APPS, none of the four participants explicitly point out the specific clip levels. 
However, Robert_APPS indicated that there is a delegation document within APPS 
that “spells out the parameters by which people can approve work [Robert_APPS]”. As 
he related,  
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 “We have a delegation document which clearly spells out the 
basic parameters under which people can approve work. So it 
is predominantly based on two key indicators: what the value 
of the work is, and what the profit from the work is. So inside 
that metrics, as I said, if it is under a certain dollar value, and 
over a certain profit level, it falls inside my ability to sign off. 
If it is at a higher level of dollars, or slightly lower level of 
profit, it goes to someone else [Robert_APPS]”.  
 
 
From the above, one can thus infer that there are different levels of assessment for 
different values of work. One interviewee, Keira_APPS, outlined the aforementioned 
approval process and further explained how it ties back in with achieving client-
specified outcomes. As she described, 
 
 “So every Statement of Work that we do, we put a cost plan 
together, and then it has to be approved. I am the first 
approver. My team does it. I then look at it. And I approve it. 
Then it goes off to three or four levels above me for approvals.  
 
We have to get Statement of Works out to the client within 
certain SLAs, certain service level agreement. If one of the 
approver is not available there, sick for the day or something 
like that, then we do not get out on time. We get a fine you 
know [Keira_APPS]”.  
 
 
Approval process within APPS appeared to be facilitated by the close proximity of the 
approvers. A visit to the office revealed that Keira_APPS is seated next to 
Robert_APPS in the office, with Robert_APPS indicating that the approval process is 
“relatively sleek”, and he has the authority to approve deals set at a very high threshold. 
Patrick_APPS is seated about ten to fifteen steps away, and Leonard_APPS is seated 
directly across from Patrick_APPS. In this view, the approval process is different from 
INFRA in that the review process is conducted internally within APPS. It is expected 
that there will be some form of system in place facilitating the transmitting of a 
completed SOW from one approver to another within APPS. This system was however 
not identified.  
 
This section has outlined the approval process within APPS and INFRA and the role of 
the rules, policies and procedures within the organisation environment. It also explains 
the hierarchical authority that becomes apparent only when it comes to the approval 
process, where individuals have to go through different levels of approvals based on the 
value of the solution. The next section focuses on how performance measurements are 
linked to outcome controls.  
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5.4.3 Performance measurements and evaluation process 
In Section 5.3.2, it was found that members within Team ALPHA are bounded by 
outcome controls, such as SLAs and financial penalties. This section reports on the link 
between outcome controls and performance measurements. It emerged from the 
analysis that working on every RFSs, i.e. the end-to-end process of receiving RFSs, 
assessing the requirements, seeking extensions, initiating or responding to clients’ 
request of consulting workshops are tied to individuals’ achievement of performance 
measurements at the organisation level.  
 
At INFRA, one out of the two participants [Ed_INFRA] related that in addition to a 
daily tracking of SLAs, the team of architects at INFRA also go through a weekly 
performance tracking where the focus is on providing managers with a view as to the list 
of RFSs or proposals that have been submitted to the clients. However, the focus of the 
weekly performance tracking at the organisation level is not focused on examining the 
RFSs that are due in the next seven days. Rather, the focus of performance review at the 
organisation level is on contract value, revenue of each solution and is based on a 
monthly turnaround. The interviewee described how this tracking is performed within 
the INFRA division,  
 
 “We [INFRA] also have a weekly financial review, which 
tracks total contract value and revenue for each solution. 
Basically, we identify out of everything in our pipeline what 
are the solutions we are confident of achieving within that 
month. We also identify within our pipeline the solutions that 
might not be signed off within the month. In the review, we 
also present a view to our manager solutions within the 
pipeline that have been signed off and registered 
[Ed_INFRA].”  
 
 
The second participant at INFRA, Jason_INFRA, who is currently a contract staff with 
no targets or performance measurements corroborated the division’s focus on tracking 
contract value. In a discussion on technological systems within GTECH, the 
participant related of the lack of integrated tools within the organisation that will enable 
him to track his personal performance, and that he had to go through a manual process 
to retrieve the number of RFSs that he has submitted to the client.  
 
At APPS, IS professionals are assessed based on “utilisation” rate (Refer Table 5.10 
below). Several participants (two out of seven) specifically indicated that they have to 
achieve an 80% utilisation rate over a calendar year. That is, the number of hours that 
are billable and charged to the client for work done. For example, based on a forty-hour 
week, individuals are expected to bill clients for a minimum of 32 hours of their time on 
a weekly basis over a calendar year to achieve an 80% utilisation rate for that year.  
 
Five out of the seven participants reported having to input the hours they have worked 
for the week into a Timesheet system on a weekly basis. That is, time has to be input 
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against “codes” within the system. The practice of inputting time against system 
provides both tracking for clients and for annual appraisals. Personnel in Operations 
positions, such as Rachael_APPS and Geena_APPS, on the other hand are regarded as 
overheads, and are not paid by clients for their work done. For instance, Geena_APPS 
revealed that she is being assessed based on productivity, while Rachael_APPS 
indicated the need to input her time against any conducted activity. It can thus be 
deduced that both Operations personnel are assessed similarly. This finding is 
summarised in Table 5.10 below.  
 
Table 5.10: Performance measurements at APPS 
Pseudonym Performance 
measurements 
Example Other identified performance 
measurements 
Robert Utilisation 
rate 
“GTECH sees utilisation as a 
significant KPI.” 
Subjective assessments 
 
“At the end of each year, when we do 
our process, our assessments, we do 
make allowances for individuals that 
have been constrained. But every 
time there is an opportunity, they 
have done really well. That is the 
subjective part of the assessment.” 
Keira Utilisation 
rate 
“My own performance is rated on 
utilisation” 
- 
Patrick Utilisation 
rate 
“At the end of the year, one other 
thing they measure is how well-
utilised you were, and how much 
money you brought in.” 
The amount of new businesses 
 
(Refer first interview quote) 
Brad Utilisation 
rate 
“We go through a annual 
appraisal process where we 
evaluate how successful people 
are. And utilisation targets are a 
key measure within that.” 
Other measurements 
 
“One of the guidance was that 
utilisation is a measure that goes into 
measure how people went. But it's 
not the only measure.” 
Rachael Did not 
mention 
 
“I am in a Project Services role at 
the moment, I don't work on one 
particular project. The hours that I 
worked are spread across lots of 
different, like lots of different 
contracts. I am an overhead 
cost… I am supposed to bill 
against each contract.” 
- 
Leonard Utilisation 
rate 
“I have to input the details of how 
many hours I worked on what.” 
- 
Geena Productivity “GTECH pays for me to do my 
work. The client does not pay. So 
I can only be measured that way, 
on productivity.” 
- 
 
In relation to the client, one out of the seven respondents from APPS, the Project 
Coordinator, explained the importance of inputting the time against activity on a 
weekly basis, in order to charge clients for work.  
 
 “So each staff member will go into the Timesheet system 
and enter their time that they did against each activity. That 
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would come through the system in the form of a timesheet, 
so then we can then provide that timesheet to the client, and 
get them to approve. That is, the clients have to agree that 
these people did this amount of work on their particular 
contract, and they are willing to pay the $20,000 or whatever 
it is.  
 
So there is a process there of where we need to, the person 
needs to submit their time in the tool. We need to review it, 
the timesheet when it's produced, make sure that it's aligned 
to what we think we should be billing, the rate that it should 
be. And then we then need to forward that on to the client, 
get their approval, document their approval, and then send 
that onto our invoicing team” [Rachael_APPS]. 
 
At the organisation level, as evident from Table 5.10 above, utilisation rate is one of the 
primary indicators of individuals’ performances and evaluation is based on this.   
 
 “I think utilisation rate serves the purpose. I think it gives 
people a guide for what the focus the organisation. So I 
think that is very important… So we go through an annual 
appraisal to evaluate how successful people are. And 
utilisation targets are a key measure within that” 
[Brad_APPS]. 
 
 
Another participant echoed this sentiment,  
 
 “When someone is able to charge a client for their work, 
then it increases their utilisation. And obviously GTECH 
would want that person to be almost a 100% utilised if they 
can, excluding annual leave and stuff. Because that means 
that they are earning money for the company, and not sitting 
on what we call the bench here, or idle time, when they are 
in between accounts or they don't have work that they can 
charge the client for. So it's costing GTECH money” 
[Rachael_APPS]. 
 
 
The above findings have highlighted that members at INFRA and APPS are subjected 
to two different performance measurements within the organisation environment. 
Based on the two participants from INFRA who responded in this study, organisation 
targets are based on the amount of new businesses clinched on a monthly basis. 
Members at APPS on the other hand, are measured based on utilisation rate. However, 
members from both teams are also required to perform to client-specified outcomes.  
 
It emerged from the analysis that there is an integral link between performance 
measurements and client-specified outcomes. Every proposal that clients signed off 
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constituted a new business for members at INFRA. For APPS, signed off proposals are 
transformed into a project that members can bill their hours towards and get credited 
for utilisation. This is a reflection of the matrix organisation structure established at 
GTECH, where individuals have to report to both functional and business group 
managers.  
 
The findings presented in relation to how outsourcing and organisation controls 
interface will be summarised accordingly in the following section.  
5.4.4 Section summary 
This section has outlined the findings in relation to how outsourcing controls interface 
with controls at the organisation environment. The findings indicate that a series of 
procedures take place post-receipt of RFSs. They include (1) receiving of RFSs, (2) 
collaborating on RFSs, (3) approval process and (4) performance measurement. Each 
procedure involves different forms of rules, policies and procedures, and this finding is 
summarised in Table 5.11 below.  
 
Table 5.11: Summary of findings on organisation controls 
Procedure  Organisation control  
Receiving RFSs Organisation structure A RFS that requires the collaboration between 
both INFRA and APPS are dispatched to 
members with both divisions.  
Collaborating on 
RFSs 
Organisation structure & 
rules, policies and 
procedures 
To collaborate on RFSs, a MoU (contract) (rule, 
policies and procedures) has to be established 
between INFRA and APPS (organisation 
structure) to formally document the 
collaboration.  
Approval 
process 
Organisation structure, 
rules, policies and 
procedures & 
hierarchies 
Each division (organisation structure) has its 
own approval process (rules, policies and 
procedures). Approval process is based on clip 
levels and goes through different hierarchies.  
Performance 
measurements 
Organisation structure 
and performance 
measurements 
Each division (organisation structure) has its 
own set of performance measurements.  
 
As evident from Table 5.11 above, the organisation structure was found to play a 
significant role due to different performance measurements and processes. The next 
section will outline findings in relation to how controls can pose influence on the clan.  
5.5 Controls and its influence on the clan 
In this case, the clan consists of members from APPS, INFRA and Client AEC. This 
section will first examine the current relationship between the aforementioned three 
parties according to the participants’ viewpoints. Subsequently, limitations on 
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outsourcing and organisation controls relating to formalised collaboration between 
APPSa and INFRA, as well as challenges related with regards to the existing approval 
process will be discussed. 
5.5.1 Relationship between APPS and AEC 
Amongst those interviewed who discussed the relationship between the client and the 
team, the impression formed was that APPS appeared to have fostered a great working 
relationship with AEC over the years that the contract had been established. Indeed, at 
some point in time, certain team members from APPS were actually located in and 
working out of the client’s office.   Patrick_APPS (Refer Appendix D for the field 
notes), mentioned before the recording began that he had moved back to the GTECH 
office recently, and how he preferred being seated with the client in order to understand 
their requirements better.  
 
Leonard_APPS, the developer, discussed the differences working at the client’s locale 
and working at the GTECH office,  
 
 “Last year, I was working at AEC’s office. It was quicker and 
easier as I could speak to people immediately, get immediate 
feedback, things like that…. [now that we have been relocated 
to the main GTECH building], it is going to take time if we 
want to sit down and hash something out on a whiteboard or 
draw something on a piece of paper on my desk” 
[Leonard_APPS].  
 
 
As a result of the relocation, the participant above indicated of the need to bill clients 
for not only the duration of a scheduled meetingbut also for travel time. The participant 
related an example where a twenty-minute meeting might result in the billing of a full 
hour of time to the client. The participant further related that the relocation does not 
exactly benefit the client considering the discussion could have been “a ten minute 
conversation by stopping by their desks”, and the client would not even be billed (out of 
goodwill). In this view, an informal meeting, which can be a way of socialising between 
members of both client and vendor to come to a common understanding on 
requirements, is being transformed into a formal arrangement that ties back with 
individual performance assessments of billable hours.  
 
However, during the time of the interview, members from APPS have been relocated to 
the primary office building and are seated on the same floor as INFRA. As one 
participant described the changes in the organisation,  
 
 “Well now that we are actually in the one building, on the one 
floor, and even sitting next together. I am hoping (laughs) 
that that is actually going to make things work a lot better. 
Before that, the people were just names. You did not actually 
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know them either. So now that INFRA quoting team is 
sitting in the same cubicle that I am, so even on Day One, just 
the fact that we could just walk across the cubicle to ask them 
something. So I am hoping and expecting that to actually 
improve overall. If you have a meeting, I think sometimes that 
just work better face to face. Even though you can ring in, we 
have got conference calls, I think that face to face is ideally a 
better option. And we are going to be able to do that more. 
And I think that is going help make things work better going 
forward” [Geena_APPS]. 
5.5.1.1 Commitment 
Instances that demonstrate APPS’ commitment to delivery of projects for Client AEC 
are shown by two of the nine participants in their discussion of past project deliveries 
and these provided insights into the relationship between APPS and Client AEC. The 
Account Executive, Robert_APPS, stated very confidently that Client AEC as an 
organisation, “appreciate the value and contribution that GTECH has made to them 
and their business growth [Robert_APPS]”. The participant drew a parallel between the 
providing optimal client services to that of visiting a café that offers great customer 
service to illustrate the type of service his team has been providing to Client AEC,  
 
 “Think about it. If you have got a good restaurant, you have 
got to have good coffee. If you know someone that makes 
good coffee, you will go back. And you go back every so 
often, they will throw you a muffin because they see you 
every day, to the extent where you do not even think about 
the other café down the street. That is no different in the 
way business works” [Robert_APPS].  
 
 
Relating the value-added services APPS has provided to Client AEC over the years, 
Robert_APPS related that the commitment to delivering and deploying projects is by 
and large a result of “people sacrificing their weekends, doing work at unsociable hours 
and not getting paid any more than they get their normal pay”. The second participant, 
Keira_APPS, similarly related an account where a successful project collaboration, that 
did not come easily, was achieved between client and vendor. In the spirit of 
commemorating the event, the team decided to purchase customised mugs printed with 
a congratulatory message for the client for all members involved within the project. 
Keira related the effort, sacrifices and commitment of members in both client and 
vendor organisations and how some relationship attain a friendship status,  
 
 “You have a team that has worked so hard for you, and you 
jus want to have a token thank you. People have given up 
family holidays to work over release weekends. [It will be 
great] to have something [a mug] in the cupboard that says, 
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“God, that was a crazy project. I remember that. I made 
really good friends on that project” [Keira_APPS].  
 
At the time of the interview, one interviewee [Leonard_APPS] further related that he 
had been up working at 4am in the morning due to a performance issue with an 
application the day before.  
 
From the data reported above, there was a sense of a strong working relationship 
between APPS and Client AEC, and this is demonstrated through statements relating 
to commitment and a strong sense of belonging within the clan. This can be attributed 
to the co-location prior to the current shift back into GTECH’s main office building, 
which has added on to this reciprocal relationship.  
5.5.1.2 The role of trust 
At INFRA, both Ed and Jason faced issues with the requirements gathering and 
refinement process (More details in Section 5.2.3). In the context of summarising the 
issues he faced in requirements gathering, Ed_INFRA shared that there have been 
some events in the past, which have led to a “loss of trust” between AEC and INFRA. 
The participant further highlighted the reasons relating to potentially high pricing 
against industry for the same product that might have resulted in a potentially strained 
relationship,  
 
 I think the best situation [between INFRA and AEC] is if we 
had more trust I guess. More trust. And I don't think we have. 
I think there has been some history there that we have lost a 
bit of trust with the client. We have competitors in more 
nimble places, and a lot of costs constraints. [Stakeholders at 
AEC are] making sure that their interests are taken care of, 
and they expect good quality outcomes at a really cheap price, 
and you know... that's not possible. Something always gives” 
[Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
Further, based on the transcripts, it appears that there might have been disputes where 
the client realised that the hardware that was built does not function well with the 
system as intended, even though the hardware was built based upon the client’s 
requirements. This led to the establishment of a RFS counselling and improvement 
program that is aimed at providing a baseline understanding to the client as to what 
constitutes “good requirements” and to avert future disputes.  
 
Identified challenges include unclear requirements and Client AEC not stating what 
they actually want. This appears to have resulted in disputes between the two parties, 
and is shown by how an RFS Counselling Program was established to counsel Client 
ALPHA on what constitutes “good requirements”. The establishment of the RFS 
Counselling program appears to indicate that the “history” might have included serious 
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disputes. The program requires stakeholders at AEC to document requirements in the 
form of quantifiable and specific statements. This is also to safeguard GTECH as all 
documentations will be in black and white, and AEC will not be able to lodge another 
dispute, as everything is documented. This shows through the following statement, 
where Ed_INFRA related how he ensures requirements are properly defined,   
 
 “We gave you the outcome you asked for. What is it that is 
critical to the business that this solution will provide. What 
was the business problem you were trying to fix? What are the 
changes in events you're trying to exploit. So if you define it, 
and you apply a test to that. If we can prove that x, y, z occurs 
afterwards, we consider that to be a successful outcome. 
 
So at the end of the project, you said we did not meet your 
requirement, we can then go through what their requirement 
was” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
Throughout the interview this participant made several references that might further 
provide insights into the working relationship. For instance, he dropped reference to 
how “it was the more technical people that can understand the reasoning behind why 
requirements may be more complex [Ed_INFRA]”. In other words, the relationship 
between INFRA and AEC might not be as serious as conceived by Keira_APPS, as this 
participant indicated that the relationship with technical personnel within AEC is 
better. On the other hand, the results might indicate that trust might not be 
instantiated at a clan level, but on a personal level instead.  
5.5.2 Outcome controls and the influence on the ability to provide 
holistic solutions 
Three out of the nine participants shared the view that SLAs (outcome controls) can 
impede the ability for IS professionals to provide a holistic solution for the clients, with 
two of the participants proposing the elimination of SLAs. One respondent viewed 
SLAs as a double-edged sword, in that the time limitation set on each and every RFSs 
limits the amount of time and effort one can put into the provision of a quality solution.  
 
 “The double edge sword is that if the service level is too 
short, then you get exactly the amount of effort that's 
allowed within the timeframe. I understand that clients 
need service levels to ensure we do not take as long as 
we want. But the constant problem is trying to give 
good quality responses within a short timeframe 
[Ed_INFRA].”  
 
 
Two other respondents suggested that service levels should be eliminated in order to 
provide quality solutions. While SLAs continue to function as the primary means for 
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responding to RFSs, it would be difficult to provide a holistic and quality solution. As 
Jason_INFRA related,  
 
 “So sometimes, instead of focusing on the proposal itself, or 
the solution, your main driver is the SLA, rather than 
solution for the customer. So this is the driver, that I think, 
it should disappear to provide a best, effective solution to the 
customer” [Jason_INFRA]. 
 
 
Robert_APPS proposed to get rid of the SLAs, and shift the focus to engaging Client 
AEC from the beginning of developing business requirements, identifying business 
issues to delivery. In Robert_APPS’ view, there will be fewer issues in the requirements 
gathering and refinement process, and less iterations of going back to the client to 
clarify requirements.  
 
 “If I was going improve the process, I would remove the 10 
days, and seek to get more engaged with the client as they go 
through the generation of the requirements. And if you look at 
the process end to end, from conceptualising inside, 
identifying inside the client’s business, and need - to the point 
that we deliver a quote to deliver, and then ultimately to 
deliver. We have very little visibility of what happens up to the 
point AEC provides the RFS to us.  
 
Currently, AEC will send the request to us. So we take that, 
read it, and go "Hang on, what if, what do they mean? And oh 
hang on, that doesn't seem right. That requirement contradicts 
this bit" etc”. The more we can refine and understand it before 
we quote, the less issue there is typically when you get into the 
build, and the design that fits the build” [Robert_APPS].  
 
 
The importance of solutioning based on a holistic understanding of clients’ 
requirements is imperative. Four out of the nine members at ALPHA related incidents 
in the past where solutioning based on clients’ requirements have resulted in unintended 
consequences. Patrick_APPS summarised this perspective eloquently,  
 
 “They do not know the implications of other things they 
might break by adding certain functionalities, or changing a 
certain interface, or moving a certain feature from Point A to 
Point B. They do not understand or realise what they are 
looking for. There can be unintended consequences which 
can occur that have to be discussed with the clients” 
[Patrick_APPS]. 
 
 
However, even though discussions can be held with clients to identify potential 
implications or repercussions as a result of a certain requirement, this can fall on deaf 
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ears. Geena_APPS recalled an incident that had occurred during the interview period 
where APPS had provided members at Client AEC with three different solutions in 
response to a certain request, highlighting the different pros and cons of each solution 
and recommending that client should select a particular solution out of the three 
presented. However, the client decided to go against the recommended proposal and 
instead selected another option to proceed with the project. The option selected, which 
was not APPS’ preferred recommendation, led to a number of changes in existing 
business functions. Geena_APPS related the incident after the client realised the 
changes,  
 
 “We gave them three different options. We told them which 
one we preferred. They did not go with our option. But as 
far as the option that they picked, we said something would 
have to change as a consequence. It could effectively mean 
that tiny change, or a training thing on the business side. So 
we worded it. They picked that option.  
 
We put together the Statement of Work, had a walk 
through of it all, and they asked, "Why are you changing 
that business functions? We did not ask you to do that. It 
could affect this, this and this." In fact, we had actually 
called it out as part of the solution, and that's what they 
actually picked. In the end, they went back to the business, 
and the business said they're okay. 
  
I think when they just read the different bullet points in that 
option. They do not really understand either. In their mind, 
they see the end result, not all the bits that go with it, and 
then do not like the things that sometimes you suggest, 
because sometimes it may be a little bit more costly. But at 
the end of the day, it can actually solve other problems that 
they may have had. And it is for them to understand that” 
[Geena_APPS]. 
 
 
The above incident highlighted the lack of technical expertise of members at Client 
AEC. Clients can however be technically skilled and know exactly what they want as 
well. Ed_INFRA provided an example where a client listed specifically what they 
required on a solely INFRA request without providing the infrastructure design. That 
is, Ed_INFRA himself will not be able to provide any advice as to whether the 
requirements do fit and can work in tandem with the existing infrastructure. In order to 
adhere to client’s request, Ed_INFRA had to indicate specifically to the client that the 
onus of responsibility is on the client to ensure things will work, as he had no visibility 
of the design, but it had to sit on a particular virtual local area network (VLAN). It 
turned out that the server that was built to requirements was not meant for the VLAN, 
and the client had installed the server on a different VLAN. This resulted in the need to 
rework and rebuilding the server.  
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Typically, issues with requirements are not detected until after the project is in progress. 
Clients’ expected outcomes are generally more complicated than the requirements that 
had been stated within the initial RFS document. Thus, the submitted pricing based on 
clients’ submitted requirements are usually revised to a higher value. As Robert_APPS 
related,  
 
 “The reality when you start to go through the design, 
the build, and even the test sometimes, means that the 
costs can inflate simply because you know, you are at a 
point where you got much understanding of the detail” 
[Robert_APPS].  
 
 
A synthesis of the aforementioned point of views discussed in this section highlight 
firstly the complexities of the requirements clarification process, and the limitations of 
outcome controls in enabling the provision of a holistic solution. Secondly, the above 
perspectives, when taken together, focus on how ALPHA should be working towards 
servicing the client and helping them generate requirements, which would be beneficial 
to both parties. It can be inferred from participants’ perspectives that the current way of 
working can potentially impact the applications developed or the infrastructure solution 
that has been proposed, as clients generally might not be technically inclined to 
understand the potential implications of the solutions they want. There is thus a 
rationale behind wanting to get rid of SLAs and focus on servicing the client, as it 
might impact on clients’ perceptions of vendors’ performances. Based on prior 
researches, this can impact on clients’ view of the partnership and lead to loss of trust. 
On the other hand, one of the findings highlight that trust might be more personal as 
opposed to being instantiated at the clan level.  
 
The following section will examine how formalised collaboration within APPS and 
INFRA can impede the clan. 
5.5.3 Formalised collaboration between APPS and INFRA 
Collaboration on RFSs is key to achieving of client-specified outcomes. However, as 
noted in the previous section, collaboration can be impeded as a result of the existing 
matrix organisational structure. In the interviews, four of the nine participants used 
variations of the word “silo”, e.g. “siloed organisation”. Participants also described the 
structure and the different divisions using terms such as “pillars” and “tower”. There is 
also a view that every division seems like a different company within the organisation; 
two participants used the same term - “separate companies” in their depiction of 
working across divisional lines. Table 5.12 below provides a summary of the interview 
quotes made in relation to the organisation structure.  
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Table 5.12: Representative interview quotes on organisation structure 
Participant Representative interview quotes describing organisation structure 
Robert_APPS “The pillars are too tall inside the structure… We are a very siloed 
organisation as we currently stand”  
Leonard_APPS “It seems as if we are two separate companies working.” 
Keira_APPS “We should not be separate companies within one company. We should be 
one company…” 
Patrick_APPS “Each tower have their own set of business processes and they are run 
differently”. 
 
It was also noted from the interview transcripts that there were certain ways in which 
the organisation structure determines the collaboration between members in APPS and 
INFRA. This was made apparent through participants’ use of the term “engage” when 
describing the need to approach members from another division, third-party vendors or 
the client. A text search conducted revealed that “engage” and “engagement” were used 
a total of nineteen times for five out of the nine participants. Representative interview 
quotes reflecting the aforementioned are presented in Table 5.13 below.  
 
Table 5.13: Instances noted - Generalised use of term “engage”  
Participant Number of 
instances 
noted 
 Representative interview quotes depicting the 
term “engage” 
Party engaging 
Jason_INFRA 4  “The more you engage with the customer, the 
better chance to have to secure the deal… we 
prefer to engage through identification of pain 
points of the customer. So we try to engage with 
the customer at the beginning…” 
Client 
Geena_APPS 1  “We actually engage the team in Manila for the 
extra level of pricing approval…” 
Within 
organisation 
(Overseas 
team) 
Robert_APPS 1  “We being APPS, before you require INFRA to do 
a piece of work as part of the solution, then we 
have to engage them as part of the solution”. 
INFRA 
Patrick_APPS   “For us to actually interlock with INFRA, it is not 
just a matter of talking to a colleague or maybe 
sitting there, there is an engagement process to 
engage members in INFRA”. 
INFRA 
 “There was one project where all we needed was 
to open up a firewall port… it took about six 
weeks… the client had to engage us. Then we 
had to engage INFRA. INFRA then had to engage 
[the communication services provider], who then 
had to engage [another service provider]. 
Client-Vendor, 
INFRA, and 
third-party 
vendors 
Rachael_APPS 1  “The other day, I had to engage a sub-contractor. 
When GTECH does not have certain resource 
that can provide a certain skill for Client AEC, we 
are able to go to other companies to ask if we can 
get them to work for us”. 
Third-party 
vendor 
 
As evident from the table above, the term “engage” was not only used to depict 
collaboration exchanges between fellow colleagues within GTECH, but also towards 
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clients as well as third-party vendors. The use of this term is significant as it highlights 
that there are certain ways of collaborating across divisions that augment participants’ 
perspectives of not being “one GTECH [Robert_APPS]”.  
 
The findings also indicate that APPS and INFRA are marked by different objectives 
and goals at the higher management level. Two out of the nine participants indicated 
that the divisional objectives, key performance measurements and fundamental goals of 
each division, i.e. financial objectives differ from one another.  Keira_APPS, the Project 
Manager related that the APPS division is focused on “driving new businesses”, whereas 
INFRA is focused “on cutting costs”. This has prevented her from obtaining more 
business for the organisation in general. For Keira, this is a contradiction and a 
“disconnect” between the divisions,  
 
 “Our KPIs seem to be on driving new business… I believe 
that KPIs of the INFRA Executive is on cutting costs. Now 
those things are completely at odds with one another. Reason 
being if I need something to help drive the sale, I will need 
money. But the INFRA Executive is getting rid of that thing 
because it costs money. And then we all fail. There seems to 
be a real disconnect between the businesses” [Keira_APPS].  
 
 
This gives the impression that members who were meant to collaborate across divisional 
lines in order to achieve client-specified outcomes can be distanced due to the divisional 
objectives set at the management level. However, both Keira_APPS and Robert_APPS, 
the two out of the nine participants who highlighted this point were of the view that the 
problem is not the people.  
 
For instance, Keira_APPS remarked, “the people that I have had to work with at 
INFRA are overworked, underpaid, stressed and very, very good.” Rather, she 
attributed the challenges in collaboration to the internal processes at INFRA where 
“there is a culture of I cannot do it. I have to tick it [Keira_APPS].” Similarly, 
Robert_APPS in his account discussing his personal challenge of having to rely on 
networking and escalation in order to get things done maintained that people are not 
the issue. Rather, there is a suggestion similar to Keira_APPS of different objectives at 
the management level and that everyone is trying to do the best they can within existing 
constraints. As Robert_APPS stated,  
 
 “[The INFRA Executive] is sitting over there in their pillar, 
doing a great job, best job they can do with a different set of 
business objectives set by their management, which do not 
necessarily align with APPS’ management at a high level. Yes, 
we are all one GTECH, but we are not. We are each doing 
our own component, working with different constraints about 
resources and objectives” [Robert_APPS]. 
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The participant from APPS, Keira, in her discussion of past collaborations on RFSs 
with members from INFRA related how her counterparts at AEC had a negative 
perception of INFRA, which she has to try and overcome. This, according to 
Keira_APPS, is by and large a result of the process controls (rule, policies and 
procedures) at INFRA, where she related to be “process-driven” and how there is a 
culture of “I cannot do it. I have to tick it.” Additionally, the different performance 
management assigned at the organisational level are at odds with one another. As a 
result of the treatment of the two collaborating divisions as different business entities, 
projects are assigned to two project managers (one from INFRA and one from APPS) 
chargeable to clients on top of two process overheads. Keira related how she attempts to 
overcome the dual charges by concealing the INFRA component in projects.  
 
 “The client gets very upset that they have to pay for two 
Project Managers. They have to pay for two lots of process 
overhead. You know that meeting I said I have to go to there 
with my forecast, well, we employ a finance person, we employ 
a project management person to help manage all that, well so 
does INFRA.  
 
So from a client's perspective, they're like "why am I paying for 
these things twice?" I got one piece of work that I ask you to 
do. I want some consulting, and part of that is that you've got 
to put a new server in, right? They view that as one project, 
and they get very angry that they believe they're paying twice” 
[Keira_APPS]. 
 
 
A synthesis of the aforementioned viewpoints suggests existing division structure can 
influence the working relationship within the clan, specifically for APPS and INFRA. 
As one participant remarked candidly,  
 
 “If I could change the GTECH world, I would get away. I 
would do away with INFRA. I will do away with APPS. I will 
have an organisation, which is what we're trying to focus and 
move towards - that is here to service the customer. The fact 
that we are multiple parts that do not easily interlock yeah. 
We're still constrained by establishing MoUs between two 
parts of our organisation. Why? Why in this day and age?” 
[Robert_APPS]. 
  
 
The next section will report on the next theme identified – the influences of rules, 
policies and procedures on achieving client-specified outcomes.   
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5.5.4 Rules, policies, procedures and its influence towards achieving 
client-specified outcomes 
The findings indicate an overall negative perception with regards to existing rules, 
policies and procedures. Views on existing standardised work procedures were similarly 
more negative than positive. As summarised in Table 5.14 below, 27 negative terms as 
well as 18 neutral and positive terms were noted in across all respondents.  
 
Table 5.14: Negative, positive and neutral terms noted 
Division Pseudonym Negative Neutral Positive 
Count of Terms 
27 9 9 
INFRA Ed ‘compliance-related’ 
‘one-size-fits-all kind of 
methodologies’ 
‘tick a lot of boxes’ 
‘rigour and more system got 
implemented’ 
‘ticked off’ 
 
Jason ‘conform’ 
‘less flexibility’ 
‘less communication’ 
‘restrictions’ 
‘due diligence’ (x2) 
‘standard worldwide’ (x2) 
 
APPS Robert ‘constrained’  ‘straightforward’ 
‘higher level of authority 
and autonomy’ 
‘relatively sleek process’ 
‘process doesn’t slow it 
down’ 
‘processes assist in doing a 
lot of things’ 
‘clarifying the details’ 
Keira ‘arduous’ 
‘difficult’ 
‘time-consuming’ 
‘check-boxy in the 
extreme’ 
‘a culture of I can’t do it, I 
got to tick it.’ 
‘uses way too much of my 
time’ 
‘hate’ 
‘it’s a necessary evil’ 
 
 
Patrick ‘roadblock’ 
‘complicated’ 
‘detriment’ 
  
Brad ‘overcomplicated process 
and controls’ 
‘could be a lot simpler’ 
‘disjointed’ 
‘so much compliance and 
monitoring’ 
 
‘business functions, which 
everyone has to participate in’ 
 
Rachael ‘overwhelm that 
happenings (work)’ 
‘tick in a box’ 
‘heavily process-oriented’  
Leonard ‘slows us down’ 
‘get in the way’ 
 ‘clearer definition of what is 
to be expected’ 
‘tracking your progress’ 
‘alleviate conflicts’ 
Geena  ‘more processes’ (compared to 
previous organisation) 
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In relation to the approval process (Section 5.4.3), it was noted that participants were 
using “slow”, “roadblock”, “constrained” amongst others to describe existing processes, 
as shown in Table 5.15 below.  
 
Table 5.15: Terms used in relation to approval process 
Participant Terms Used Context in which terms was verbalised 
Ed_INFRA ‘tick a lot of boxes’ Discussing the internal review and approval 
process 
Jason_INFRA ‘less flexibility’ Discussing challenges of processes 
Robert_APPS ‘constrained’ 
‘slow to deal with you as a 
customer’ 
Discussing challenges of processes 
Keira_APPS ‘check-boxy in the extreme’ 
‘a culture of I can’t do it, I 
got to tick it.’ 
 
Discussing INFRA’s processes which might 
impact her delivery of SOW 
Patrick_APPS ‘roadblock’ 
‘complicated’ 
‘detriment’ 
Discussing challenges of processes  
Leonard_APPS ‘slows us down’ 
‘get in the way’ 
Discussing challenges of processes 
 
Ed spoke about how there were several layers of approvals and reviews required before 
being able to “put [the SOW] together”. This review and approval process remains the 
same for all job requests regardless of contract value. It appears the client may have 
previously compared GTECH’s INFRA response time against other external vendors 
who are in “more nimble places”, who can work out the same solution within a shorter 
amount of time.  
 
 “Sometimes it's only for very low value and very low-risk piece 
of work. And you would hope [for more pragmatism], and 
that's why we get compared to other competitors. All they 
need to do is talk to their managers. Their managers say "Yeah 
that looks right." And they send it out. Because that's very 
low-risk. But in our situation, we have to make sure we have to 
tick a lot of boxes” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
Jason echoed a similar sentiment and offered a big picture view of threats within the 
industry. He appeared to suggest that the competitors come with agendas attached, and 
may potentially threaten GTECH’s share of the AEC’s business. Even though there is 
a contractual agreement between GTECH and AEC, this contract however does not 
prevent “competitors from proposing solutions” which AEC may choose to sign up for. 
Even though Jason did not explicitly state his point of view, a review of the transcript 
and field notes indicated that Jason’s views on existing business processes were critical. 
He observed less communication, flexibility and efficiencies in large organisations. 
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More interesting was his observation that standard processes were not customer-
focused, but rather compliance-related where members of the organisation are 
“requested to comply”.    
 
 “Most of my life, most of my experience was with the mid-
range and smaller companies, where I see more effective 
communication happening. More streamlined processes where 
processes are tailored according to their customers, and there's 
more efficiency with more flexibility in their processes. Where 
I see when you work with a bigger organisation which has 
been established for a while, they have a certain processes that 
they require for due diligence. Due diligence, they are standard 
worldwide, and they request you to conform to such processes. 
So it's less flexibility” [Jason_INFRA]. 
 
 
Patrick_APPS remarked that, “things take longer and are harder. And something that 
should be quite straightforward and simple has to... you have to jump through a number 
of hoops to get somewhere.” Robert_APPS brought up the collaboration between 
INFRA when he was discussing how processes were “constrained” and “slow”. 
Robert_APPS’ seemed to suggest that a request can actually be turned around more 
effectively if it does not involve INFRA due to the existing differences in process,  
 
 “Because it's constrained. It's complex. It's constrained by 
processes that make it slow to deal with you, as a customer. As 
I said earlier, if we miss the 10 days SLA because we have to 
go to INFRA. So not only do we have to say "here's a piece of 
work we'll like you to do as part of our piece of work". But 
before we submit the proposal back to the customer, we have 
to put an agreement in place with INFRA that will do the 
work at this price, this is the scope, [etc]. Once we've got that, 
we can then say, "right, we can move forward” 
[Robert_APPS]. 
 
 
In this view, participants’ disagreement with regards to existing approval process is a 
fundamental result of wanting to preserve the clan. Once again, vendors might take the 
view of INFRA as an unreliable service provider. This can indirectly impact on the 
“partnership” view and lead to loss of trust.  
5.5.5 Section summary 
This section has outlined the findings in relation to how controls can influence the clan, 
which consists of APPS-INFRA and AEC. Respondents within APPS appeared to 
have forged a strong relationship with Client AEC, and examples of commitment and 
trust were given. On the other hand, one respondent from INFRA related a potential 
lack of trust due to previous unsatisfactory performances from the clients’ perspectives. 
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In relation to influences on the clan, respondents in this case identified that outcome 
controls can impact on the clan as it sets a time limitation on their ability to understand 
clients’ requirements in a comprehensive manner. Outcome controls can potentially 
influence the clan in that if requirements were not fully comprehended prior to 
solutioning, this might result in unintended consequences.  
 
Respondents in this case also identified that the working relationship between APPS 
and INFRA is formalised, based on contracts even though they are essentially a team, 
and from a single organisation that provide services to AEC. Despite members from 
APPS maintaining that it is the organisation controls that result in the view of not 
being a single organisation and that members within INFRA are not the problem, 
nonetheless, as a result of differences in objectives, and processes deriving from the 
organisation structure, the clan (APPS and INFRA) treat each other as third parties 
within a single organisation.  
 
While it is important to maintain the clan, i.e. the relationship between APPS, INFRA 
and AEC, the findings suggest that existing rules, policies and procedures can 
potentially lead to slower response time, which might jeopardise and lead to breaches in 
contractual agreements due to failure to achieve the SLAs.  This might again result in a 
performance issue, which can potentially lead to loss of trust and confidence in 
GTECH as a trusted partner.  
 
The findings in this section are summarised in Table 5.16 below. 
 
Table 5.16: Summary of perceived influences on the clan at ALPHA 
Control 
domain 
Control 
identified 
Limitations of control identified  Inferred potential impact on 
clan if workaround 
unsuccessful OUTSOURCING 
 
Service levels  
(OC) 
Unclear requirements, which might result in quality 
issues. Inability to fully understand requirements and 
engage with end-users and stakeholders. Solutioning 
based on unclear requirements might result in 
unintended consequences. 
 Unsatisfactory performance 
leads to lost of trust 
Impact on partnership view 
Service levels  
(OC) 
Require more time due to complexity of requirements  Loss of trust 
Impact on partnership view 
Service levels 
and financial 
penalties 
(OC) 
Overcome clients’ non-approval of extension of SLAs 
that might lead to failure of SLAs 
 Loss of trust 
Impact on partnership view 
ORGANISATION 
 
Organisation 
structure 
Formalised collaboration between divisions. Clients 
perceive GTECH as a single organisation. However, 
SOWs that are processed at both INFRA and APPS 
is based on two sets of costs due to divisional 
differences, which are both charged to clients. 
 Impact on partnership view 
Organisation 
structure 
Formalised collaboration between divisions  Impact on the clan – working 
relationship between APPS and 
INFRA. 
Rules, policies 
and procedures  
Impact on responsiveness. Approval process adds 
on time to existing time limitations set by SLAs 
 Impact on partnership view 
 
This section has highlighted the limitations of both outsourcing and organisation 
controls, and shed light on how they can pose influence on the clan. The next section 
will report on the findings on self-control.  
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5.6 Self-control 
This section reports on the findings in relation to how individuals exercise self-control 
in relation to both outsourcing and organisation controls. In Section 5.4.3 the link 
between performance measurements and client-specified outcomes as explained. To 
recall, at the organisation level, it was identified that performance measurements are 
tied to outcomes, in that clients signing off on proposals will either translate to more 
project work which individuals at APPS can bill their time towards, or translate to 
contractual value that individuals at INFRA count towards their set target of contract 
value and revenue stream.  
 
This section focuses on how individuals exercise work-autonomy and self-sanction in 
relation to existing controls.  
5.6.1 Work autonomy 
As reported in Section 5.5, participants reported a number of limitations with regards to 
existing controls both within the outsourcing and the organisation environment. They 
include impact on the ability to provide quality solutions, formalised collaboration 
between divisions as well as impact on responsiveness, which indirectly relates to a 
potential loss in competitiveness against other third-party vendors. This section reports 
the findings on how respondents identified their “know-hows” based on prior acquired 
skills and experiences about how to get things done and how this exhibits their work-
autonomy.  
5.6.1.1 Overcoming limitations of outcome controls 
The findings indicate that participants can draw upon behaviour control mechanisms to 
overcome limitations of outcome controls and the inability to produce a quality solution.  
 
One participant reported on drawing upon consulting workshops (behaviour control) in 
hope of getting ahead before the client submits a RFS through the official channel. As 
the respondent described,  
 
 “We expect to get a business requirement document that is 
clear. When you talked about ways around things, there may 
be, for example, prior to submission of RFS document, the 
client might do some consulting with in order to gain a 
estimation as to the price of the solution due to potential 
budget constraints. Thus as opposed to going through the 
process of submitting a RFS, they might request consulting 
workshop just to obtain a view as to whether the solution fits 
their budget.  
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In a sense, this is a short cut. Having the consultation before 
the process gets started can help get people on board, 
understanding what clients are after, so the process is not 
slowed down” [Patrick_APPS]. 
 
Thus, in this view, consulting workshops can function as a clan control mechanism that 
can be relied upon to foster a common understanding and shared beliefs with the 
clients. Two participants also reported on the ability to draw upon provisions of 
extensions to SLAs as a workaround to the time-limitations (Refer Section 5.3.3.2).  
 
Participants’ responses appeared to suggest that extensions are dealt with as they occur 
during the course of work. In this view, provisions for extensions is a formal governance 
mechanism that is drawn upon when needed, and somewhat allows for a certain degree 
of leeway and slack should a requirement be more complex than what was determined 
by the client. However, based on participants’ responses, the extension process consists 
of procedures that must be abided by. For instance, both participants related of the need 
to seek approval with the client in order to extend a RFS, as well as the need for 
artefacts, i.e. a record of exchange between members seeking approval and the client to 
prove that an extension has been granted. As one participant related,  
 
 “We have been more focused on making sure that 
information's right, making sure that anything we've 
changed that affects our service levels has an artefact from 
the client that that agrees to that. We will not change 
things within the system unless we have an artefact” 
[Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
However, seeking extensions to RFSs can be problematic, as clients might not approve 
of requests for extensions. The same participant further described his personal 
challenges in obtaining approvals for extensions,  
 
 “We have to work really really hard in convincing them to 
stop the clock. So it is all very subjective, and a lot of the 
power for saying "yes or no" is with the client. It's not 
unusually agreed, and sometimes it's not even based on 
what's logical or practical” [Ed_INFRA]. 
 
 
What can be deduced from the above finding is that certain clan conditions must be 
satisfied prior to approvals. For instance, while the participant from INFRA related 
difficulties in obtaining extensions, a participant from APPS was relating the extension 
process in a manner that suggests open communication would easily facilitate 
extensions. As the participant from APPS (Geena) related, 
 
 “The reason for seeking extensions might be because the 
client’s requirements are not quite right. But if that is the 
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case, then we will put the request on hold. So the clock, if 
you like, stops. And the SLA clock stops for that period 
of time. Once we get something sufficient enough that 
can be estimated against, then the clock can start. Our 
main way of dealing with that is that we highlight for 
whatever reason upfront, communicate that with the 
client. It is almost if we have got an email – an artefact 
that they [the client] accepts the revised date. Then you 
have a new SLA” [Geena_APPS]. 
 
The aforementioned finding can be analysed with regards to the relationship within the 
clan, where it was reported previously of a fundamental difference in AEC’s view 
towards APPS and INFRA (Refer Section 5.5.1). In this view, there are clan 
conditions, i.e. trust that will overcome limitations of formal controls. Consequentially, 
provisions for extensions of SLAs can be analysed as individuals’ exercising of work-
autonomy to overcome issues of non-extensions of SLAs (Section 5.3.3.3).  
 
The next section will focus on how respondents exercise work-autonomy to overcome 
limitations of division constraints, i.e. formalised collaboration (Section 5.5.3). 
5.6.1.2 Overcoming limitations of divisional constraints 
Two out of the nine participants at ALPHA related networking within the organisation 
and “knowing the right people” was very important for overcoming the limitations of 
divisional constraints and to navigate around potential restrictions on work. As one of 
the two participants described the significance of networking, 
 
 “The piece of advice I was given by somebody was to network. 
Network, then network, then network some more. Build your 
networks inside the organisation. You will achieve more 
through a networking than you will through process. And I'd 
suggest that's exactly true. That's what I found who you know 
would assist you immensely. If you don't know something, you 
might know somebody who does. And if they don't, they 
probably do know somebody who does” [Robert_APPS].  
 
5.6.1.3 Overcoming limitations on responsiveness 
When queried on ways to work around the constraints of existing processes, four out of 
the nine participants arrived at the same conclusion - that face-to-face meetings would 
relieve and alleviate the limitations on their work. These face-to-face meetings differ 
from the official meetings scheduled on a daily or weekly basis. They can be informal 
meetings. For example, one participant [Patrick_APPS] reported the need to engage 
approvers prior to submission of approval requests, i.e. providing a heads up to the 
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approver. Another participant reported “pleading” [Ed_INFRA] with approvers to 
escalate existing approval requests. Robert_APPS shared how he would “always end up 
calling the Executive at INFRA” in an attempt to escalate approval requests.  
 
One participant discussed bypassing existing processes in order to increase the amount 
of time he would save in resolving a problem encountered with coding of applications. 
As much as he would like to adhere to the process, at times he could “solve the problem 
in half an hour [Leonard_APPS] compared to how the overseas team will take four 
hours to do” the same job. On such occasions, he would simply make the decision to 
bypass the process and make the changes on the development code himself, as it would 
be done quicker. He commented that while bypassing processes was frowned upon, 
there definitely needed to be ways to work around processes, as they could get in the 
way of work.  
 
In summary, participants reported engaging and negotiating with fellow colleagues, as 
well as bypassing existing guidelines in order to get work done. This is indicative of how 
participants exercise creativity in their execution of work, and a reliance on social 
networks in order to make one’s job easier.  
5.6.2 Self-sanctioning in accordance to performance measurements 
As reported in Section 5.4.3, there is a link between performance measurements at the 
organisation level and client-specified outcomes. To recall, the findings reported 
indicated that clients signing off on submitted SOWs either constitute a sale which 
members at INFRA can be credited for, or at APPS, a SOW will progress into a project 
in which hours can be charged to client. This section reports on how participants self-
sanction in accordance to existing client-specified outcomes and performance 
measurements. The findings indicate three instances of individuals self-sanctioning in 
accordance to existing performance measurements. 
 
One participant [Ed_INFRA] was aware of the need to achieve his own personal KPI 
based on contract value, leading him to suggest that he should be credited for his time 
and effort spent on conducting consulting workshops (clan). As noted, achieving SLAs 
indirectly feeds into his KPIs of contract value, in spite of an understanding that 
consulting workshops should be conducted out of goodwill, and function as a form of 
relationship building effort to sustain the ongoing business relationship with Client 
AEC. Maintaining strong relationships with clients can potentially result in more 
businesses. However, for the participant, performing these additional workshops has no 
added benefits to himself, as it further divides his time and effort, when in his view, 
more effort can be placed on working on existing deals with a time-based limitation, i.e. 
SLAs.  
 
This participant is particularly interesting as analysis of his interview indicates that he is 
an experienced individual who has been employed for two decades and has worked 
through the ranks in GTECH from an intern to his current position as a Team Lead. 
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Further, when queried about his motivation for work he responded that he takes pride 
in his work for being a “trusted advisor to [his] client… give good advice, and give good 
outcomes [Ed_INFRA]”. In spite of disagreements with the way things work within 
the organisation, the participant had to adhere to the norm by dividing his time and 
effort through participating in consulting workshops when necessary, maintaining client 
relationships, working on existing RFSs, and attending internal and client review 
meetings. All of which ties back in with achieving his performance measurements, i.e. 
Total Contract Value ($).  
 
Jason_INFRA who is currently a contract staff with no performance measurements or 
targets also has interesting views. This participant disagreed with how there were 
insufficient tools and non-integrated tools within the organisation that will allow him to 
track the number, and the value of the RFSs he has secured. The lack of tools, in his 
view, is problematic, as he would like to be able to obtain his individual performance 
and “push himself” to his manager for an opportunity to convert to a permanent 
position. As he stated,  
 
 “At the moment, I'm working as contractor with GTECH, so 
I don't have these targets. But I always like to tell [my] 
manager [that] these are the RFSs that I won. These are the 
value of RFSs ($) I signed, so I can push myself to the 
company” [Jason_INFRA]. 
 
 
As a recent migrant to the country, his focus is to provide for his family and “put food 
on the table”. Thus, for this individual, converting to a permanent position with 
GTECH might assist in securing a higher salary, sprucing up one’s resume due to being 
in a reputable organisation such as GTECH and in due course, he might be able to 
move through the ranks and occupy a more substantial role like he did as an Operations 
Manager in his home country. As the individual himself admitted when queried upon 
his motivation for work, “there is a financial perspective for me [Jason_INFRA]”.  
 
Keira, the Project Manager displayed strong emotions when discussing her experiences 
with her performance measurements, i.e. utilisation rate. She related that the strategic 
initiative of GTECH in the past few years has been to propose the value of Cloud 
technologies to existing outsourcing clients. In order to align to this initiative, the 
participant conducted research and developed a series of white papers with the objective 
to educate Client AEC on the value of migrating to a Cloud platform. In spite of all 
these efforts, she had decided not to proceed with these educational and upselling 
programs, i.e. attempt to market new products to Client AEC. The underlying reason 
for not proceeding with this initiative relates to how it will end up disadvantaging her 
utilisation rate, i.e. she will not be credited for all her efforts, as it does not “fit” her 
performance measurements framework.  
 
 “At the beginning of the year, I got really involved in 
learning about Cloud, I went on a seller's course so that I 
will be able to sell Cloud. Fantastic! I developed loads of 
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papers about the strategy, like a strategy piece we could 
take to clients to help them understand how they could 
convert to a Cloud model. 
 
Now, I'm rated on how utilised I am but I did not get a 
utilisation code for it. I would be someone who would 
probably rock at selling that Cloud stuff right! I would be 
pulling them in money in their new strategy. But because 
they chose not to recognise my work, so therefore I choose 
not to do it for them. So they've just actually done 
themselves out of someone who can help them go in that 
direction” [Keira_APPS].  
 
Another participant [Rachael_APPS] highlighted how it was imperative for members 
within APPS to clinch and work on as many projects as possible in order to be able to 
“charge the client” for work done. The more resources that are free and not working, 
the more it will “cost GTECH money”.  
 
The above perspectives not only augment the link between performance measurements 
and outcome controls. It has also exemplified how members within outsourcing 
arrangements practice self-control in their work, and sanction their selves in accordance 
to set targets.  
5.6.3 Section summary 
This section has reported on the findings in relation to self-control. The results indicate 
that participants disagreed with regards to existing performance measurements. 
However, in spite of disagreements, this study notes of three instances where 
participants were self-sanctioning themselves in accordance with performance 
measurements. It has also highlighted the role of extrinsic motivations present within 
the organisation environment that encouraged individuals to exercise self-control. The 
findings highlight how individuals still choose to acquiesce to demands of performance 
measurements, which was identified in Section 5.4.4 to be linked to client-specified 
outcomes in spite of contests and disagreements.  
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings from ALPHA in accordance with the structure 
of the research questions. In relation to how formal governance mechanisms translate to 
outcome or behaviour controls, the study found that: 
• Not all formal governance mechanisms function as outcome and behaviour 
controls.  
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• Outcome controls act upon individuals through the use of meetings (behaviour 
controls) that require individuals to provide daily updates to all RFSs within the 
pipeline.  
• Behaviour controls act upon individuals in that they require individuals to 
perform procedures in a certain way in accordance to specified operating 
procedures.  
• Formal governance mechanisms appeared to relate to the governance structure 
of the outsourcing arrangements. 
• Outcome controls are primarily exercised from client organisation, but behaviour 
controls were mostly conducted within the organisation through review 
meetings.  
 
Pertaining to the interface between outsourcing and organisation controls, the findings 
indicate that: 
• There are two primary processes to collaborate on RFSs. They are namely 
approval process and establishing of a MoU between divisions before any 
proposals can be returned to clients. There are also performance measurements 
and evaluations within organisation that respondents are subjected to.  
• Organisation structure plays a significant role in terms of how members within 
different divisions relate to each other.  
• Existing rules, policies and procedures intertwined with the approval process 
have the potential to impact on the ability to achieve client-specified outcomes.  
• The ways in which organisation control interface with outsourcing controls is 
multi-dimensional, in that it involves organisation structure, rules, policies and 
procedures as well as hierarchical authority.  
 
In relation to the influence of controls on the clan, the findings suggest that: 
• Outcome controls can impact on the clan in that it sets a time limitation on 
their ability to understand clients’ requirements in a comprehensive manner.  
• Collaboration between APPS and INFRA as part of the clan is formalised as a 
result of the organisation structure, which treat each division as a third party. 
This shows through the need for the formalisation of collaboration through 
contracts. This can impact on the clan due to dual charges and more expensive 
quotes.  
• Existing rules, policies and procedures adds on time, and can potentially impact 
on response time. This can impact on the clan in that it might affect the 
partnership view, and facilitate the introduction of competitors.   
 
On self-control: 
• Individuals practice work-autonomy by drawing upon previous skills and 
experiences to bypass limitations of controls.  
• Self-control is encouraged within the organisation through the link between 
performance measurements and outcome controls.  
 
The next chapter will focus on reporting the findings from Team BETA.  
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS FROM TEAM BETA 
   
 
6.1 Overview 
As outlined in Chapter Four (Section 4.2), Team BETA consists of six participants 
belonging to the same division, i.e. Infrastructure Services Division (INFRA) that are 
dedicated to serving the strategic outsourcing client – Best National Bank (BNB).  The 
team consists of four Information Systems (IS) professionals in both managerial and 
non-managerial roles, as well as two Operations personnel one of whom assumed 
managerial position. Similar to Team ALPHA, all participants have a pre-existing 
working relationship with one another (Refer Section 3.6.4). Table 6.1 below provides a 
brief summary of participants in BETA and their roles and responsibilities.  
 
This chapter will follow a similar structure to Chapter 5. Firstly, it will provide a high-
level description of the work conducted by members at BETA (Section 6.2). The 
chapter will then proceed to present the findings on formal governance mechanisms, 
including classification of the mechanisms into outcome and behaviour controls 
(Section 6.3). Following this, findings in relation to controls established at the 
organisation level will be examined (Section 6.4). Subsequently, the findings in relation 
to how controls can influence the clan will be examined (Section 6.5). Finally, the 
chapter will present findings in relation to self-control (Section 6.6) and a summary 
section (Section 6.7).  
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Table 6.1: Summary of participants from Team BETA 
Division Pseudonym M/F Years at 
GTECH 
Roles Responsibility Classification Manage
r (Y/N) 
Recruitment into 
GTECH 
INFRA 
Donald M 20 Account Executive Building and maintenance of the 
relationship with BETA. Final 
approver of all requests before they 
get sent to the client.  
IS professional Y Merger + 
promotion 
Kate F 17 Team Manager Manage a team of architects. IS professional Y Internal transfer 
from an overseas 
branch + 
promotion 
Dave M 4 Solution Specialist Provide guidance to architects within 
the team with regards to technical 
solutions. 
IS professional N External hire 
Hugh M 8 Infrastructure 
Solutions Architect 
Understand clients’ requirements 
and provide a proposal/solution 
based on their requirements. 
IS professional N External hire + 
promotion 
Felicity F 14.5 Business 
Performance 
Manager 
Analysis of the performance of the 
outsourcing team. 
Operations Y External hire 
Meryl F 15 Business 
Performance Analyst 
Responsible for generation of 
performance reports, consolidating 
and obtaining inputs from architects. 
Operations N External hire. 
Contract worker. 
Recently 
converted to 
permanent 
position.  
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6.2 Description of the work conducted at BETA 
As part of the outsourcing contract, BETA consists of employees from only the INFRA 
division. The services BETA provides as part of the outsourcing contract include 
helpdesk, database and server management that are offshored and located in South East 
Asian (SEA) region. As one participant described,  
 
 “A lot of our services are delivered through India, 
Malaysia and Philippines. There would be about 350 
resources across those regions. The contract established 
between GTECH and BNB is highly leveraged on global 
delivery” [Donald]. 
 
 
Similar to ALPHA, the overall objective of the work activities of respondents in this 
study relates to the responding of requests sent in by members at BNB.  The aim is to 
produce a Statement of Work (SOW), a proposal that outlines the details of the 
solution, services provided and the cost of the solution. 
 
Even though BETA consists of members from a single division, there are instances 
whereby as part of a solution, they might have to tap into resources and skills that 
INFRA do not possess within their division.   
 
 “There have been occasions where we have engaged 
APPS with respect to procuring specific skills, most 
notably things like high-level project management skills 
or high-level architecture skills” [Dave]. 
 
 
 It has to be noted that such cross-divisional procuring of resources and skills are not 
limited to only APPS, as another participant in this study indicated the need to tap onto 
services from other business divisions, such as Network Services Division or the 
Delivery Services Division. As outlined above, BETA evidently consists of members 
that are located in other overseas locations. However, the focus in this study is to 
examine controls within the vendor organisation. Thus, it would not be within the 
scope of this study to include members at the offshored location. 
6.3 Formal controls 
This section reports on the controls at the level of the outsourcing arrangement that 
emerged from the data collected from participants at Team BETA. A total of ten 
formal governance mechanisms were found at BETA, which were further categorised 
into outcome or behavioural control. Table 6.2 below summarises the identified 
governance mechanisms, a brief description of each mechanism, and classification into 
outcome or behaviour controls, as well as the number of participants who discussed the 
specific mechanism.  
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Table 6.2: Outsourcing controls identified at BETA 
Formal governance 
mechanisms 
Description Number of 
instances 
(out of 6) 
Classification 
1. Contractual details Type of contract established 
between client and vendor.  
3 Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
2. Business office Functions as the “bridge” 
between outsourcer and 
outsourcee, which manage all 
incoming request for services 
(RFSs), and dispatch the 
requests electronically via 
systems in place to the 
respective outsourcing team.  
1 Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
3. Request for service 
document 
A document initiated by the client 
that is used to communicate to 
the outsourcing team through 
specifying the background of the 
business problem, requirements, 
complexity of the requirements, 
as well as other pertinent 
information such as the contact 
details of the requestor. 
5 Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
4. Procedures for 
receiving RFSs 
Participants’ description of how 
RFSs are received. 
2 Formal 
governance 
mechanism 
5. Service level 
agreements with 
different levels of 
complexities 
The number of days required to 
turnaround a request for service 
that is associated with varying 
complexity levels. 
6 
 
Specification 
of days 
4  
Outcome control 
6. Penalties for failing 
service levels 
Financial penalties payable to 
outsourcee (client) should 
service levels not be met. 
3 Outcome control 
7. Requirements 
assessment 
The process following the receipt 
of RFSs that primarily aimed at 
clarification of requirements sent 
through from Client BNB.   
2 Behaviour 
control 
8. Procedures for 
escalation and 
dispute resolutions 
Specification of the processes for 
resolving disputes and managing 
of situations. 
1 Behaviour 
control 
9. Consulting 
Workshops 
Initiated by members within client 
or vendor team that aims to 
understand and propose 
solutions to business problems. 
Includes clarification of 
requirements, understanding of 
requirements, or generation of 
requirements. 
1 Behaviour 
control 
10. Frequency of 
monitoring and 
review 
Meetings that are used to 
monitor vendors’ performance 
against pre-specified standards. 
2 Behaviour 
control 
11. System for 
management of 
RFSs 
Specification of the type of 
systems in place between BETA 
and client. 
2 Outcome control 
Behaviour 
control 
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6.3.1 Formal governance mechanisms 
Four formal governance mechanisms were highlighted across the six participants. They 
related to contractual details, the use of a request for service (RFS) document, presence 
of a Business Office or vendor management office that manages all incoming RFSs, as 
well as procedures and systems in place for the receipt of RFSs from Client BNB. 
However, the study also found that systems in place could function as both outcome 
and behavioural control. These findings will be discussed in the following sections. 
6.3.1.1 Contractual details 
Three of the six participants at BETA revealed contract details established between 
BETA and BNB, utilising descriptive terms, such as “stock standard pricing” [Hugh] 
and that “costs is a defined factor [within contract]” [Dave], with the third participant 
discussing the complexity of the contract. For the first participant [Hugh], this was 
brought up when the participant was relating how he had managed to affect change 
within the outsourcing team through the development of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
that has made approvals within the organisation less tedious.  
 
The second participant [Dave] highlighted the contractual agreement type when 
discussing the challenges faced in collaborating across organisational lines, and how 
there was a need to justify to the client a potential increase in charges not in line with 
the current contractual agreement. Based on prior literature, this is a form of pricing 
schedule. The third participant [Donald] raised the problem of the complexity of the 
contract, highlighting how “there are probably about 200 documents that actually define 
the contract and all the services that [the team] delivery to them”, including how 
existing contractual operating procedures that GTECH apply for new customers “are 
very well-defined and the same across every customer [that the organisation partners 
with]”.  
6.3.1.2 Business Office  
Only one of the six participants mentioned the role of the Business Office established 
between BETA and BNB, where the participant [Dave] described that the office 
functioned as “a glue that keeps [the (RFS)] moving]” from receipt of request from 
client to the development of a technological solution in the form of a SOW that will be 
submitted to the client for sign-off.  
 
Chapter Six: Findings from Team BETA 
 
 
 
Page 141 of 249 
6.3.1.3 Request for services document 
Five out of the six participants related that the RFS is the primary document sent in 
through from the client that outlines the initial requirements. Dave explicitly described 
the process by which an RFS is received from the client, which will be further discussed 
in the next section. Kate highlighted that her team is responsible for responding to 
requests sent in from the clients, while Felicity related the process by which RFSs are 
being received from clients and the procedures for processing. The fourth participant 
did not explicitly mention the term “RFS” or “requests”. However, he responded to a 
query with regards to how existing SLAs can impact the performance of work, with 
workarounds used to “buy time”. For the researcher, this was treated as an 
acknowledgement on the use of RFSs, which is associated with SLAs. The above 
finding is summarised in Table 6.3 below.  
 
Table 6.3: Representative interview quotes on RFS 
Division Pesudonym Representative interview quotes on RFS 
INFRA Donald “A Request for Service (RFS) or Statement of Work (SOW) which defines the 
scope of work, the costs, what dates we are going to do things by, the 
milestones, how we get paid. It is all defined in that SOW.” 
Kate “We submit a work through the RFS process” 
Dave “They liaise with the client only in that, only if the client raises a request” 
Hugh Did respond to queries regarding limitations around RFSs 
Felicity “Part of our process is we have to receive the requests from the customer,” 
Meryl   
 
A small number of participants further described how, as part of the governance 
process, the RFS document gets sent through to the Business Office (Section 6.3.1.2), 
which provide perspective to how RFSs are received from Client BNB. This will be 
examined in the following section. 
6.3.1.4 Procedures for receiving RFSs 
Two out of the six interviewees related how RFSs were received from Client BNB. In 
the discussion of coordination challenges within the organisation, Dave described the 
workflow of the system including how “there was an unspoken view that all requests 
should be within the system before any work should commence” in order to ensure all 
records are officially tracked. Dave’s commentary describing the workflow within the 
Request Management System (ReqMgmtSystem) is reproduced below,  
 
 “There is a very defined flow within ReqMgmtSystem. 
Request will come through. Business Office will create a 
record. Once they have created it, it sits within the system and 
waits for an architect. The architect will then qualify the 
request, fill it all the details, and they will then get it to a 
solution design point, which will then be assigned to a 
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technical solutions architect. The technical solutions architect 
will then take that record, and update it as soon as a 
Statement of Work is produced” [Dave].   
 
The functionalities of the system were also described by Felicity, the Business 
Performance Manager. She detailed how the RFSs are tracked through the 
ReqMgmtSystem and the demands for processing the RFSs and capturing of 
information for reporting of SLAs. As she described,  
 
 “Part of our process is we have to receive the requests from the 
customer, and we have to process that in a particular way. You 
know, the guidelines in terms of processing that, we obviously 
have to capture the date, we obviously have to capture the 
information. We have to store it in a place… so the fact that it 
is captured in a tool. The fact that it is stored in a particular 
place, and it has to, you know, when they capture it, they then 
have a tool that they can assign to the person that needs to be 
looking at the information first. And then they can further 
assign that to the next person that needs to deal with the 
information” [Felicity]. 
 
 
What can be derived from the aforementioned statements is the presence of official 
procedures that is pre-developed to guide (1) how clients send in requests, as well as (2) 
how members within the vendor organisation should process the received requests. 
These are regarded as formal governance mechanisms, as they do not directly exert 
influence over the work of individuals. The ReqMgmtSystem was additionally 
identified as both an outcome and behaviour control, which will be further discussed in 
Section 6.3.4. 
 
The next section will present the findings on outcome controls that emerged from the 
analysis.  
6.3.2 Outcome controls 
As per the framework developed, the analysis found two instances of outcome controls. 
They are namely service level agreements (SLAs) associated with different level of 
complexities, and financial penalties.   
6.3.2.1 Service level agreements  
Five participants in BETA explicitly pointed out of the need to achieve clients’ specified 
SLAs, which set a time limitation and specify the number of days required to 
turnaround a RFS. The other participant, Donald the Account Executive, only briefly 
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responded to an inquiry regarding service levels but did not explicitly discuss the 
concept. The interview quotes reflecting the above are presented in Table 6.4 below. 
Following this, the findings will be discussed.  
 
Table 6.4: Representative interview quotes on service levels at BETA 
Division Pesudonym Representative interview quotes on SLAs 
INFRA Donald Did not explicitly discuss SLAs.  
Kate “Sometimes you're asked to achieve things, based around the end result being 
a number. Be it a financial number, a number of people, or a number of days.” 
“There are two types of work that come into my team. One that's governed by 
this time box – 7 or 21 days.” 
Dave “The SLA there is on acknowledge of the request and assignment of a 
responsible person to the request.” 
Hugh “… We have Service Level Agreements with financial penalties.” 
“We are very much driven by Service Level Agreements, because our Service 
Levels have financial penalties associated with them.” 
Felicity “Our company has contracts with various customers and in those contracts we 
have to perform to certain levels”  
Meryl  “I am sure the SLAs and the targets are there, are there to keep them 
accountable. And I think sometimes they need to be accountable.” 
 
In the discussion of SLAs, one participant highlighted how the SLAs set the “time box” 
for each RFS [Kate] and stated that SLAs established between BETA and BNB are 
associated with different levels of complexities (low and high) and turnaround time (7 
or 12 days). Another participant, Dave does not personally have any SLAs due to his 
role within the outsourcing team. For him, the SLA is simply an acknowledgement that 
the team has received the RFS from the client, and that he is the person responsible for 
it. In spite of this, he related how his fellow colleagues within BETA are “fighting for 
time” as the tracking functionalities of the ReqMgmtSystem keep tabs on each and 
every RFS. Hugh, who has to respond with SLAs, made a similar comment to Dave; 
“[the team] is very much driven by service levels”.  
 
The fourth participant, Meryl a Business Performance analyst related that the need for 
SLAs was to ensure individuals are being held accountable. Only Felicity explicitly 
mentioned service levels as part of contractual agreements established between BETA 
and BNB. As she states,  
 
 “Our company has various contracts with various customers 
and we have to perform to certain service levels in those 
contracts”.   
 
 
 As indicated previously by Kate, the SLAs are based on either 7 or 21 days turnaround 
time with different complexity levels7. A request of low complexity will be set at a 7-day 
SLA, while a 21-day SLA is applicable for RFSs of high complexity. Table 6.5 on the 
next page presents a summary of the service levels established between BETA and 
BNB. 
                                               
7 The service levels have been intentionally altered in order to ensure that BETA team, and its members 
will not be identified. 
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Table 6.5: Service level agreements between BETA and Client BNB 
Service level agreements  
Level of complexity Low High 
Number of days (SLAs) 7 21 
 
Service levels are also associated with financial penalties, which will be examined in the 
following section.  
6.3.2.2  Financial penalties 
Three out of the six participants in BETA were also found to associate failing SLAs 
with financial penalties, with one participant indicating the range of financial penalties 
payable. Kate related the need for the team to perform to the best of their abilities in 
order not to fail service levels and “not incur penalties whenever possible” as “[the 
penalties] can be hundreds of thousands of dollars”. Felicity, the Business Performance 
Manager, on the other hand stressed the importance of not failing SLAs due to 
potentially large financial penalties. Hugh similarly presented the same point and his 
statement appears to suggest that it is due to the financial penalties involved with failing 
SLAs that drives the work of the team.  The aforementioned findings is summarised in 
Table 6.6 below. 
 
Table 6.6: Representative interview quotes on financial penalties at BETA 
Division Pseudonym Representative interview quotes reflecting financial penalties 
INFRA Donald - 
Kate “I like to feel that you can achieve this challenge, and that you can perform this 
to the best of your abilities so that in this case, we don't fail service levels or we 
don't incur penalties wherever possible.” 
 
“We are contractually obliged to work within a certain timeframe. That's what 
we get measured on. And that's what we get penalised for if we don't make it.” 
Dave - 
Hugh “We are very much driven by Service Level Agreements, because our Service 
Levels have financial penalties associated with them.” 
Felicity “Because there's dollars involved. There's a lot of time and energy spent. You 
know, there are potential penalties. And they can be very large.” 
Meryl - 
 
The above two sections have highlighted the findings on what is regarded as outcome 
controls at the contractual level between client and vendor. It is evident from the 
findings that both contractual agreements are based on service levels, as identified by 
twelve out of the fifteen participants.  
 
The next section will outline the findings of behaviour controls that emerged from the 
data analysis.  
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6.3.3 Behaviour controls 
These findings on behaviour controls will be discussed in the following order; (1) 
requirements assessment, (2) provisions for disputes, (3) consulting workshops and (4) 
frequency of monitoring and review.  
6.3.3.1 Requirements assessment 
Only one out of the six participants indicated the presence of a requirements assessment 
process after receiving RFS from clients. The participant described this process,  
 
 “So the architects mainly produce Statement of Work 
document. And they will, from requirements that have been 
sent in by the client, liaise with the client only if the client 
raises a request and there is something they need to question 
about the requirements. They will contact the clients and ask 
them about the requirements to get clarity” [Dave]. 
 
6.3.3.2 Provisions for disputes 
Only one of the six participants [Kate] suggested that disputes between BETA and 
Client BNB should SLAs not be met, could be solved through legal channels. A current 
manager with a team of twelve architects, Kate had previous received feedback from her 
team members to replace SLAs with a more subjective assessment of technological 
proposals, i.e. SOWs. In spite of agreeing and empathising with her team members, 
Kate related the difficulties for subjective measurements, when there is a need for things 
to “to be very black and white” when financial penalties have the potential to be as large 
as “hundreds of thousands of dollars”. Kate continued with the implications of potential 
disputes if subjective assessments were the main criteria for evaluation of the SOWs, 
“we will spend a lot of time, our lawyers will be spending a lot of time, wasting time 
arguing whether it passes or fail in terms of the contract”. 
 
Even though only one of the six participants highlighted the potentially legal 
implications of failing SLAs, they also indicated that there are contractual clauses that 
both client and vendor organisation can adopt should a dispute occur.  
 
This finding indicate that outcome controls are intimately tied with financial penalties, 
and in spite of calls for subjective assessments as opposed to objective measurements, 
what clients demand is for service levels and stated requirements to be met. Failure to 
do so can result in serious implications that might cost GTECH money.   
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6.3.3.3 Consulting workshops 
Similar to the previous finding, only one of the six participants [Dave] mentioned the 
provision of consulting as a result of contractual obligations. He related that his primary 
responsibility was to respond to pre-project consultation request that is “written into the 
contract with [Client BNB]”. Members from Client BNB can engage with him 
formally as described above, or informally by calling him to seek advice on potential 
projects the clients have in mind. The expectation for responding to consulting requests 
can take “anywhere from two hours to up to two weeks, depending on the complexity of 
the requirements”.  
 
Dave also noted that he had a colleague who holds a similar position to him. This 
member of BETA was not interviewed for this study, as he is a newcomer to the team 
and organisation. It can thus be inferred from this finding that Dave is expected both 
formally and informally to behave in a certain manner in order to respond to clients’ 
requests for consultations.  
6.3.3.4 Frequency of monitoring and review 
Two of the six participants (Kate and Felicity) related being involved in a daily meeting 
where requests are reviewed. According to Felicity, the Business Performance Analyst, 
the meeting involves the generation of reports from the ReqMgmtSystem, which serves 
as the point of reference for reviewing the statuses of all RFSs. Felicity elaborated and 
described the form of information she relied on in order to “create a flowchart [to the 
client] on what has happened on a specific data” to report back on whether 
commitments were met. The types of detail she requires and asked during the meeting, 
as the participant related, include the following,    
 
 ““What requests have gone out? What requests have not gone 
out yet? Are they being held up? Who are the personnel 
holding up? Do we have enough information at the moment?” 
[Felicity]. 
 
 
What the above indicates is that review and monitoring of performance are primarily 
being conducted within the vendor organisation, and the client primarily exercised 
outcome controls. Also, the daily review meetings might be a result of clients requesting 
a daily report. However, this was not queried either. In Felicity’s interview, she also 
mentioned a client meeting she had to attend after the interview in order to discuss the 
performance of the contract. This suggests review meetings would be held between 
client and vendor, but the frequency is unknown.  
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6.3.4 Information systems as outcome and behaviour control 
The focus of this section is to examine how the ReqMgmtSystem functioned as both an 
outcome and behaviour control. All findings in this section will be summarised in Table 
6.7 below.  
 
As an outcome control, Felicity, the Business Performance Analyst, indicated that 
review meetings involve the generation of reports from the ReqMgmtSystem, which 
serves as the point of reference for reviewing the statuses of all RFSs. Another 
participant described the function of the systems, reports would be extracted in order to 
understand “the performance of the team as a whole, [and might] not necessarily 
[target] the individual” [Hugh].” Felicity elaborated and described the form of 
information she relied on in order to “create a flowchart [to the client] on what has 
happened on a specific data” to report back on whether commitments were met.  
 
Dave provided the most striking example of how existing systems can influence the 
behaviours of individuals, and function as a behavioural control. Dave discussed the 
unwritten rules within the organisation that guide individuals’ behaviours. It appears 
that even though ReqMgmtSystem stands as the official platform for Client BNB to 
communicate RFS to Team BETA, there was another channel by which the client 
might send in RFSs. Client BNB sometimes put in RFSs through to BETA via a 
Commercial System8, to which only he is the only one who have access to. This 
indicates that Dave would be the sole person within the team that would have been 
aware should an RFS be received through this channel.  
 
Dave reported that due to the dual channels by which RFSs may be received, issues 
might occur when collaborating with his fellow architects due to their unwillingness to 
work on RFSs that are not logged within ReqMgmtSystem. Dave observed risk-related 
reasons such as potential differences in documentation as well as a deviation from 
official guidelines should the architects accept responsibility for working on the RFSs 
that were not sent in through the official system. The participant stated that adhering to 
official guidelines “is a bit of making sure that the blame is in the right place, and not 
accepting work that you're not supposed to be working on yet” [Dave]. He related how 
the tracking functionality of the system can affect the behaviours of his fellow 
colleagues,  
 
 “The process is [the architects] should only reference 
documents that are in ReqMgmtSystem. If they reference 
documents that I have provided, there's a potential that I 
might provide a different version of the document. The 
process says that a request can only be worked on when it is 
properly assigned via ReqMgmtSystem. But reality says don't 
be stupid. We have got all the details you need. Work on it.” 
[Dave]. 
 
                                               
8 The features and functionalities of the Commercial System was not revealed. 
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There had been instances where his fellow architects would accept Dave’s proposal to 
retrieve the RFS document and send it to them via email. However, Dave also reported 
occasions where architects were too consumed with other RFSs that they might reject 
Dave due to deviation from official guidelines. The dual channel of receiving RFSs 
could impact Dave profoundly, as he was the only one who had access to the system, 
thus any delays on the request might fall on his shoulders.  
 
Dave shared that he had previously explained to Client BNB to send all RFSs through 
the official system, and the client understood the reasons. However considering that 
there had been a recent occurrence when the interview took place, it is an indication of 
an outstanding issue that had yet to be resolved. However, this incident, when related 
back to Felicity’s need for accuracy in the reporting of time shows exactly why it is not 
encouraged for IS professionals to be working on RFSs that are not tracked by the 
system, as the organisation will not be able to account for such RFSs appropriately.  
 
Table 6.7: Representative interview quotes on ReqMgmtSystem at BETA 
Division Pseudonym Facilitating the receipt of 
requests 
Tracking of requests Generation of reports for 
reviews 
INFRA Donald - - - 
Kate - - Felicity indicated that Kate is 
involved in a daily meeting for 
daily tracking of statuses of 
requests.  
Dave “We use a workflow tool called 
ReqMgmtSystem. There is a 
very defined flow within the 
system. Request will come 
through. Business Office will 
create a request record. Once 
they have created it, it sits 
there and waits for an 
architect. The architect will 
then take that qualify the 
requirements, fill in all the 
details and they will get it to a 
solution design point.” 
“Once it's been 
assigned to them, it 
can be tracked. Yes. 
Until it's been assigned 
to them, they are not 
being tracked on it, on 
their name. So if 
something goes 
wrong, it's not their 
name on it. Nobody 
can say that the TSA 
didn't do it. So it's a bit 
of cover your arse. 
Umm it's a bit of 
making sure that the 
blame is in the right 
place, and not 
accepting work that 
you're not supposed to 
be working on yet.” 
- 
Hugh - “So we're measured 
on, how accurate we 
are, like we have to 
state when the 
proposals that we 
prepare will go to the 
client. There are 
reports that are run 
that say "Quote 1 2 3, 
originally that said it 
was going to take two 
weeks, but it took 4 
weeks." 
“I am aware of reports that get 
run within GTECH that looks at 
the performance of the team as 
a whole, not necessarily the 
individual. But also, it's an 
impersonal mathematic 
approach that doesn't look at 
environmental factors. So 
therefore it's outside of a 
performance limitation. You 
could say, or characteristic.” 
Felicity “Part of our process is we 
have to receive the requests 
- “So in the meeting that I am in 
every morning, we are 
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from the customer, and we 
have to process that in a 
particular way. The guidelines 
in terms of processing are 
that, we obviously have to 
capture the date, we obviously 
have to capture the 
information. We have to store 
it in a place where outputs can 
be generated. We changed 
from an old system to 
something called 
ReqMgmtSystem”.  
reviewing what requests have 
gone out, what have not gone 
out yet. Are they being held up? 
Who are they with? Do we have 
enough information at the 
moment? One of the people in 
the meeting is a graduate who 
helps extract the comments the 
architects are made into 
ReqMgmtSystem, and provide 
me with enough information to 
validate that we have met our 
timeframe or have not met our 
timeframe”. 
Meryl -   
 
As indicated previously, the system involved with reporting is ReqMgmtSystem. 
Felicity mentioned that the accuracy of the information stored within the system is only 
as accurate insofar as IS professionals update it on time. According to her, due to the 
in-built functionalities and properties of the system, any entries or updates made after 
business hours will be automatically updated to signify that the RFS was not waiting 
throughout the day for the clients’ input and feedback. She described this process as 
follows,  
 
 “If we are waiting today, and the entry gets input in a timely 
manner, then we can communicate to Client BNB that the 
request is in their space. However, if the entry goes in at 
7pm, because it is out of business hours, or it goes into the 
next day, the system assumes that we were not waiting on 
anything even though the comment might say we were.” 
[Felicity]  
 
 
Due to the system functionalities, Felicity reported that she spends half of her time 
analysing the data within the reports in order to understand the flow of each RFS and 
whether it achieves the specified SLAs by client. This report is then regarded “as a 
source of truth” [Felicity].  
 
The findings indicate the use of daily meetings to solicit updated information on the 
status of RFSs in order to gain and understand which RFSs are at risk of failing, the 
number of days each RFS is currently at, and how many more days to go before an RFS 
constitutes a risk. 
6.3.5 Section summary 
This section has outlined the findings in relation to the controls established at the level 
of outsourcing arrangement. A total of eleven formal governance mechanisms were 
identified. However, only six out of the ten governance mechanisms were essentially 
operationalised and function as outcome and/or behaviour controls. This finding is 
summarised in Table 6.8 below.  
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Table 6.8: Summary of formal controls at BETA 
Formal governance 
mechanisms 
Outcome controls Behaviour controls 
1. Contractual details 
! Supporting 
contractual 
documents; 
! Pricing schedule 
  
2. Business Office 
3. RFS document 
4. Procedures for 
receiving RFSs 
5. Service levels with 
different levels of 
complexities 
6. Financial penalties 
7. Requirements 
assessment 
8. Provisions for dispute 
resolutions 
9. Consulting workshops 
10. Frequency of monitoring 
and review 
 
The findings suggest that outcome controls, identified in BETA as SLAs, financial 
penalties, and systems, act upon individuals through the daily meetings (behaviour 
controls) established within the vendor organisation that require individuals to provide 
daily updates to solutions. In a sense, this ensemble of controls operates in tandem to 
exert control over individuals in that they have to be at the top of their game in having a 
view of all RFSs. Respondents at BETA identified requirements clarification process, 
provisions for disputes and escalations, consulting workshops and systems as behaviour 
controls. The study found that behaviour controls require individuals to perform tasks 
in certain ways and have specific procedures.  
6.4 Interface between outsourcing and organisation controls 
The previous section has focused on reporting the findings at the level of outsourcing 
arrangement. This section reports on how controls established at the outsourcing 
arrangement interface with controls within the organisation environment. Participants 
in BETA identified several procedures that they have to adhere to in the course of 
submitting a proposal to clients.  Even though participants at BETA are primarily from 
one division, they however reported having to collaborate across divisional lines (Refer 
Section 6.2). They also reported having to submit proposals through the approval and 
review process prior to submission to the client. Additionally, the performance 
evaluation process within the organisation environment was reported to be different 
from the evaluation process at the outsourcing level.  
 
The procedures reported by participants is summarised in Table 6.9 on the next page. 
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Table 6.9: Procedures identified at ALPHA 
Procedure  Description Number of 
participants 
Collaborating on RFSs 
across divisional lines 
Even though all members from BETA are within 
the same division, they reported having to 
collaborate across divisional lines based on the 
nature of the requests.  
3 
 
Approval process Approval process is based on clip levels and goes 
through different hierarchies.  
4 
Performance 
measurements 
Performance and evaluations within organisation.  3 
 
At BETA, participants reported having to collaborate across divisional lines and the 
need to submit all developed SOWs through the approval process.  
6.4.1 Collaboration across divisional lines 
While BETA primarily services the needs of Client BNB in terms of infrastructure, 
three of the six participants reported the need to collaborate with Applications Services 
Division9 (APPS) and delivery teams when the requirements of BNB require some form 
of consultancy work. It became apparent that each division had different objectives, in 
the form of key performance indicators (KPIs) that do not align with one another.  
 
Even though Team BETA comprises only members from INFRA, some RFSs might 
require them to procure resources or services from APPS.  Two of the participants, 
Dave and Donald, related incidents where they had to procure consultancy resources 
and services from APPS. Donald expressed the opinion that KPIs between INFRA and 
APPS at the divisional level were fundamentally “at odds with each other”, and that 
there are “contention between the businesses”. Due to the contract with BNB that only 
requires the services of INFRA, the existing policy within the organisation is that only 
one division can be credited for the revenue of any signed contract.  
 
Quite often, as reported by Donald, was how members at APPS would request for 
INFRA to give up the entire revenue to APPS, leaving members at INFRA with 
nothing to credit for during the reporting of KPIs. As the participant related his 
account of his experience, how he believed it to be a result of conflicting business 
objectives and KPI,  
 
 “Quite often, I can go to APPS tomorrow try and get some 
consulting services done. And their answer will be, I can 
actually sell that same resource to a customer, rather than give 
it to you. So I can give you the resource, if you give me the 
 
                                               
9 Note that the members from APPS that IS professionals from BETA will approach are not from Team 
ALPHA and will be a different group of members who are not aligned to any strategic outsourcing 
account. 
Chapter Six: Findings from Team BETA 
 
 
 
Page 152 of 249 
revenue.  
 
In the ideal world, I mean if you are going to get involved in a 
job, and you are part of it, then you should really be 
incentivised on that number as well. Both organisations should 
be incentivised. There should not be any conflict. Should not 
have any conflict at all” [Donald]. 
 
The second participant, Dave, related that collaboration across divisions, i.e. procuring 
resources and services from within the organisation, should be easy considering that a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) can be established to formalise the 
collaboration. However, Dave identified that negotiations on pricing of resources would 
have to take place across divisions, and the quotes might be considerably higher than 
those offered by third party vendors. In his view this did not make sense as it 
contributed to the view that the organisation consists of different groups working 
within their own interests and priorities, instead of catering for the well-being of the 
organisation, i.e. securing the business, as a whole.  
 
 “You would think that we would have more flexibility because 
it is GTECH to GTECH. But we actually do not. We 
actually, in my opinion, have less. Because within the groups, 
there's no clear-cut understanding and each division is still 
seen as a third party. I could just as well do a MoU with third 
party vendors and get one of their engineers on site, and they 
might be cheaper [than APPS]” [Dave]. 
 
 
The experiences of the two participants led them to opine that GTECH consists of 
many “siloed organisations” [Donald] and that GTECH does not feel like a single 
organisation.  
6.4.2 Approval process 
Four of the six participants related the need to obtain approvals for all developed 
proposals prior to submitting of the completed SOW to the client. Representative 
interview quotes reflecting this are given in Table 6.10 below.  
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Table 6.10: Representative interview quotes on approval process 
Division Pesudonym Representative interview quotes on approvals 
INFRA Donald “But that's the reality of it. So you had delegation in Australia, you could actually 
fast track the process. Because to get to the top of the tree, you only have to go 
2 levels, 3 levels. Now you got to go 6 levels.” 
Kate “It is very easy for me to say "oh, this piece of work is not particularly good", but 
nobody's measuring us on whether it's good. They're measuring us on whether 
it gets to the customer in time. So where I not, perhaps, as keen as quality 
aspects of things, I will be happy to kind of go "okay, that's not great. But let's 
zap it off.” (As an approver) 
Dave “It used to be that anything over, I think it was anything over $500,000AUD, 
somewhere that region, or somewhere $250,000 had to go through Global 
Approval System for quality assurance approval.” 
Hugh “Whenever we did every quote, we had to go to corporate finance and get the 
pricing approved.” 
Felicity - 
Meryl - 
 
For BETA, two out of the six participants identified that any RFSs or proposals over 
the value of AUD $1.8M will need to go through the global approval process. As part 
of the process, IS professionals submit all relevant documents via the Global Approval 
System for pricing and quality assurance.  
 
However, as related by one participant, this approval level was only recently changed in 
response to deals lost and decreased client satisfaction with GTECH’s way of working. 
It appeared that approval levels were set at AUD $500,000 previously which meant that 
any deals exceeding the clip level had to be put through “full diligence, full delivery, full 
technical and full quality assurance” [Dave] procedures. Within BETA, one participant 
candidly described the approval process as being “very hierarchical” [Donald]. From the 
aforementioned, it becomes apparent that the existing approval process, as one 
participant related, is “simply based on dollars” [Dave]. Thus, even though the existing 
approval process had been revised to a higher value however, as reported by two of the 
six participants, it still does not cater for exceptional scenarios and the complexity of 
solutions/proposals are still quantified based on financial figures.  
 
Hugh expressed a different opinion on the rationale behind existing processes and why 
it takes up time. In his perspective, “it means less risk for GTECH”, and going through 
the process means that the organisation can deliver on its promises listed within the 
proposal, i.e. SOW, in that “GTECH can support the job, run the job and do what is 
necessary to meet the SLAs” [Hugh].  
6.4.3 Performance measurements and evaluation process 
As reported by two of the six participants, namely Kate and Donald, there was a need to 
report to two different managers who might be concerned with, “things that GTECH 
cares about” as opposed to what “the client cares about”.  
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At the organisational level, Kate is assessed based on the total contract value of the 
RFSs that are signed, while Donald is being assessed based on revenue and costs. 
Through the reporting lines, one can assume and speculate to a certain degree that 
Kate’s subordinates, who are participants in this study, such as Hugh will be evaluated 
based on contract value as well. Dave, on the other hand, explicitly stated that he is 
assessed based on a subjective assessment of client satisfaction. However, Dave has up 
until recently had to report all of the deals he is working on within his pipeline, 
essentially estimations of solutions that he has provided to members within Client BNB 
in order to provide his manager, i.e. Kate, with insight of what are the deals he has been 
seeding.  
 
There is thus a dual reporting structure. Based on her remarks and them with those of 
the INFRA participants in this study (including ALPHA participants10), every RFS that 
is signed off by Client BNB constitutes a new business and has to be reported as part of 
the pipeline or forecast at the divisional level, which is based on 30 days, i.e. monthly 
turnaround. For Kate, who is the only individual to highlight the supposedly 
contradiction but illustrates the conversion of time-based measurements into a financial 
figure states,  
 
 “[The divisional manager] would like those work to be turned 
around in thirty days [in order to achieve revenue targets]… 
and there are also a lot of reasons why these bits of work do 
not get done within thirty days. Sometimes, they are on hold 
waiting for the customer to confirm on what those 
requirements are. So those thirty days could be used up just by 
the clients having meetings amongst themselves. But that 
thirty days of customer talking among themselves still counts 
towards my measurements. So I get penalised for something 
that is out of my control” [Kate]. 
 
 
From the participants’ comments, the association between time-based measurements 
and penalties at the organisational level becomes apparent. Further, Felicity, the 
Business Performance Analyst also explained that she had to communicate with Donald 
in order to obtain the updates on RFSs. Noting from the previous section that Felicity 
is concerned with time-based measurements, i.e. SLAs, while Donald reported that he 
is assessed at a divisional level based on revenue and costs. 
 
The data indicates that two out of the four IS professionals were of the view that 
existing use of meetings to track KPIs were incessant. For one participant [Donald], 
members at Team BETA had no influence and control over a client’s decision as to 
whether they decide to sign off on RFSs, which constitutes new business for GTECH. 
For example, one participant commented, “you have a customer who can do whatever 
they like, and it is typically never compelling for a client to do whatever GTECH 
                                               
10 It was already noted through the cross-comparison of data in Chapter Four that all INFRA participants 
were assessed based on similar measurements (Section 4.7.5). 
Chapter Six: Findings from Team BETA 
 
 
 
Page 155 of 249 
wants” [Donald]. Another participant shared that she had to report to two different 
managers, one of whom was concerned with turning around RFSs within SLAs, while 
another manager was concerned with an internal measurement of 30 days turnaround 
time that substantially differs from SLAs (Section 6.2.2). As a result of this 
measurement structure, she reported being penalised for events that occurred that were 
outside her control.  
 
 “These two measurements conflict. If I focus on one, I lose 
focus on the other. Because we don't have enough people to 
be able to manage both to everyone's satisfaction. So, my 
natural reaction to that is to deal with the one that costs the 
company money rather than the one that is measured because 
somebody wants to measure it. But there doesn't seem to be a 
reason why they want to, and that's the conflict” [Kate]. 
 
6.4.4 Section summary 
This section has outlined the findings in relation to how outsourcing controls interface 
with controls at the organisation environment. The findings indicate that a series of 
procedures take place post-receipt of RFSs. They include (1) collaborating on RFSs, (2) 
approval process and (3) going through performance evaluations established at the 
organisation environment. Each procedure involves different forms of rules, policies and 
procedures, and this finding is summarised in Table 6.11 below.  
 
Table 6.11: Summary of findings on organisation controls 
Procedure  Organisation control  
Collaborating on 
RFSs 
Organisation structure & 
rules, policies and 
procedures 
To collaborate on RFSs, a MoU (contract) 
(rule, policies and procedures) has to be 
established between INFRA and other 
divisions within GTECH.  
Approval process Organisation structure, 
rules, policies and 
procedures & hierarchies 
Approval process is based on clip levels and 
goes through different hierarchies.  
Performance 
measurements 
Organisation structure and 
performance 
measurements 
Each division (organisation structure) has its 
own set of performance measurements.  
 
Performance measurements are indirectly 
tied to the need to achieve client-specified 
outcomes.  
 
As evident from Table 6.11 above, the organisation structure was found to play a 
significant role due to different performance measurements and processes. The next 
section will outline findings in relation to how controls can pose influence on the clan.  
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6.5 Controls and its influence on the clan 
6.5.1 Relationship between BETA and BNB 
Two out of the six participants within BETA provided perspectives on the relationship 
between the team and Client BNB. There were however contradicting viewpoints.  
 
Donald, the Account Executive, shared a perspective that appears to show a negative 
view of the client organisation. He seemed to suggest that Client BNB has an 
expectation for GTECH to go above and beyond and provide services that are not part 
of the contractual agreement. In spite of this, perhaps out of goodwill and in 
consideration of the integral relationship between client and vendor, members within 
BETA have treated BNB with goodwill and provide the services as required. As he 
related,  
 
 “BNB is a great bank alright. But the way they look at the 
contract is not actually about how they can help GTECH 
to provide the service. They do not look at themselves 
and say "GTECH only has this small piece of it. BNB 
has all of the network space with another service provider. 
BNB has all the security stuff, which is the firewalls." 
And the team spend an enormous amount of time 
helping to resolve network issues, and security issues. And 
we don't own that. It's owned by BNB. SO BNB's the 
integrator. They don't do any integration” [Donald]. 
 
 
While Donald somewhat exhibits a negative perception of BNB, another participant 
was not of the same view. He related that the management at BNB appears to take a 
positive partnership view of GTECH. As Hugh puts forth,  
 
 “One of the thing that is good about on the BNB account 
is that some people at BNB would say "oh things are 
tougher with GTECH". Yet executive level management 
like it because we get more things done” [Hugh]. 
 
 
As evident from above, there were divergent views with regards to the current working 
relationship between members at BETA and BNB, with one respondent perceiving that 
clients lack the goodwill and expect BETA to go above and beyond contractual 
agreements. On the other hand, the second participant revealed that the management 
were satisfied with BETA’s performance. In this view, clan might be interpersonal as 
opposed to being enacted at the clan level. The next section will report on limitations of 
controls and participants’ perceived influence on the clan.  
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6.5.2 Outcome controls and its influence on the clan 
There is evidence that SLAs could influence the quality of solutions. Even though only 
member [Kate], occupying a Team Manager role within Team BETA expressed this 
view, the participant stated that she had received feedback from the majority of her 
team members to change the current time-based measurement to a more subjective one, 
i.e. quality. Currently managing a team of twelve architects, Kate explained that existing 
“time-based measurements do not exactly foster and engender an environment for 
quality work” [Kate]. 
 
Kate further divulged that her role as a manager included continuing motivation of her 
team and helping them understand the repercussions of failing SLAs, and to steer them 
towards achieving set targets.  Kate highlighted how she had received feedback from her 
team members in the past requesting more subjective measurements in their 
performance of work. Displaying empathy for her team members, she elaborated the 
reasons behind the importance of submitting quality solutions as it could potentially 
affect one’s professional reputation within the technology industry.  
 
 “Somebody in my team wouldn't necessarily want a piece of 
work that they didn't feel was good enough. Because 
ultimately, it's got their name on it. So it's their professional 
reputation. It's not just GTECH. It's their personal 
reputation. The information technology (IT) Industry in 
Australia is a very small, tiny community. Everyone knows 
everyone else pretty much. So it is not good for somebody to 
put a bit of work out there that's not of a good standard” 
[Kate]. 
 
 
In summary, even though only one participant stated how SLAs might impact the 
provision of quality solutions, she represented the voices of the eleven team members 
she was currently managing who had requested more subjective assessment instead of 
being constrained by time-based limitations.  
 
The above finding highlighted that firstly; there might be a difference in expectations 
between managers and members within BETA. From a managerial perspective, Kate’s 
objective was to ensure service levels are met to prevent financial penalties. However, 
her team members can be inferred to be intrinsically motivated to produce a piece of 
quality work. Secondly, on the other hand, the findings can be further viewed in terms 
of preservation of the relationship between BETA and BNB, as dissatisfaction with 
vendor’s performance can inadvertently result in loss of trust and an impact on the 
partnership view. However, this finding has to be interpreted with caution, as the data 
collection halted before more architects from BETA can be recruited (Refer Section 8.7 
for discussion on this limitation).  
 
When queried on challenges with regards to the time limitations of SLAs, Hugh 
acknowledged the issue of the inability provide better quality solutions for clients. 
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However, he appeared to concur with Kate’s point of view, and puts forth the notion 
that meeting clients’ expectations based on their documented requirements within RFS 
is more critical than the production of a quality solution. As he remarked,  
 
 “Something I learnt very early on is the trick is consulting is 
provide the client what they're looking for, ask the client 
what they're looking for. If you can provide the client what 
they're looking for, you will succeed. It's fairly simple” 
[Hugh]. 
 
6.5.3 Rules, policies, procedures and its influence towards achieving 
client-specified outcomes 
There was a view that GTECH’s internal belief and mission conflicts with the processes 
in place that did not reflect the organisation’s position of being a “service-oriented 
organisation” [Donald]. In the participant’s view, existing processes are “slow and 
cumbersome” when dealing with clients, and could impact responsiveness. It was also 
identified that the review and approval process was slowing the process down, and 
existing processes were more focused on maintaining “integrity” [Donald] as opposed to 
servicing the client. Comparing the capability of GTECH with smaller organisations, 
Donald believed that there was a need to be more responsive to clients.  
 
 “A small organisation that maybe has 200 employees in 
Australia could do some of the things we do 10 times faster 
than GTECH, because they do not have to tick any of the 
boxes. They don’t have all the rules and compliance regulations 
that GTECH has” [Donald].  
 
 
Davie joined GTECH from a small-medium enterprise, and highlighted his frustration 
with regards to interacting with processes. He was of the view that responsiveness could 
inadvertently lead to loss of customer loyalty, and provide competitors with 
opportunities to displace GTECH. Owing to this, Dave found the demarcations of job 
roles and constraints within GTECH constrained the ability for him to perform in his 
work. He was also of the view that processes were more concerned with ensuring 
accountability and risk-management, as opposed to providing what the customers 
require.  
 
Dave recalled an incident where he had worked on a relatively simple deal whereby 
Client BNB purchased 100 stock-standard servers, which had led to an exponential 
increase in the value of the deal. This subjected the proposal to unnecessary scrutiny and 
Dave had to work through the internal quality assurance cycle twice. Dave also shared 
that there was a substantial difference in what constituted a complex solution in 
GTECH’s view and Client BNB’s view. While GTECH viewed complexity in terms of 
dollar values, Dave and Client BNB’s view of complexity related to the details of the 
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solution. The participant expressed his frustrations and anguish over the approval 
process, 
 
 “It makes no sense! It should not have to [go through the 
quality assurance cycle twice], but it did. It is constrained by 
processes, and the processes do not give you exemptions for 
the types of deal. It is simply based on dollars. We pointed 
that out, and the answer is, ‘it is processes. Just do it” [Dave]. 
 
 
Another participant [Donald] shared that the tool essentially automates the procedures 
by ensuring the approval request goes to the right person through an email, of which 
“these people may not actually make one ounce of a difference to deal. They do not add 
any value” [Donald]. From his perspective, the global approval tool ensured approvals 
were granted without any understanding of the contextual factors surrounding the 
RFSs. 
 
 “It is hardcoded into the application. It sends the emails 
out. So it is all automated. And it knows who the 
approvers are when you raise an approval request. The 
approver does not know what he or she is approving. But 
he or she is going to approve it. He or she is getting 
approval requests from everywhere. This is the rule. It is 
the same for everybody in the world” [Donald].  
 
 
More critically, putting a proposal through the approval process takes time. Time, 
which IS professionals do not have, due to the need to respond to members within 
Client BNB in an efficient manner and within the time-based limitations. Two 
participants reported issues with this system primarily due to the amount of time the 
global approval process embedded within the system added to responding to Client 
BNB. For example, one participant commented that going through this tool to obtain 
approvals “adds on substantially more time, from one day to a month” [Dave]. Another 
participant related, “if you get something out in three to four weeks, you are very lucky. 
It is typically longer than that” [Donald]. 
 
Three of the six participants at BETA were in consensus with regards to how the 
existing approval process adds on time and conflicts with the time-based limitations. 
One of the three participants indicated that existing processes “have a lot of integrity” 
even though he maintained that processes did not support the servicing of the client. In 
the participant’s view, existing processes are “slow and cumbersome” when dealing with 
clients, and could impact responsiveness. Another participant commented that 
“GTECH as a whole is very preoccupied with processes to the point where the 
organisation is not necessarily doing the best job for customers and employees” [Kate].  
 
From the above examples, the nature of the approval processes is exemplified through 
its quantification of proposals as risky based on the value of the proposals, as opposed to 
the complexity of the solution, negating the complexities of the requirements into a 
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financial figure. There were two divergent opinions on this, with participants lamenting 
that this impacts customer loyalty and client satisfaction due to the impact on 
responsiveness. At the other spectrum, the approval process with its risk assessment and 
quality assurance procedures ensures that GTECH have the resources and time to 
perform the job as listed within the SOW.  
6.5.4 Section summary 
This section has outlined participants’ perspectives with regards to the influence on 
responsiveness. Participants who shared this view indicate that existing processes does 
not cater for leeway and exceptions. Participants also compared the existing approval 
process with smaller organisations suggesting that other organisations are considerably 
more nimble. Last but not least, there also appear to be a view that responsiveness can 
lead to an impact on client loyalty. 
 
Following Table 6.12 below, this chapter will next turn the focus to self-control. 
 
Table 6.12: Summary of perceived influences on the clan at BETA 
Control 
domain 
Control 
identified 
Limitations of control 
identified 
Rationale  Potential impact on 
clan OUTSOURCING 
Service levels 
and financial 
penalties 
(OC) 
Limited timeframe to fully 
understand clients’ 
requirements. Inability to 
provide quality solutions. 
Ties back to individual’s 
reputation within the industry. 
 Unsatisfactory 
performance leads to 
lost of trust 
Impact on 
partnership view 
Service levels Limited timeframe to fully 
understand clients’ 
requirements. Inability to 
provide quality solutions. 
Individual understanding that 
consulting is based on giving 
clients what they want and need. 
Negotiations can help clients 
understand limitations and 
provide compromise to 
requirements.  
 Impact on client-
vendor relationship  
ORGANISATION 
Organisation 
structure 
Formalised collaboration 
between divisions 
Understand how each team 
“works” in order to get work 
done. 
 - 
Organisation 
structure 
Divisional differences in 
terms of objectives – 
contention between 
divisions 
Contract is based on fixed price 
schedules. Third party vendors 
would be cheaper. There is no 
need for division of revenue 
within internal divisions. 
 Potentially expensive 
quotes which might 
lead to client’s 
dissatisfaction 
Impact on 
partnership view 
Loss of trust 
Rules, policies 
and 
procedures  
Impact on 
responsiveness. 
Approval process adds 
on time to existing time 
limitations set by SLAs. 
Negotiation through informal 
means to bypass time 
constraints and achieve SLAs. 
 Loss of customer 
loyalty 
 
Rules, policies 
and 
procedures 
Impact on 
competitiveness. Over-
processing adds on costs 
to solutions. 
Approval process does not cater 
for content of solution and 
focused on price. Complexity is 
related to price. 
 Potential 
unsatisfactory 
performance due to 
impact on 
responsiveness 
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6.6 Self-control 
This section reports on the findings on self-control, primarily how individuals exercise 
work-autonomy and self-sanction in accordance to performance measurements. 
Findings in relation to work-autonomy will be first examined. This will be followed by 
findings relating to the concept of self-sanction. 
6.6.1 Work-autonomy 
The findings in this section focuses on examining how individuals exercise work-
autonomy and creativity in overcoming limitations pertaining to outcome controls, 
divisional constraints and responsiveness 
6.6.1.1 Overcoming limitations on outcome controls 
One participant highlighted that clan control mechanisms in the form of open 
communication and knowledge sharing was a way to navigate around constraints 
surrounding potential non-quality solutions. As he stated,  
 
 “If you talk to the client and say "Well, I can only do ABC.", 
you know. You are not going to have that successful 
relationship with them. Whereas, you can say, "Well, we're 
supposed to do ABC. You need XYZ, which means if you 
compromise and do something for me, I would be able to 
meet your requirements in a different way." So it is about 
offering a solution. The approach is to offer a solution to the 
client's needs” [Hugh]. 
 
6.6.1.2 Overcoming limitations on divisional constraints 
Only one of the interviewees related a previous incident that illustrated how one can 
overcome limitations on divisional constraints. Hugh, reported having learnt through 
“scar tissues” to “work out how each team functions” in order to obtain assistance when 
required. He further elaborated that collaboration could be a success if existing rules, 
policies and procedures of the division one is seeking to procure resources and services 
from were adhered to. As he related,  
 
 “You know like, some business units, unless you give them an 
internal clause code, they won't talk to you. Whereas, some, 
they're quite good and helpful. So you get to learn which are 
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the teams. So when you need help from the team that needs 
the clause code, you contact them and you go armed with the 
clause code. Okay. As long as you know that process, typically 
you can achieve a successful collaboration” [Hugh]. 
6.6.1.3 Overcoming limitations on responsiveness 
Four participants related previous experiences that align with the notion of relying on 
negotiation to work around existing processes. On the topic of the ability to speed 
things up for Client BNB who was looking for “agility”, Donald said the only way 
processes could be escalated was to do a “manual set of work”, which was to “bribe every 
approver”.  
 
 “Bribing involves going to the approver, and saying ‘Can you 
look at that deal? It is in your inbox.’ They have hundreds of 
approver requests in their inbox, and my request is not the 
priority. And they approve deals in a sequential fashion. So 
you have to go to every one of those approvers and ask them to 
approve your request. And then you go to the next approver.” 
[Donald] 
 
 
Another participant [Hugh] also shared a recent experience about the need to approach 
approvers due to a change in the approval assessment level, whereas he would not have 
to do so previously as the deal value was not over the limit. Or as per Dave’s account of 
the need to go through the approval process twice due to the quantification of 
complexities of proposals based on financial figures,  
 
 “It is quicker to just do the processes than it is to argue about 
it. Because it is not going to change for this one deal, just for 
you. So you [just] do it [Dave]”.  
 
 
There were also workarounds in place by simply adhering to processes in place. One 
participant remarked that there was an open-door policy in place within GTECH, 
where employees could provide feedback with no repercussions. She commented, “if you 
find that a certain process is actually a roadblock to do something which does make 
good sense, or it is the financially the right thing to do for a customer, or for GTECH, 
there are ways around it” [Kate].  
 
Another participant, Hugh, shared how he went to each approver, and “explained to 
them very quickly the differences and why [he had to go to them]”, and he got his 
“rubber stamp” within the same day. This participant related several examples where he 
was able to get things done simply by abiding to existing ways of working. For Hugh, 
“the trick in our job is working out which and how each team functions. Are they by the 
book or is there room to move?” The participant further highlighted that it was possible 
to negotiate amongst members within GTECH in order to tailor things to what the 
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client wants. Hugh highlights, “as long as GTECH achieves, obtain the right approvals, 
and ensure that the right level of governance is not broke or disregarded, there is a 
certain amount of leeway” [Hugh].  
 
 
 
“For example Delivery Team A. Two people come to them 
asking them for help. One person comes to them submits the 
request in the correct official process with the correct clause 
code. The other person doesn't. Who do you think it's going 
to get look after first?” [Hugh]. 
 
 
Through the above, we have been able to understand that participants who discussed 
how they workaround existing approval processes or how they avert difficulties when 
collaborating across divisional lines rely on social relationships. This will be performed 
in order to speed things up in order to respond to Client BNB.  
 
However, adhering to existing rules, policies and procedures still remain a core 
component of work life. For instance, two participants shared the perspective that 
bureaucratic ways of organising in the organisation while “unnecessary and might result 
in less agility and less responsiveness” [Donald], but were necessary for reasons 
pertaining to accountability within organisation. Another participant [Kate] reported 
that processes were necessary for reasons due to jobs creation. As she remarked “process 
adherence is almost becoming a job itself… people have vested interests in propagating, 
continuing the complexity of processes, because it keeps them in their jobs” [Kate].  
 
Further, as Hugh explained, workflows, processes and procedures were standardised at a 
global level, which will thus be difficult to change. Elaborating further, he brought up 
the size of the organisation, and commented, “if you understand the size of the 
organisation, you can understand why things are [the way] they are, i.e. a higher level of 
rigour and due diligence. That’s the same with any large organisations”. However, his 
further comment highlighted his perspective of the need to work within the existing 
system, and find ways around it instead of “making waves” and being “difficult”.  
 
 “There is a saying – the tail is wagging the dog. We all know 
that a dog wags its tail right? Well, think the other way, the 
tail is making the dog do what it needs. So the business 
processes represent the tail. So you have to do something a 
certain way to comply with the process. So the trick is to 
realise the limitations, acknowledge it for what it is, and work 
with it.” [Hugh] 
 
 
This section has outlined how respondents exercise work-autonomy, exercise 
professional judgements and rely on past knowledge and experiences in order to perform 
to outcomes at both outsourcing and organisation level. The following section will 
report on the findings on how individuals self-sanction in accordance to performance 
measurements. 
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6.6.2 Self-sanctioning in accordance to performance measurements 
At BETA, there was only one instance noted regarding self-sanctioning in accordance 
to performance measurements. The sole participant, Kate, disagreed with the 
implementation of existing measurements. However, it appears that she has no option 
but to abide by existing norms. Based on her comments reproduced below, it is evident 
that instead of quality, SLAs serve as the driver for work as that is what Client BNB 
was concerned with. Further, failing to achieve SLAs would lead to financial penalties. 
As she related,  
 
 “There is a bit of a saying in the technical world - You can 
have it done quickly, you can have it done cheaply, or you 
can have it done well. But you can only have two of those 
three things. At the end of the day, my boss and myself 
have to pay a penalty payment to our customer if we fail to 
meet these, the days that we committed. So it's very easy 
for me to say, “Oh, this piece of work isn't particularly 
good’. But nobody is measuring us on whether it's good. 
They're measuring us on whether it gets to the customer 
in time” ” [Kate].  
 
 
As outlined in Section 6.4.3, achieving outcomes translate to achieving of KPIs 
established within the organisation. Thus, in a sense, this participant was actively self-
sanctioning in accordance to performance measurements.  
 
The following section will provide a summary of the findings and conclude  this chapter  
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings from BETA in accordance with the structure of 
the research questions. A high-level summary of the findings at BETA (some very 
much similar to ALPHA), as well as a comparison with the findings from ALPHA is 
outlined below. This is provided in order to provide perspective on the differences 
between both cases and preface the discussion in Chapter Seven.  
 
In relation to how formal governance mechanisms translate to outcome or behaviour 
controls and exercise influence over individuals, the study found that: 
• Not all formal governance mechanisms function as outcome and behaviour 
controls.  
• Outcome controls act upon individuals through the use of meetings (behaviour 
controls) that require individuals to provide daily updates to all RFSs within the 
pipeline.  
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• Behaviour controls act upon individuals in that they require individuals to 
perform procedures in a certain way in accordance to specified operating 
procedures.  
• Formal governance mechanisms appeared to relate to the governance structure 
of the outsourcing arrangements. 
• Outcome controls are primarily exercised from client organisation, but behaviour 
controls were mostly conducted within the organisation through review 
meetings.  
 
Table 6.13: Formal governance mechanisms and controls: Similarities/differences 
between ALPHA & BETA 
Dimensions Similarities Differences 
Formal governance 
mechanisms 
! Contractual details 
! Business Office 
! RFS document 
! Procedures for receiving 
RFS 
Minor differences in contractual details. 
ALPHA identified threshold for SLAs. At 
BETA, participants highlighted the 
presence of pricing schedule, and 
documentation. 
Outcome controls ! Service levels 
! Financial penalties 
Service levels for ALPHA is set at three 
levels of complexities 
(low/medium/high), i.e. 7, 14 and 21 
days.  
 
None of the participants from ALPHA 
revealed the financial penalties payable 
upon failure of service levels.  
Behaviour controls ! Requirements 
assessment 
! Provisions for dispute 
resolutions 
! Consulting workshops 
! Frequency of monitoring 
and review 
Provisions for extensions of SLAs not 
highlighted at BETA. 
Information 
systems as both 
outcome and 
behaviour controls 
! Both teams identified 
ReqMgmtSystems as the 
primary vehicle in which 
reports are generated. 
! Both teams also 
identified the tracking 
functionalities within the 
system. 
- 
High-level analysis 
of findings 
When viewed singularly, the findings do not shed light into the 
differences between formal governance mechanisms and formal 
controls.  
 
When taken together the analysis augment the perspective for the 
following:  
(1) how outcome controls are exercised by clients in outsourcing 
arrangements within GTECH (Refer Section 7.2.2). 
(2) how behaviour controls are primarily maintained within the 
vendor organisation as opposed to being exercised by clients 
(Refer Section 7.2.3) 
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Pertaining to the interface between outsourcing and organisation controls, the findings 
indicate that: 
• Organisation structure plays a significant role in terms of how members within 
different divisions relate to each other.  
• Existing rules, policies and procedures intertwined with the approval process 
have the potential to impact on the ability to achieve client-specified outcomes.  
• The ways in which organisation control interface with outsourcing controls is 
multi-dimensional, in that it involves organisation structure, rules, policies and 
procedures as well as hierarchical authority.  
 
Table 6.14: Organisation controls: Similarities/differences between ALPHA & 
BETA 
Procedures 
identified 
Organisation 
controls 
identified 
Similarities Differences 
Approval 
process 
Organisation 
structure, 
hierarchical 
authority, policies 
and procedures 
Members within both 
teams identified having 
to put a solution 
through the approval 
process prior to 
submitting of the SOW 
to the client. 
ALPHA consists of 
members from two 
divisions, INFRA and 
APPS. Approval processes 
are sought at a divisional 
level, after which the 
solution will be 
consolidated into one for 
the client.  
 
BETA only consists of 
members from one division. 
Approval is within division. 
Establishment 
of a MoU 
Organisation 
structure, policies 
and procedures 
Found evidence for the 
need to establish MoU 
in both teams. 
BETA rarely needs to 
collaborate across 
divisional lines due to the 
nature of the contract, 
which only requires the 
services of one division. 
Performance 
measurements 
Organisation 
structure, 
performance 
measurements and 
evaluation process 
Members in both teams 
related of performance 
measurements at 
outsourcing and 
organisation level.  
At ALPHA, performance 
measurements of members 
in APPS and INFRA are 
different. 
High-level 
analysis of 
findings 
When viewed within each case, the findings did not reveal much significant 
with regards to how outsourcing organisation controls interface with one 
another.  
 
When viewed collectively, the findings indicate an established set of controls 
within the organisation environment that is similar across outsourcing teams 
(Section 7.3).  
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In relation to the influence of controls on the clan, the findings at BETA suggest that: 
• Outcome controls can impact on the clan in that it sets a time limitation on 
their ability to understand clients’ requirements in a comprehensive manner.  
• Existing rules, policies and procedures adds on time, and can potentially impact 
on response time. This can result in performance issues from the clients’ 
perspectives.  
 
Table 6.15: Influence on clan: Similarities/differences between ALPHA & 
BETA 
Identified limitations Similarities Differences 
Influence on quality of 
solutions 
Both teams identified 
impact on quality of 
solutions due to outcome 
controls. 
At ALPHA, quality of solutions were 
linked by participant at ALPHA to issues 
with requirements. At BETA, quality of 
solutions were explicitly highlighted by 
one participant, but only acknowledged 
by another. 
Influence on 
collaboration 
- Not found at BETA due no impact on 
clan 
Influence on 
responsiveness which 
can impede 
competitiveness 
Both teams indicated 
issues with 
responsiveness due to 
existing approval 
process.  
Members from APPS at ALPHA 
attributed issues with approval 
processes at INFRA.  
 
 
On self-control: 
• Individuals draw upon prior skills and experiences, and engage in people 
negotiations to overcome limitations of outcome and organisation controls.  
• Only one instance was noted regarding self-sanctioning to performance 
measurements. The findings note that in spite of contests and disagreements, 
the respondent was still self-sanctioning herself in accordance to performance 
measurements.  
 
Table 6.16: Self-control: Similarities/differences between ALPHA and BETA 
Dimensions Similarities Differences 
Work 
autonomy 
Overcoming limitations of 
outcome controls 
Overcoming limitations of 
divisional constraints 
Overcoming limitations of 
responsiveness 
Across both cases, findings were quite similar 
in terms of context.  
 
At ALPHA however, participants reported 
using behaviour controls to overcome time-
limitations (Section 5.6.1.1). At BETA, one 
participant indicated negotiations with clients 
(Section 6.6.1.1).  
Self-
sanction  
Participants in both teams 
contested the ways by which 
performance measurements 
were executed.  
Differences rest upon the different contexts in 
which self-sanctioning was observed.  
 
 The next chapter will present the results of the cross-case analysis.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
7.1 Overview 
Using the rich information acquired through the analysis of all the data obtained from 
the two case studies, this chapter presents the results of the cross-case analysis and 
findings. This chapter will first discuss findings in relation to the first research question, 
which aimed at establishing the difference between formal governance mechanisms and 
the controls that are operationalised that function as outcome and behaviour controls 
that act upon individuals. The findings in relation to the second research question that 
aimed to understand the interface between outsourcing and organisation controls will be 
outlined. Following this, findings pertaining to how outsourcing and organisation 
controls can pose influence on the clan will be examined. The final section will examine 
the findings in relation to self-control, i.e. how in spite of contests and disagreements 
against performance measurements, that individuals still self-sanction in accordance to 
set targets and measurements.  
7.2 Formal controls in outsourcing arrangements 
Following empirical observations that not all formal governance mechanisms are 
operationalised (Kern & Wilcocks 2002), this study drew on Tiwana (2007) definition 
of outcome and behaviour controls (Section 2.4.3), with the objective of understanding 
the type of controls that both directly and indirectly guide, influence or impact the work  
of members working within an outsourcing arrangement. Twelve governance 
mechanisms were identified at ALPHA, while eleven formal governance mechanisms 
were identified at BETA. This minor difference can be attributed to the lack of 
respondents within BETA identifying the presence of extensions to service levels 
(highlighted in grey).  
 
The findings are summarised in Table 7.1, and includes a description of each 
mechanism, its classification as either outcome or behaviour control, as well as the 
number of respondents at ALPHA and BETA who referred to the respective 
mechanism. The findings on each mechanism will be discussed after Table 7.1.  
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Table 7.1: Identified formal governance mechanisms and formal controls 
Formal governance 
mechanisms 
Description of mechanism 
based on participants’’ 
interview transcripts 
Classification ALPHA 
(out of 9) 
BETA 
(out of 6) 
TOTAL 
1. Contractual 
details 
Miscellaneous contractual 
clauses, terms and conditions. 
Formal 
governance 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
2. Business office  Functions as the “bridge” 
between outsourcer and 
outsourcee, which manage all 
incoming request for services 
(RFSs), and dispatch the 
requests electronically via 
systems in place to the 
respective outsourcing team.  
Formal 
governance 
3 
 
1 
 
4 
3. Request for 
service 
document 
A document initiated by the 
client that is used to 
communicate to the outsourcing 
team through specifying the 
background of the business 
problem, requirements, 
complexity of the requirements, 
as well as other pertinent 
information.  
Formal 
governance 
4 
 
5 
 
9 
4. Procedures for 
receiving RFSs 
Participants’ description of how 
the RFSs is received. 
Formal 
governance 
2 
 
2 
 
4 
5. Service level 
agreement with 
different levels 
of complexities 
The number of days required to 
turnaround a request for service 
that is associated with varying 
complexity levels.  
Outcome control 6 
INFRA: 2 
APPS: 4 
 
Specification 
of the 
number of 
days: 
5 
6 
 
 
 
Specificati
on of the 
number of 
days: 
4 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
6. Penalties for 
failing service 
levels 
Financial penalties payable to 
outsourcee (client) should 
service levels not be met.  
Outcome control 2 
 
3 
 
5 
7. Requirements 
assessment 
 Behaviour 
control 
3 
INFRA: 1 
APPS: 2 
1 4 
8. Procedures for 
extension of 
SLAs 
A form of contractual 
governance that specifies 
procedures for extension of 
SLAs.  
Behaviour 
control 
2 
 
- 2 
9. Procedures for 
escalation and 
dispute 
resolutions 
Specification of the processes 
for resolving disputes and 
managing of situations.  
Behaviour 
control 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
10. Consulting 
Workshops 
Initiated by members within 
client or vendor team that aims 
to understand and propose 
solutions to business problems. 
Includes clarification of 
requirements, or generation of 
requirements. 
Behaviour 
control 
4 
 
1 
 
4 
11. Frequency of 
monitoring and 
review 
Meetings that are used to 
monitor vendors’ performance 
against pre-specified standards.  
Behaviour 
control 
2 
 
2 
 
4 
12. System in place 
for management 
of RFSs 
Specification of the type of 
systems in place between 
Business Office and client. 
Outcome control 
 
Behaviour 
control 
3 
 
 
 
2 
 
5 
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Two primary themes were identified from the cross-case analysis conducted, which 
provide insights into current knowledge gaps within the literature (Refer Section 2.3.5). 
The first relates to the potential role of an outsourcing governance structure. The 
second theme shows how controls are exercised within an outsourcing arrangement.  
7.2.1 Formal governance mechanisms & the outsourcing governance 
structure 
Formal governance identified across both cases include (1) contractual details, (2) the 
role of the business office, (3) the request for service (RFS) document as well as (4) the 
system in place for the management of RFSs. The findings re these were all consistent 
across the participants, except for contractual details. 
7.2.1.1 Contractual details  
The above inconsistency can be attributed to how a single participant at ALPHA 
identified the threshold of the number of RFSs that is written into contracts (Section 
5.3.1.1) but that the team is currently handling RFSs way over the this threshold. Prior 
studies have identified demand and change clauses within contractual agreements (Goo 
et al. 2009; Kern & Wilcocks 2002), which can lead to revision of contractual details as 
the relationship between client and vendor progresses. The finding in this literature 
supports the view, however it is unknown if GTECH would leverage on such a clause 
in the future. On the other hand, the aforementioned formal governance can be viewed 
a way of balancing the power between client and vendor, as a vendor can stop or delay 
work on any incoming requests when the threshold is reached (Kern & Wilcocks 2002; 
Lioliou et al. 2014).  
 
At BETA, contractual details were identified as documentation as well as the pricing 
schedule for infrastructure products and services (Section 6.3.1.1), which is accordance 
with clauses within contract for supporting documentation, payments or miscellaneous 
provisions (Refer Table 2.2) (Kern & Wilcocks 2002). Respondents in this study did 
not identify that the above contractual details and documentation exert any control over 
the conduct of their work activities. They thus remain as formal governance mechanism, 
which functioned as high-level contractual clauses established between client and 
vendor. 
7.2.1.2 Business Office  
Across both cases, participants were consistent with regards to the perceived role of the 
business office, the RFS document and the procedures for receiving RFSs. At both 
ALPHA and BETA, four out of the fifteen respondents across both cases identified the 
role of the business office that functions as a management office for receipt of requests 
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(Section 5.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.2). There was a collective agreement across these participants 
that the business office plays a central role in receiving requests from clients, and 
dispatching of RFSs to the respective teams and divisions.  
 
At ALPHA (Refer Section 5.3.1.4), one participant revealed the role of the Business 
Office in the management of RFSs, where he described that members within the 
Business Office would review the RFSs and make a decision as to whether the request 
should go to APPS or INFRA. Dependent on the nature of the requirements, a request 
can go to both APPS and INFRA. There were however conflicting statements with 
regards to how RFSs are received at APPS. Further verifications revealed that RFSs 
were indeed received from the ReqMgmtSystem in place.  
 
At BETA (Refer Section 6.3.1.4), one participant indicated that as part of the 
procedures established, RFSs have to be processed in a specific way, while another 
interviewee suggested of a rule of thumb that has been established that all requests 
should be recorded within the system prior to commencement of any solution design 
and development. In terms of processing with the system, one participant also indicated 
that a record of the RFS will be created within the ReqMgmtSystem, and it would 
remain in the system until an architect has been assigned.  
7.2.1.3 Request for service document 
Nine out of the fifteen participants discussed referencing the requirements documented 
within the RFS document in the conduct of their daily work activities (Section 5.3.1.3 
and 6.3.1.3). Last but not least, there was a collective agreement with regards to how 
RFSs are received from the teams’ respective clientele. However, what was particularly 
useful and insightful for this study pertains to the RFS document (Figure 5.1) that was 
collected from one of the participants, which provided perspective on the details that 
clients would input within the RFSs, such as specifying the level of complexity and 
urgency, background of request.  
7.2.1.4 Procedures for receiving RFSs 
Across both cases, four out of the fifteen participants described the specific ways in 
which RFSs are received from members within both ALPHA and BETA (Section 
5.3.1.4 and 6.3.1.4).  There are specific procedures in each outsourcing contract as to 
how each outsourcing team, i.e. ALPHA and BETA provide services to their respective 
clients. A Business Office is established as part of the management of incoming RFSs 
from the client. Members within the Business Office will then review the information 
within the RFS and input the complexity level as well as the associated service levels 
(turnaround time) within the system. This sets the SLA for each RFS that is received 
from the client.  
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The findings suggest that these formal governance mechanisms, namely contractual 
details; business office and RFS document formed the basis for how members within 
the vendor organisation should process the received requests. One participant at BETA 
affirmed that GTECH maintains a standard governance mechanism within the 
organisation to manage the existing portfolio of outsourcing clients.   
 
 “The processes that we apply for new customers are very well-
defined. They are the same across the whole portfolio, across 
every customer that we actually have” [Donald_BETA]. 
 
 
The procedure as based on a synthesis of participants’ comment is depicted in Figure 
7.1 below. What is interesting about this procedure is its uncanny similarity to that of 
both outsourcing and project governance structure (Meng et al. 2007), where the 
Business Office functions as a program management office that disseminates 
information, in the form of RFSs to the respective teams. Governance also functions as 
the framework that prescribed functions and processes to guide activities. Scholars such 
as Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008) have called for greater understanding on how formal 
controls are exercised, but empirical research conducted within the context of 
outsourcing arrangements that is based on IS control theory is scarce. The results of this 
study have addressed this gap, by providing a rudimentary understanding with regards 
to how contractual clauses functioned as controls, as well as how control is exercised by 
outsourcing clients through existing governance structure.  
 
Additionally, the aforementioned identified mechanisms remained as formal governance 
mechanisms, or contractual clauses that are not operationalised (Kern & Wilcocks 
2002) as they do not act upon individuals, directing and guiding them on how to behave 
or what sort of actions to take. Participants’ discussion of the identified mechanisms 
also did not reveal that they set targets or outcomes that exert control over individuals 
within both ALPHA and BETA.  
 
On the other hand, these findings are consistent with the transaction costs economics 
(TCE) perspective that contracts form the basis for corporation between client and 
vendor (Goo et al. 2009; Huber et al. 2013; Lacity 2002; Lioliou et al. 2014). Contracts 
are complex and consist of different provisions and clauses for collaboration between 
client and vendor (Goo et al. 2009; Kern & Wilcocks 2002). The analysis indicate that 
three out of the four identified formal governance mechanisms discussed above 
appeared to provide insights into how the vendor organisation conducts work for their 
respective outsourcing clients. A deeper examination suggests that there are specific 
ways of operating at the governance level that would enable the management of RFSs 
and for keeping track of RFSs. The way in which contractual details, Business Office, 
RFS document, ReqMgmtSystem operate in tandem is illustrated in Figure 7.1 on the 
next page, after which the findings on outcome and behaviour controls are examined.  
 
In the next section the findings in relation to the second identified theme, i.e. how 
clients exercise controls, are discussed.  
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Figure 7.1: Governance mechanisms & governance structure 
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7.2.2 Exercising outcome controls  
The following formal governance mechanisms operating as outcome controls were 
identified across both cases; service level agreements (SLAs), financial penalties, and 
systems (outcome and behaviour control). These three forms of governance mechanisms 
that function as outcome and behaviour controls will be drawn upon to outline the 
results of the cross-case analysis performed. This is consistent with existing control 
theory-based research that indicates that controllers use both outcome and behaviour 
controls in tandem to ensure outcomes are met (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 
1997).  
7.2.2.1 Service level agreements 
Across both cases and consistent with prior empirical research (Goo et al. 2009; 
Hoetker & Mellewigt 2009; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Lioliou et al. 2014), twelve out 
of the fifteen respondents identified that either they themselves or their team members 
were required to respond to requests within stated service levels, which sets a time 
limitation on responding to RFSs submitted by the clients (Refer to Section 5.3.2 and 
6.3.2). The current study also found that SLAs are unique to each contract/client, and 
are associated with different levels of complexities.  
 
At ALPHA, five out of the nine participants indicated that the service levels established 
between GTECH and Client AEC are based on three levels of complexities (low, 
medium and high) that are associated with 7, 14 or 21 days respectively. Between 
GTECH and Client BNB, four out of the six respondents indicated that SLAs are 
based on two levels of complexity only, namely low and high, that corresponds to 7 and 
21 days (See Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2: Service level agreements at ALPHA and BETA 
Service level agreements 
Level of complexity Low Medium High 
ALPHA 7 14 21 
BETA 7 - 21 
 
The above finding is particularly significant considering there is still a lack of 
understanding with regards to how outcome controls are exercised in outsourcing 
arrangements (Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008). As mentioned in the previous section, 
members within the Business Office are responsible for inputting the complexity of 
requirements into the ReqMgmtSystem. In this view, the level of complexities triggers 
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the “clock” within the system. IS, functioning as an outcome control was highlighted by 
three out of the participants at ALPHA (Section 5.3.4) and two out of the six 
participants at BETA (Section 6.3.4).  
 
The results of this study indicate that SLAs act upon individuals through the 
specification of turnaround time and function as the primary driver behind the work of 
members within outsourcing arrangements. For instance, across both cases, the 
significance of SLAs became evident at ALPHA, firstly because participants were 
pressured for time in the achievement of client-specified outcomes, and also that that 
service levels were the primary driver behind their work activities   (Section 5.3.2.1 and 
6.3.2.1).  
7.2.2.2 Financial penalties 
The findings across both cases indicate that service levels were also associated with 
financial penalties. Five out of fifteen respondents across both cases mentioned the 
potential financial penalties if the SLAs were not met. In accordance with prior 
literature, penalties are classified as an outcome control (Kern & Wilcocks 2002; Lacity, 
Yan & Khan 2017; Lioliou et al. 2014).  
 
At ALPHA, only one participant vocalised concern with regards to the incurring of 
financial penalties if a request is not responded within the timeframe, while the 
presence of financial penalties was inferred from the second participant where he stated 
that “management will not be happy [Ed_INFRA]” if SLAs were not met (Section 
5.3.2.2).  
 
At BETA, three out of the six participants mentioned financial penalties, with one of 
the three participants indicating that the financial penalties can amount to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars (Section 6.3.2.2). Across both cases, the significance of financial 
penalties as an outcome control became apparent through the ways in which 
participants vocalised their concerns regarding incurring penalties, and how they tried to 
avert incurring any penalties by achieving the service levels. However, its significance as 
an outcome control is further exemplified through the review meetings conducted with 
GTECH.  
7.2.3 Information systems as outcome and behaviour control 
Four respondents across ALPHA and BETA identified the Request Management 
System (ReqMgmtSystem) as the primary channel by which requests are received from 
clients (Section 5.3.4 and 6.3.4). However, based on email verification by a participant 
at ALPHA, clients do not have access to this system. Rather, the team at Business 
Office used this system to register and log all incoming requests, which would then be 
dispatch electronically to the respective outsourcing team. At BETA, one participant 
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identified the presence of a Commercial System, which clients sometimes utilise to send 
their requests. Requests sent through this system are not logged, and IS professionals 
are discouraged to work on requests that are not send through the official channel.  
 
Members at the client’s end are responsible for entering the type of request, its 
complexity, the urgency of the request, contact information and description of services. 
Members of the Business Office will then input the complexity and urgency of the RFS 
into the system, which essentially determines the SLA for each request received. The 
“clock” in the system begins ticking once the RFS has been dispatched and assigned to 
the relevant personnel in each team, tracking the number of business days from 
assignment to response to RFSs.  
 
As just described, it is therefore the client not the IS professional who is determining 
the complexity of the RFS.  This is surprising. For one IS professional at ALPHA, but 
none at BETA, this has resulted in the need to request extensions to SLAs as clients 
might not be aware of the complexity of their requirements when coming up with a 
RFS (Refer Section 5.3.3.2).. Analysis of the interviews of participants who discussed 
this suggests that SLAs extension procedures basically involve obtaining approvals from 
clients. Only one IS professional [Ed_INFRA] from Team ALPHA highlighted how 
there were escalation and dispute procedures should approvals not be granted, from 
within GTECH, to relieve the team from failing SLAs. 
7.2.3.1 Frequency of monitoring and review meetings 
Similar to past studies conducted in internal and outsourced IS projects (Choudhury & 
Sabherwal 2003; Goo 2010; Kirsch 1997), this study found that meetings were used as a 
behavioural control mechanism within each team to track the progress and status of 
existing RFSs (Section 5.3.3.5 and 6.3.3.4). This is also in accordance with prior studies 
that have identified checking of performance targets and regular interactions between 
client and vendor as a behavioural control mechanism (Goo 2010). However, instead of 
clients exercising behaviour controls directly over individuals, meetings were established 
within the vendor organisation and controls are exercised through review and status 
updates on existing RFSs.  
 
At ALPHA, only two out of the nine participants mentioned the review meetings they 
had to attend (Section 5.3.3.5). There was a common agreement between both 
members from APPS and INFRA respectively of a daily review meeting established 
within each division that aimed at understanding which RFSs are due in the next seven 
business days, and how each individual is tracking towards the datelines. Additionally, a 
participant from INFRA indicated of weekly meetings with the client to discuss the 
RFSs that are currently in work-in-progress. The purpose of this weekly meeting is to 
prioritise existing RFSs with the client and obtain insights with regards to the requests 
the vendor team should take priority and dedicate more resources to work on the 
requests.  
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Similarly, at BETA (Section 6.3.3.4), two participants occupying managerial positions 
[Kate and Felicity] had to attend a daily meeting where they review all RFSs, “which 
requests have gone out and which have not gone out yet”, in order to assess whether the 
team will be able to achieve the timeline of meeting SLAs. A weekly or monthly 
meeting is also scheduled with the client to discuss existing statuses of RFSs. The 
Account Executive [Donald] also attend a weekly meeting revolving around 
management obtaining commitment from personnel on when RFSs can be signed off.  
 
The aforementioned finding supports Chang et al. (2013) study in an outsourced 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) project that clients primarily implement outcome 
controls, while behaviour controls were implemented within the vendor organisation. It 
is however in contrary to prior studies conducted within outsourcing contexts that have 
highlighted active involvement by clients in monitoring behaviours and outcomes 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Tiwana 2010).  A reason for this can be attributed to 
different contexts. Every outsourcing arrangement is unique, as exemplified by the two 
case studies examined in this research. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to govern 
how clients and vendors should interact. Neither is there an optimal manner in which 
outcome and behaviour controls should be exercised. Based on the results in this study, 
it can be ascertained that there will be daily, weekly and monthly meetings are 
scheduled both internally and with the outsourcing client and how it is used as a 
behavioural control mechanism. The results show that controls are exercised within the 
organisational environment through daily and weekly tracking with the purposes of 
submitting a SOW within the SLAs in order to prevent penalties.  
 
The subset of research examining control dynamics can offer another perspective. This 
body of research suggest that control configurations do not remain stagnant and evolves 
throughout the lifecycle of a project. It is recognised within the literature in both 
internal and outsourced projects that formal controls; in particular, outcome controls 
and vendors’ self-control are heavily relied upon in the initial phase of the project 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Prifling, Gregory & Beck 2009; Susilo, Heales & 
Rohde 2007). This is largely a result of unfamiliarity between controller-controllee and 
an inability to judge the performance of vendors (Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008; 
Mähring 2002; Prifling, Gregory & Beck 2009). In other words, controllers lack 
knowledge of what behaviours to monitor (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003). However, 
the findings in outsourcing arrangements might be contrary to this body of research 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Prifling, Gregory & Beck 2009; Susilo, Heales & 
Rohde 2007). The current study found that outcome controls are still very much relied 
on by clients, and the results indicate that controls are exercised on each and every 
request that is sent through to the team and is being tracked on a daily basis. This is in 
spite of the long-term relationship, i.e. ALPHA and AEC has been established for 
close to a decade, while BETA and BNB has been established for a little over a decade. 
This can be attributed to simply contextual differences. Or perhaps, outsourcing 
arrangements might be more complex due to the role of contracts. This finding thus 
adds on to the knowledge base regarding possible relation to governance structure, and 
adds on further insights to how client and vendor relate to one another. This is depicted 
in Figure 7.2 on the next page (highlighted in blue).  
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Figure 7.2: Exercising of outcomes through Business Office 
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7.2.4 Behaviour controls 
As noted in the literature review (Section 2.3.3), behaviour control mechanisms are pre-
specified contractual clauses and written within the contract, i.e. prescribing the 
methods and procedures to be adopted by the outsourcee in undertaking activities 
(Tiwana 2007). In this study, the definition was extended to an individual perspective 
by including activities that direct individuals within the outsourcee firm to perform 
activities in accordance to methods and procedures.  
 
Commonly identified behaviour controls across both cases are consistent with those 
identified in prior research in outsourcing arrangements include (1) dispute and conflict 
arbitration processes (Goo et al. 2009), as well as (2) frequency of monitoring and 
review (Cao & Lumineau 2015). This study added new insights to existing knowledge 
base as the results found three other formal governance mechanisms that can be 
classified as behaviour control mechanisms. They are namely (1) clarification process 
upon receipt of RFSs; and (2) procedures for extensions of SLAs; and (3) consulting 
workshops. In accordance with the order listed in Table 7.1, requirements assessment 
would be first examined, followed by provisions for extensions, provisions for disputes 
and consulting workshops. Finally, frequency of monitoring and review, as well as the 
IS in place that function as both outcome and behaviour control will be examined in the 
preceding sections.  
7.2.4.1 Requirements assessment 
The current study found that requirements assessment constitutes a behavioural control 
mechanism, in that it is a procedure to be performed by respondents upon receipt of 
RFSs. Four out of the fifteen participants in the current study discussed this procedure 
related how it was part of the workflow after receiving requests. There was agreement 
among the four participants (three from ALPHA and one from BETA) of the need to 
perform an assessment of requirements upon receipt of every RFS to ensure that what 
the client documented is clear and can be appropriately solutioned. For example, as one 
respondent from ALPHA described,  
 
 “We receive the RFS, and the RFS is sent to either APPS or 
INFRA. And both divisions work similarly, where we will 
perform a review of requirements just to assess the 
requirements” [Patrick_APPS]. 
 
 
The next section will examine the finding on consulting workshops.  
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7.2.4.2 Consulting workshops 
Consulting workshops was identified by prior research as a form of formal governance 
mechanism that also functions as a form of relationship building between client and 
vendor (Huber et al. 2013). In this study, there is adequate evidence to suggest the 
feasibility of classifying consulting workshops as a form of behavioural control, as it 
inadvertently influences the behaviours of participants who discussed this issue, 
requiring them to behave in accordance to contractual agreements.  
 
At ALPHA, one individual perceived providing consulting for free negatively as it 
neither contribute to incurring more business for the organisation nor to his 
performance measurement. However, he has had to perform the required behaviour of 
providing free consultancy as a result of contractual obligations. Another participant 
from ALPHA stated that clients could request workshops to consult on the feasibility 
of new business ideas and plans, suggesting that consulting workshop, as a behaviour 
control can lead to individuals performing actions in accordance to clients’ expectations 
and requirements. Others who discussed this were of the view that consulting 
workshops can facilitate generation of requirements, which would make the solutioning 
of process much easier (Section 5.3.3.4). At BETA, only one participant related that 
the provision of pre-project consultations is part of the contractual agreement between 
GTECH and the outsourcing client, indicating of the need to provide consulting 
services as part of the contractual agreement. As one of the participants from ALPHA 
described,   
 
 “The client might want to do something consulting with 
us, they want to have a workshop to talk about a certain 
idea or a certain piece of work… all the client wants to 
obtain is a ballpark figure of the solution, and how it fits 
within their budget” [Patrick_APPS].  
 
 
Having examined the results of the cross-case analysis in the sections above, the 
following section will proceed to address the answer for research sub-question one.  
7.2.5 Addressing research sub-question one  
Prior research have primarily situated their analyses of controls in outsourcing 
arrangements by drawing upon the TCE perspective (Williamson 1979; 1985; 1998) in 
their examination of controls (Goo et al. 2009; Huber et al. 2013; Lacity 2002; Lioliou 
et al. 2014). As noted in Table 2.3 within the literature review, previous research have 
situated both TCE-perspective and control-based concepts within a single framework 
(Huber et al. 2013; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Srivastava & Thompson 2012), 
suggesting that there might be clear differentiation between the TCE and control 
theory-based paradigms.  
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Based on empirical observations that not all formal governance mechanism operate as 
controls that bounds the work of individuals in outsourcing arrangements (Kern & 
Wilcocks 2002), this study thus set out to understand how formal governance 
mechanisms, as part of the contract established, function as outcome or behaviour 
controls from the perspective of individuals in outsourcing arrangements. This is 
reflected in the first sub research question reproduced below: 
 
 SQ1: What are the forms of governance mechanisms 
established between client and vendor, and how do they 
translate to outcome or behaviour controls that act upon 
individuals? 
 
 
Insights from this study suggest that there can be a clear differentiation between what 
constitutes formal governance mechanisms, i.e. contractual clauses, and formal 
(outcome and behaviour controls). In accordance with previous literature (Goo et al. 
2009; Huber et al. 2013; Lacity 2002; Lioliou et al. 2014), the results suggest that 
formal governance mechanisms pertain to how client and vendor relate to one another 
at a contractual level (Figure 7.1).  
 
The study found that outcome controls, i.e. service levels, and financial penalties operate 
in conjunction and exert influence on individuals by requiring them to respond to 
requests within a certain timeframe, of which failure to do so will result in financial 
penalties payable to the client. To ensure individuals are performing to client-specified 
outcomes, the results indicate that daily meetings (behaviour controls) are established 
within the vendor organisation to review and track reports that are generated by the 
system on a daily basis. Individuals are thus influenced due to the need to attend the 
daily meetings, and to provide updates to existing requests. Thus, individuals 
subconsciously have to be on top of all solutions they are working on due to the need to 
provide daily updates. Table 7.3 on the following page provides a summary of identified 
formal controls in this study based on the examination conducted.  
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Table 7.3: Outcome and behavioural controls identified in this study 
Formal control 
mechanism 
Definition Identified mechanisms in this study 
Outcome 
controls 
Pre-specification of the 
desired interim and final 
outputs without regard to 
the process by which the 
outputs are achieved 
Service level agreements (Kern & Wilcocks 
2002; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Lioliou et al. 
2014); 
 
Penalties for non-compliance (Kern & Wilcocks 
2002; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Lioliou et al. 
2014); 
 
Behaviour 
controls 
Pre-specification of the 
methods and procedures 
to be adopted by the 
outsourcee in undertaking 
outsourcing activities that 
directly influences the 
behaviours of individual in 
performing to outcomes. 
Dispute and conflict arbitration processes 
(Chen & Bharadwaj 2009; Goo et al. 2009; 
Poppo & Zenger 2002);  
Frequency of monitoring and review (Cao & 
Lumineau 2015) 
Identified formal governance mechanisms that 
can function as behaviour controls 
! Requirements clarification process upon 
receipt of RFSs;  
! Procedures for extensions of SLAs; 
! Consulting workshops. 
 
Addressing of this first research question has also lead to new insights with regards to 
how controls are exercised through the governance structure (Figure 7.1). The results 
indicate that clients specify the level of complexities within the RFS document, which 
directly determines the turnaround time for a request. The exercise of behaviour 
controls on the other hand, remains established within the vendor organisation (Figure 
7.2). Having addressed research question one, the next section will examine the findings 
in relation to the second research question.  
 
 
7.3 Interface between organisation and outsourcing controls 
This section focuses on controls within the organisation environment and reports on the 
patterns and themes identified in the data that emerged as a result of the cross-case 
analysis.  
 
Participants across both ALPHA and BETA reported three primary procedures that 
control their activities within the organisation environment. Firstly, four out of nine 
participants and three out of six respondents reported having to establish a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which function as a contract that is established 
between internal divisions during collaboration. Secondly, that all solutions in the form 
of Statement of Work (SOWs) should be put through the approval processes within 
each respective division before it can be submitted to the clients. The aforementioned 
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finding is a reflection of the policies and procedures (Malmi & Brown 2008) within the 
organisation, which guide behaviours and actions of individuals (Macintosh & Daft 
1987), also functioned as a constraint on behaviours (Malmi & Brown 2008; Merchant 
& Van der Stede 2007).  
 
Participants across both cases also identified a series of organisation controls such as 
matrix organisation structure, standardised work procedures, hierarchies, culture, 
strategy, performance evaluation and rewards structure that they have to go through in 
order to present a final SOW to the client. However, it emerged from the findings 
across both cases of the significance of the organisation structure. The above findings is 
summarised in Table 7.4 below. Following Table 7.4, each of the noted 
theme/procedure will be discussed.  
 
Table 7.4: Cross-case analysis of procedures reported and controls identified 
Process Organisation control  ALPHA 
(out of 9) 
BETA 
(out of 6) 
Collaborate across divisional 
lines and establishing a 
document of understanding 
! Organisation 
structure 
! Policies and 
procedures 
 4 
(Section 
5.4.1) 
3 
(Section 
6.4.1) 
Approval process ! Organisation 
structure,  
! Policies and 
procedures 
! Hierarchies 
 6 
(Section 
5.4.2) 
4 
(Section 
6.4.2) 
Performance measurements and 
evaluation  
! Organisation 
structure 
! Performance 
measurements 
 9 
(Section 
5.4.3) 
2 
(Section 
6.4.3) 
 
7.3.1 Collaborating across divisional lines 
Four out of nine participants and three out of six participants reported having to 
collaborate across divisional lines when responding to RFSs. For participants at 
ALPHA, collaboration is a prerequisite to achieving client-specified outcomes owing to 
the nature of the outsourcing arrangement. At BETA, collaboration is only required if 
the requirements documented by the clients require the services of other divisions. As 
one participant from ALPHA described,  
 
 “Within APPS, we look after all the application-led 
environment. We develop the environment, test 
environment, small environment, big environment 
[with] lots of data, little data, specific data, fast-clock 
environments [of the client].  
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INFRA takes case the infrastructure, hardware and 
communications only. They look after everything up to 
the operating system, up to and including the operating 
system. That is how it is sort of structured in GTECH” 
[Robert_APPS]. 
 
Prior research conducted with outsourcing arrangements such as (Rustagi, King & 
Kirsch 2008) have not catered for exceptions and differences between the nature of 
outsourcing arrangements. A reason for this might be attributed to the situating of 
examination of controls at the contractual/partnership level. In this study, the factoring 
in of the organisation controls have offered a different set of insights into the role of the 
organisation structure and its influence, but does not identify with a causal relationship 
as theorised by Cram, Brohman and Gallupe (2016). A reason for this can be attributed 
to a difference in context.  
 
Organisation structure dictates how members within outsourcing arrangements relate to 
one another (Malmi & Brown 2008). In the current study, four out of nine participants 
at ALPHA and one participant at BETA identified that divisional collaboration is 
characterised by the establishment of a MoU between divisions  (Section 5.4.1 and 
6.4.1), which highlights the policies and procedures that is intertwined with working 
towards achieving client-specified outcomes. At ALPHA, the results suggest that the 
APPS and INFRA (which is part of the clan) have to establish the contractual 
agreement for every collaboration on RFSs.  
 
At BETA, one participant suggested that the MoU treats each division as a third-party 
vendor. On the other hand, one participant from APPS suggest that the MoU 
essentially provides assurance that the proposal provided by INFRA when collaborating 
has been approved and that INFRA would be able to fulfil the requirements of the 
proposal upon clients’ sign-off. As one participant related,  
 
 “I think the MoU is a good thing to have. Because at least 
that, you know that the information that has been put into 
that document has been reviewed by someone on the INFRA 
side, the pricing side, it has all been approved. It is all 
finalised. It is all about me then taking that information, 
knowing that it is effectively finalised and just inserting that, 
and merging it with the documentation that I have 
[Geena_APPS]”.  
 
 
Looking towards industry can offer insights to this finding.  It was noted in Chapter 
Four, Section 4.2.3 of GTECH’s need to remain compliant with accreditation and 
wider legislative requirements as a result of being a US-based organisation. This require 
procedures within GTECH to be based on sound reasoning in order to protect the 
client from any potential risks within the environment (Hall & Liedtka 2007; KPMG 
2017).  
 
 
Chapter 7: Cross-Case Analysis 
 
 
 
Page 185 of 249 
The next section turns the focus to the approval process identified by participants as 
part of the procedures they have to abide by in their work towards achieving client-
specified outcomes.  
7.3.2 Approval process 
Across both teams, ten out of the fifteen participants reported of the imperative for 
approvals to be obtained at the organisational level prior to the submission of the 
solution to the client. At ALPHA, approvals would be obtained at INFRA and APPS 
separately before being compiled into a single proposal which would be submitted to 
clients. At BETA, approvals are required as well, however only within their own 
division.  
 
Approval process within the organisation is intertwined with organisation structure, 
policies and procedures and seemingly reflects the hierarchies within the organisation. 
For instance, one participant from APPS mentioned a delegation document that spells 
out the threshold for each approver. At INFRA, approvals are also based on clip levels 
and a proposal that is higher than a certain amount needs to go through more stringent 
checks and reviews as it signifies a proposal that is more complex.  
 
During the period of interview, participants identified that approval threshold within 
INFRA has been revised. Previously, any proposals that are over the threshold of 
AUD500,000 would have to go through the Global Approval System. It has since been 
revised to AUD1.8M.  
 
In line with the suggestion outlined in the previous section of GTECH’s need to satisfy 
legislative requirements, this finding can be made sense of through the theory of audit 
explosion by Power (1994; 1999; 2007) which draws heavily from institutional theory. 
This theory extends our understanding of the social structures by highlighting how a set 
of principles grounded in financials is embedded within organisational controls. Writing 
against the backdrop of New Public Management, Power (1994) observed an increase in 
regulatory and authority bodies. Power (2007) posited that institutional effects of 
accounting pertains to how controls underpinning the financialisation of the firm and 
quality assurances are embedded within governance structures in organisations in 
response to external institutional demands. This results in deeply rooted controls 
underpinned by financial concepts and quality assurances embedded in the governance 
of structures, Kelly (cited in Power 1999, p. 66) referred to as ‘control of control’. This 
also encourages meta-regulation, where organisations self-govern and monitor. In this 
view, members within GTECH can be inferred to be engaging in self-governing and 
monitoring, where approval processes are characterised by quality assurances processes 
and where complexity is based upon the value of the proposal.  
 
The aforementioned was evidently not examined in depth within this study, as this was 
unexpected, and demonstrates of a rather rudimentary understanding of organisation 
controls and its interrelationship outsourcing controls. This is neither a reflection of the 
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researcher’s incapability nor a reflection of prior scholars’ lack of foresight. Rather, every 
research uncovers more insights into a certain topic of interest. This finding will serve as 
an important insight for future research. In relation to the second objective of this study, 
it has achieved its intended goal, which is to understand the interface between 
outsourcing and organisation controls. The overview of the workflow is depicted in 7.3 
on the next page (marked in hues of red), and adds on to our understanding on the 
interface between outsourcing and organisation controls from the perspective of 
individuals in both outsourcing arrangements.  
 
The section following Figure 7.3 will focus on reporting the results of performance 
measurements and evaluation process at the organisation level. 
 
Chapter 7: Cross-Case Analysis 
 
 
 
Page 187 of 249 
Figure 7.3: Workflow depicting the process of responding to clients 
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7.3.3 Performance measurements and evaluation process 
The current study found that individuals are required to perform to two sets of 
performance measurement, one of which relates to the service levels set by the 
outsourcing client (outcome controls), and performance targets within the organisation 
environment (Refer Section 5.4.3 and 6.4.3).   
 
At ALPHA, seven out of the nine participants related the need to perform to service 
levels (Refer Table 5.3). Eight out of the nine participants at ALPHA also identified 
performance measurements that are set at the organisation environment (Refer Section 
5.4.3). At BETA, seven out of the nine participants identified the need to achieve 
service levels, while three out of the six participants identified that they were assessed 
based on a different measurement within the organisation.  
 
Table 7.5: Outcome and performance measurements at ALPHA and BETA 
Team Division Pseudonym Service 
Levels 
Amount of 
new 
business  
Utilisation 
rate 
Productivity Other identified 
performance 
measurements 
ALPHA INFRA Jason  ✔ ✔    
Ed ✔ ✔    
APPS Robert ✔  ✔  Subjective 
assessments 
Keira ✔  ✔  - 
Patrick ✔  ✔  The amount of 
new businesses 
Brad   ✔  Not indicated, but 
there are other 
measures. 
Rachael   Did not 
mention 
✔✑✑ - 
Leonard ✔  ✔  - 
Geena ✔   ✔ - 
Tabulation (out of 9 
participants) 
7/9 2/9 5/9 2/9 - 
BETA INFRA Donald  ✔    
Kate ✔ ✔    
Dave ✔ ✔*   Client satisfaction 
Hugh ✔     
Felicity ✔     
Meryl ✔     
Tabulation (out of 6 
participants) 
5/6 3/6 0/6 0/6 - 
Tabulation (out of 15) 12/15 5/15 5/15 2/15 4/15 
*Reported that teammates were subjected to performance measurements in the form of contractual values.  
 
 
                                               
11 Assumed to be productivity as similar to Geena_APPS, Rachael_APPS reported having to input hours 
to current projects.  
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Consistent with seminal control frameworks (Brown 2005; Ferreira & Otley 2005; 
Otley 1999), three out of the nine participants at ALPHA reported that performance 
measurements within APPS are based on both financial and non-financial, i.e. 
subjective measurements, though it is unclear from the data what form of subjective 
measurements are present.  
 
At ALPHA (Refer Section 5.4.3), performance measurements in the form of utilisation 
rate encouraged individuals within APPS to exercise self-control in that working on 
requests which will eventually be signed off by clients constitute a new project that can 
be worked on by the team. That is, a new project in which members within APPS can 
bill their hours towards in order to achieve their performance measurement in terms of 
utilisation or productivity. On the other hand, performance measurements of members 
from INFRA within Team ALPHA are measured in terms of contract value signed, 
which is also tied to achieving of outcome controls and the clinching of new deals.  
 
At BETA (Refer Section 6.4.3), whose members consist of only members from INFRA 
division, the performance measurements were similar to that of participants from 
INFRA from the ALPHA team. At BETA, only one out of the six participants related 
of being assessed based on two sets of measurements, one that the client cares about and 
one that GTECH cares about.  
 
What is particularly significant with regards to this finding pertains to its link towards 
achieving client-specified outcome controls – where achieving client-specified outcomes 
is equivalent to achieving organisation’s performance measurements. However, this 
finding was equally perplexing to the researcher due to the difference in measurements. 
From an outsider looking in, it would appear that teams with a common set of KPIs 
would achieve goal congruence within the organisation (Ouchi 1979; 1980). Thus, 
while it was expected that both INFRA and APPS would have similar performance 
measurements, this was not the case. Seminal studies within the literature have observed 
that organisations that operate on a matrix management would have differences in 
budgets and objectives (Davis & Lawrence 1977; 1978; Knight 1977). However, in this 
study, it has potential to impact on the clan, as will be discussed later in Section 7.4.3.  
 
To make sense of the aforementioned finding, a further literature review was conducted. 
The review provided a different perspective to the issue, and indicates that the 
fundamental difference between the two divisions, i.e. APPS and INFRA, rests upon 
the nature of each division. APPS is of a consultancy nature, and the performance 
measurement employed is similar to that of professional services firms, such as 
accounting, law firms where utilisation rate is a common industry practice (Alvehus & 
Spicer 2012; Kolakowski 2017; Nandhakumar & Jones 2001). On the other hand, IS 
professionals within infrastructure management appeared to be assessed based on sales 
performance, and can be likened to that of a salesperson where their target is set based 
on the total value of contract clinched on a monthly basis, i.e. fulfilment of quota 
(Joseph 2018). Participants from INFRA had also commented with regards to 
management obtaining views on existing pipeline. It is evidently beyond the scope of 
this study to examine this phenomenon, and best left for future research. A way of 
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doing so might be to draw from the professional services stream of research as well as 
marketing or sales literature to enhance our understanding of organisation controls. For 
if this phenomenon is an industry practice, examining it further will lead to 
advancement in our understanding of performance measurements and its influence on 
outsourcing-based activities.  
 
The following section will address research question two.  
7.3.4 Addressing sub-question two 
This study builds upon prior literature that have suggested controls established within 
the vendor organisation to encourage individuals to perform to self-control (Gopal & 
Gosain 2009; Tiwana 2010; Tiwana & Keil 2009), as well as insights from Cram (2016) 
study which identified a causal relationship between controls in the organisation 
environment (structure, process, people, culture) and the influence on control choices 
and use. Consistent with prior literature conducted within consultancy firms (Alvesson 
& Kärreman 2004; Orlikowski 1991), the results across both case studies indicate that 
controls at the organisation environment are namely, organisation structure, hierarchical 
authority, standardised work procedures, and technology. However, contrary to a causal 
relationship between organisation and project controls as proposed by Cram (2016), the 
results of this study across both cases suggest that organisation controls operate in 
tandem with controls at the outsourcing level (both formal governance mechanisms and 
formal controls) that influence individuals in their work towards achieving client-
specified outcomes.  
 
 SQ2: What are the forms of controls present within the 
vendor organisational environment that influences or operate 
in tandem with controls at the outsourcing level to ensure that 
individuals work towards achieving client-specified outcomes?  
 
 
The results of the study indicate that individuals working within outsourcing 
arrangements are subjected to organisational controls alongside with outsourcing 
controls. Identified controls include organisation structure, policies and procedures, 
hierarchical authority, performance measurements and evaluation at the organisation 
level. On one hand, the set of organisation controls influence individuals in their work 
towards achieving client-specified outcomes through directing certain behaviours, 
creating boundaries and appropriate ways of actions within the organisation. As 
identified by seven participants across both cases, they were required to establish a MoU 
when collaborating across divisions, in spite of servicing the same client. Or as indicated 
by ten out of the participants in this study, individuals were required to put through all 
proposals through the existing approval process within each division before any SOWs 
can be submitted to clients.  
 
From another perspective, in the making sense of the data through the brief outline of 
Power (1994; 2003a; 2007; Power 2003b) (Section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2), organisation 
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controls operate in tandem with outsourcing controls in that the organisation self-
governs and self-monitors in accordance with legislative requirement that aimed at 
minimising the risks faced by its existing portfolio of outsourcing clients. Through the 
existing approval process, which includes quality assurances, organisation controls in 
this view, operates in tandem with outsourcing controls to ensure individuals are 
working within the realm of appropriate behaviours and actions in order to achieve 
outcomes within time limitations.  
 
Additionally, performance measurements and evaluation process within the organisation 
indirectly operates in tandem with client-specified outcomes. This is a fundamental 
result of the matrix organisation structure, which is focused on product and functional 
division, and result in a dual reporting structure. In this study twelve out of the fifteen 
participants reported having to achieve client-specified outcomes while at the same time 
requiring members to perform to performance measurements set at their respective 
divisions (Table 7.5). In this view, clients signing off on new SOWs constitute a new 
project to which members from APPS can bill hours, while in parallel, enabling 
members at INFRA to achieve their quotas. What also emerged from the findings 
pertains to how members within outsourcing arrangements have differing performance 
measurements. This is particularly apparent at BETA where one participant is assessed 
based on client satisfaction. There are thus no performance measurements other than 
clients’ evaluation on his performance.  
 
Thus, dependent on how one view the results, organisation controls can influence or 
operate in tandem with outsourcing controls to influence individuals, or more 
pragmatically operate in tandem with outsourcing controls. The next section focuses on 
reporting the results of the cross-case analysis to the third research question.  
7.4 Controls and its influences on the clan 
This section reports on the results of the cross-case analysis on controls and its influence 
on the relationship within the clan at both ALPHA and BETA.  
 
To understand the findings better, a further literature review was conducted to 
supplement the review on clan control in Section 2.6. The body of research that will be 
drawn on are namely, dynamics of control configuration, which tracks the evolvement 
of controls throughout the duration of projects, and prior examinations on antecedents 
of clan control.  
 
Antecedents of controls. Much of the current control literature pays particular attention 
to identifying the key antecedents of control mechanisms (Wiener et al. 2016). Prior 
researches conducted within the context of internal IS projects have affirmed Kirsch 
(1997) study that controllers’ choice of control mechanisms are influenced by behaviour 
observability, outcome measurability, as well as controllers and controllees the 
knowledgeability of IS (Kirsch et al. 2002). In a follow-up survey study which examined 
pairs of clients and project leaders, Kirsch et al. (2002) reported that clients who were 
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more knowledgeable on IS have the capabilities to understand the type of behaviours to 
observe, and were thus able to exercise behaviour control mechanisms. Client liaisons 
with less knowledgeability were reported to lean towards utilising clan control 
mechanisms in IS projects.  
 
Research conducted within outsourcing/offshoring contexts has however yielded 
different results. Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) seminal study that extends IS 
control theory to an outsourced context reported inconsistent results from the 
aforementioned studies conducted within the context of internal IS projects (Kirsch 
1997). Through an analysis of five case studies, Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) 
reported behavioural controls were more difficult to implement due to geographical 
distance even when controllers (clients) are knowledgeable in IS. The authors further 
noted that controllees’ knowledge of IS as well as knowledge of the controllers’ business 
both played significant roles in influencing choice of control mechanisms.  
 
Dynamics of control configuration. The body of research on control dynamics draws 
our attention to the perspective that control configurations does not remain stagnant 
and evolves throughout the lifecycle of a project. It is recognised within the literature 
that formal control, in particular, outcome controls and vendors’ self-control are heavily 
relied upon in the initial phase of the project (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Prifling, 
Gregory & Beck 2009; Susilo, Heales & Rohde 2007). This is largely a result of 
unfamiliarity between controller-controllee and an inability to judge the performance of 
vendors (Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008; Mähring 2002; Prifling, Gregory & Beck 
2009). In other words, controllers lack knowledge of what behaviours to monitor 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003). Scholars such as, Heiskanen, Newman and Eklin 
(2008) and Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) drawing upon episodes (stable and 
consistent) and encounters (disrupting events) direct our attention towards the role of 
triggers that will lead to changes in controllers’ use of control modes (Newman & 
Robey 1992). Following each encounter, controllers re-evaluate the adequacy and 
appropriateness of existing control portfolios, and might add or revise the use of control 
mechanisms (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997). For instance, Choudhury 
and Sabherwal (2003) reported an encounter where clients found issues with the quality 
of software testing and resulted in a belief that vendors did not exercise self-control. 
This led to revision of role expectations (confidence in vendors’ abilities), and addition 
of formal control mechanisms due to increase knowledgeability on tasks. In this 
encounter, additional formal mechanisms intended to facilitate stronger self-control and 
self-management at vendors’ end can include weekly/monthly reports, clients 
recommending procedures for software testing.  
 
In addition to role expectations, the concept of trust is also recognised within control 
literature as a significant influencer towards clients’ use of control mechanisms. The role 
of trust can result in diminishing or less dominant use of formal controls by controllers, 
and a greater reliance on informal controls (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Prifling, 
Gregory & Beck 2009; Susilo, Heales & Rohde 2007). Vendors’ trust in client is equally 
important.  For example, Mao, Lee and Deng (2008) mixed methods research of thirty-
one PMs in China reported that vendors’ perceptions of clients’ goodwill and reliability 
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(trust) can improve customer relationship and project quality, as a result of effective 
communication and depth of information transfer. Mao, Lee and Deng (2008) study 
suggests that trust has a significant influence on project quality, whereas formal controls 
can assist with helping vendors’ achieve cost management.  
 
Trust can however be a double-edged sword. While trust can improve relationships and 
project quality as discussed previously, breach of trust can also trigger tightening of 
controls. For example, Piccoli and Ives (2003)’s examination of student work groups 
through the lens of psychological contracts, found that reneging (failure to follow up on 
obligations) and incongruence (differences in obligations between team members) can 
lead to decline in trust and increased vigilance (close monitoring of actions of 
counterparts). On the other hand, Gregory, Beck and Keil (2013)’s study pointed out 
that increased vigilance in monitoring through formal controls, and increasing the 
frequency and intensity of behavioural evaluations can jeopardise existing client-vendor 
relationship and shared understanding. In other words, it can influence clan behaviours, 
prevent the development of a trusting relationship.  
 
As noted within the literature review (Table 2.3), TCE proponents similarly have 
examined relational governance (clan control) using a variety of perspectives. More 
recently a review of 23 years of outsourcing literature by Lacity, Yan and Khan (2017, p. 
5221) identified seven relational governance mechanisms that have been identified by 
prior researches to be significant form of clan control in outsourcing arrangements. The 
findings of Lacity, Yan and Khan (2017)’s study is reproduced in Table 7.6 below.  
 
Table 7.6: Relational governance mechanisms 
Relational 
governance 
Definition 
Knowledge 
sharing 
“The degree to which clients and providers share and transfer 
knowledge.”  
 
Communication “The degree to which parties are willing to openly discuss their 
expectations, directions for the future, their capabilities, and/or their 
strengths and weaknesses.” 
Trust “The confidence in the other party's benevolence.” 
Relationship 
quality 
 “The quality of the relationship between a client and provider.” 
Partnership view “A client organization's consideration of a provider as a trusted partner 
rather than as an opportunistic vendor.” 
Commitment:  “The degree to which partners pledge to continue the relationship.” 
Social capital:  “The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships.” 
 
 
 
 
The following sections will draw upon the literature review conducted in this section to 
examine and facilitate discussion of the findings.  
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7.4.1 Working relationship with clients at ALPHA and BETA 
In accordance with Ouchi and Price (1993), the clan in this study is used to refer to the 
group of members from both client and vendor organisations (Kirsch 1997). At 
ALPHA, this consists of members from APPS, INFRA and Client AEC. At BETA, 
the clan includes only members from INFRA and Client BNB.  
7.4.1.1 ALPHA 
At ALPHA, the relationship between the APPS, INFRA and AEC has been ongoing 
for close to a decade. Within the ALPHA clan (Section 5.5.1), the findings indicate a 
different relationship between APPS and AEC, compared to that of INFRA and AEC. 
This difference can be attributed to the nature of the outsourcing arrangement, where 
part of applications outsourcing can involve the transfer of employees from the vendor 
organisation to the client (Gartner 2017a; 2017b). There was no evidence to support the 
notion that INFRA members at ALPHA have been collocated with Client AEC 
before.  
 
Commitment can be understood as ‘the willingness of partners to exert effort on behalf 
of the relationship’ (Mohr & Speckman 1994, p. 137). At ALPHA, three out of the 
seven participants from APPS in their discussion of the relationship with the client 
exuded a sense of commitment to the client. All three participants at ALPHA related 
sacrifices made by team members within APPS to ensure the delivery of projects such as 
giving up personal time and working till wee hours to complete work (Section 5.5.5.1). 
Of the three participants, one related of a past event where the success of a project was 
mutually celebrated by members through the use of celebratory mugs at both APPS and 
AEC. The findings at ALPHA also appear to support the notion of a partnership view 
where the client consider APPS as a trusted partner as opposed to be opportunistic 
(Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017), and was related by one participant who stated that the 
client appreciate and recognised the value APPS had provided them through the years.  
 
Turning to the relationship between INFRA and AEC, the findings in this study 
indicate that the client adopts a different partnership view towards INFRA, with one 
participant relating that the client has a negative view of INFRA which she tried to 
overcome, while another participant highlighted that there had been a loss of trust 
(Section 5.5.5.2).. The role of trust has been recognised within literature as one of the 
most significant influencer in client-vendor relationship (Cao & Lumineau 2015; Chen 
& Bharadwaj 2009; Goo et al. 2009; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; Li, Poppo & Zhou 
2010; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008).  
 
At INFRA, one participant related of previously unsatisfactory performances that have 
led to the loss of trust, and resulted in the need to rely on provisions for dispute 
resolution (formal controls) in order to obtain relief from failing SLAs, which would 
constitute a breach of the contract and lead to incurring of financial penalties. This 
supports the conclusions of prior studies that have highlighted that unsatisfactory 
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vendors’ performance can result in tightening of controls or the use of more formal 
controls to ensure vendors’ compliance (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Piccoli & Ives 
2003; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008).  
 
However, the difference between the findings of this study and those of prior research is 
that members within the vendor organisation draw upon formal controls to exert control 
over the client who did not approve of extension requests. An explanation for this can 
be attributed to nature of contract, which balances the power between client and vendor 
(Kern & Wilcocks 2002). Consistent with prior research that have suggested that clients 
with technical knowledge are less likely to rely on formal controls (Rustagi, King & 
Kirsch 2008), one participant from INFRA, while discussing issues of trust between 
BETA and himself, further elaborated that technical people were more likely to 
understand the complexities of requirements than were business personnel, and thus 
more likely to grant extensions to service levels.  
7.4.1.2 BETA 
At BETA, there were two instances that exhibited commitment towards the client 
where a participant highlighted how the team typically go the extra mile for the client 
even though it is not part of their role and responsibility (Section 6.5.1).  
 
In both long-term outsourcing arrangements, the results of the study indicate the role of 
commitment and trust. While prior studies have focus on identifying the antecedents of 
clan control, this study has minimally established the role of commitment based on the 
results. The willingness to go above and beyond for the client was exhibited in both 
cases.  
 
The next section will focus on examining the limitations identified by respondents at 
both ALPHA and BETA in relation to the perceived influence on the clan. Common 
identified themes across both cases include (1) limitations of outcome control; (2) 
impact on responsiveness and competitiveness. The difference can be attributed to 
formalised collaboration across divisional lines. Across all three identified limitations, 
there is an overall sense of individual’s intrinsic motivation to want to perform to the 
best of their ability for the client-vendor relationship. There was a sense of concern with 
regards to perceived impact on responsiveness and potential impact on customer loyalty. 
In light of these findings, a further literature review was undertaken.  
 
After which, the results of the cross-case analysis will be discussed accordingly in the 
sections below.  
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7.4.2 Limitations of outcome controls 
Four out of the nine participants at ALPHA and two out of the six participants at 
BETA expressed their sentiment with regards to the limitations of outcome controls. 
At ALPHA, this was attributed to unclear requirements documented, a limited 
timeframe to fully understand the business case, as well as clients’ lack of understanding 
of the complexity of requirements. The aforementioned identified issues are interrelated 
with one another, as suggested by three out of the four respondents pertain to potential 
unintended consequences and implications to existing systems functionalities that might 
occur. The comments of all four participants seemed to reveal an intrinsic motivation to 
want to perform to the best for Client AEC (Detailed findings can be found in Section 
5.5.3, while an overview of the findings is available at Table 5.16).  
7.4.2.1 ALPHA 
At ALPHA, two out of the nine participants, both from INFRA, shared the sentiment 
that the time limitation of service levels can impede their ability to provide quality 
solutions (Section 5.5.3). One participant related that service levels functioned as a 
double-edged sword, by aiming at keeping individuals accountable, while at the same 
time limiting the time and effort one can put into gaining a more in-depth 
understanding of existing requirements. Another participant indicated that the time-
limitation hindered the provision of a quality solution and prevented an in-depth 
understanding of the background of the business case behind a request. As one 
participant described,  
 
 “The double edge sword is that if the service level is too 
short, then you get exactly the amount of effort that's 
allowed within the timeframe. I understand that clients 
need service levels to ensure we do not take as long as 
we want. But the constant problem is trying to give 
good quality responses within a short timeframe 
[Ed_INFRA].”  
 
 
 
7.4.2.2 BETA 
On the other hand, at BETA (Section 6.5.2), of the two participants who related issues 
with the quality of solutions, only one related his personal experiences of relying on 
open communication with the requestor of solutions, and engage negotiations in order 
to bypass constraints. However, he also suggested that the trick to consultancy work is 
to provide the clients with exactly what they need in order achieve success in the 
relationship. The second participant was speaking from the point of view of a manager 
where she reported having received feedback from her team members for more 
subjective assessment of responses as opposed to being assessed based on SLAs. In spite 
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of being empathetic towards her team members, she acknowledged that the nature of 
time-based measurements is in direct conflict with the ability to produce quality work. 
However, she did not elaborate further as to the underlying reasons for the inability to 
provide quality solutions, but related it to individuals’ underlying motivation that 
putting across a non-quality solution can impact one’s reputation within the industry.  
 
A comparison of the above findings indicates a difference in perceptions between 
participants with the two cases. At ALPHA, the overall perception amongst members 
at ALPHA pertains to wanting to ensure that clients obtain a quality solution. From 
the findings, it seems that they would like to go above and beyond for clients, by 
ensuring as minimal implications as possible. For instance, one participant related how 
she felt that she was being bogged down by evaluation meetings, and that she would 
like to spend more time with the clients to help them in the generation of requirements, 
and to ensure GTECH remains a trusted service provider to the client.  
 
In this view, they were expressing their intrinsic motivation (self-control) to want to 
perform to the best of their ability for the client. At BETA on the other hand, while 
both participants acknowledged the influence of outcome controls on quality of 
solution. However, for the manager, it was more important to maintain the relationship 
with the client by ensuring SLAs are met. As she stated,  
 
 “… nobody is measuring us on whether it's good. 
They're measuring us on whether it gets to the customer 
in time” [Kate]. 
 
 
There are some differences between the managers in both ALPHA and BETA, with 
the manager at ALPHA seemingly more concerned with ensuring clients’ requirements 
are properly gathered and understood prior to solution to ensure “… things don’t break 
[Robert_APPS]”, while the manager at BETA was more concerned in ensuring SLAs 
are met. An explanation for the above differences can be attributed to the contextual 
differences between the nature of work at APPS and INFRA with one more 
application-focused while the other is more infrastructure-focused.  
 
All three participants across both cases who related issues with outcome controls 
associated it with the time limitation imposed by outcome controls. This finding can be 
analysed in accordance with the subset of knowledge within control research that have 
examined the effects of controls on project performances. While prior studies have 
identified quality as interactions and goals of project (Gopal & Gosain 2009), fitness for 
use for client (Srivastava & Thompson 2012), and client satisfaction (Mao, Lee & Deng 
2008) and level of bug severity (Maruping, Venkatesh & Agarwal 2009). However, it is 
unclear what quality of a solution means for the two participants and the team members 
of the manager who related this issue in this study due to the subjective nature of the 
dimension. The findings in this study are contrary to those of Tiwana and Keil (2009) 
which reported that volatility of requirements had no impact on the  quality of solution. 
An explanation for this might be related to the participants in Tiwana and Keil (2009) 
study where they had examined controls from the controller (client) perspective, while 
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the findings showcased the vendor’s perspective. Thus, in this view, the findings show 
support for Lioliou et al. (2014)’s empirical research that poor quality of requirements 
can be attributed to a fundamental mismatch in expectations between client and vendor.  
7.4.3 Formalised collaboration across divisions 
Collaboration is key to achieving of client-specified outcomes for members at ALPHA, 
but not at BETA. This is reflected in the findings where the perceived impact on the 
clan as a result of the formalised collaboration was not observed. This can be attributed 
to the nature of the outsourcing arrangement, where ALPHA consist of members from 
APPS and INFRA.  
 
At ALPHA and BETA, seven out of the fifteen participants used the term “engage” to 
depict internal collaboration (Table 5.13). The use of certain terms has been 
highlighted by scholars to denote a reflection of existing ways of practices and social 
processes within organisations (Orlikowski 1991). And in this case study, “engage” 
denotes a formal collaboration across divisional lines. The results also indicate that 
across both cases, five participants at ALPHA and attributed formalised collaboration 
to the structure of the organisation where each division has its own financial objectives 
and targets. For participants at ALPHA, this has resulted in a view of not being a single 
organisation (Table 5.12). The perceived influence on the clan pertains to the inability 
to provide a coherent service to the client. One participant identified that while both 
divisions were meant to be servicing a single client, they were however bounded by 
different objectives. Two out of the nine participants relates that it is not an issue with 
the people but rather the structure of the organisation that can potentially impede the 
ability to service the client.  
 
The intrinsic motivation of wanting to service the client shows through the following 
remark by one of the respondents in this study,  
 
 “If I could change the GTECH world, I would get away.. I 
would do away with INFRA. I will do away with APPS. I will 
have an organisation, which is what we're trying to focus and 
move towards - that is here to service the customer. The fact 
that we are multiple parts that do not easily interlock yeah. 
We're still constrained by having Documents of 
Understanding between two parts of our organisation. Why? 
Why in this day and age? 
 
If you are a customer dealing with GTECH, you should be 
able to get on the phone. GTECH will have a common 
theme service, which is you. So whether it's a piece of 
hardware, whether it's a piece of software, whether it's a piece 
of service from a consulting point of view, that completely 
should be transparent. So I wouldn't have a INFRA and I 
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wouldn't have a APPS. I'll have GTECH with people and 
products and expertise..” [Robert_APPS]. 
 
While the above finding has outlined an intrinsic motivation to want to perform in 
response to the clan, it however also revealed another significant insight on issues with 
regards to interdivisional collaboration. Marketing literature suggest that the internal 
orientation of the organisation, where all employees within an organisation should be 
treated as internal customers with optimal service provided, can contribute to market 
orientation – that is an organisation is responsive to clients’ needs and wants. Internal 
orientation is based on a number of antecedents including but not limited to 
interdepartmental integration, inter-functional coordination and interdepartmental 
conflict within the organisation. Prior studies have found that all three elements have 
the tendency to impede on the market orientation of organisations.  
 
Examination of the finding through this lens can offer insights to the findings in this 
study. In relation to interdepartmental integration of the firm, participants were of the 
view that the organisation is not integrated as one where each division is treated as a 
third party provider through the need to establish a MoU. Inter-functional coordination 
were marked by formal engagement and differences in KPIs were identified by two out 
of the nine participants at ALPHA which does not necessarily facilitate a common goal 
between INFRA and APPS.  
 
The next section will examine the findings in relation to the identified impact on the 
clan as a result of responsiveness.  
7.4.4 Impact on responsiveness 
Six out of the nine participants at ALPHA and two out of the six participants at BETA 
reported that existing rules, policies and procedures has the potential to impact on 
responsiveness. There were several common points of agreement across both cases, 
namely the potential impact on the client, and the way in which approval processes adds 
on time. Across both cases, four out of the fifteen participants also reasoned that 
approval processes were slow by comparing with other organisations, and inferred that 
responsiveness can indirectly result in impact on customer loyalty. This is summarised 
in Table 7.6 below, and will be discussed accordingly.  
 
Table 7.7: Similarities and differences between ALPHA and BETA 
 ALPHA BETA 
Potential impact on the 
clan 
1 2 
Adds on time  2 2 
Comparison with other 
organisations 
2 2 
Competitors 1 1 
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Firstly, at both cases, there is a general overall negative perception of existing procedures 
in place (Refer Table 5.14). Additionally, it appears that while members from APPS 
commented with regards to processes being slow due to it adding on time, members 
from INFRA across both cases related their concerns with regards to competitors in the 
market. A perplexing finding was highlighted in Section 7.3.2 with regards to the 
differences in performance measurements between members in APPS and INFRA. The 
literature review that was conducted revealed that APPS functioned as a professional 
services firm within GTECH, while INFRA appear to be regarded as sales person 
where they have to fulfil quotas.  The concerns with regard to this finding are further 
exemplified in light of the above findings.  
 
The rationale lies in the nature of the role of IS professionals. Professionals go through 
years of training and are bounded by external institutions (Australian Council of 
Professions 2016). They acquire substantial technical knowledge through socialisation 
within and external to the organisation. The concern of customer loyalty and 
comparison with competitors are at fundamental odds with the nature of the role. From 
the researcher’s perspective, this can be attributed to several issues. Firstly, the products 
and services as well as the professional knowledge that comes with the job role can be 
viewed as a commodity that can be easily replaced. Secondly, it can be conceived of as a 
working relationship that might not be as rosy as it appears to be (Section 6.5.1).   
 
Issues relating to client loyalty and threat of competitors can be analysed in accordance 
with the marketing stream of research (Goodman et al. 1995; Langer, Mani & Srikanth 
2013). Insights from the marketing literature suggests that one can draw a parallel 
between the client-vendor relationship to that of a buyer-supplier relationship where 
internal orientation and market orientation of the firm needs to be aligned in order to 
retain outsourcing clients. For the market-based relationship between client and vendor 
to maintain its longevity, and for the vendor organisation to maintain its profitability, 
researchers have suggested that the prerequisite is to ensure the provision of services 
that meet the demands of clients to ensure client satisfaction and retain client loyalty 
(Goodman et al. 1995; Langer, Mani & Srikanth 2013). Service quality has received 
considerable interest for over three decades, and it has been argued to be interrelated 
with client satisfaction and loyalty (Caruana 2000; Grover, Cheon & Teng 1996; 
Schiffman, Kanuk & Hansen 2012), and is mostly spurred on by the work of 
Parusuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1988). A seminal study that has drawn upon 
SERVQUAL to examine outsourcing is that of Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996) who 
distinguished between service quality and partnership in different outsourcing 
arrangements. Izogo and Ognba (2015) more recently suggest that service quality 
should be directed at clients through assessments of clients’ perceptions of empathy, 
tangibles, responsiveness, reliability and commitment dimensions of service quality. 
 
An insight from the above highlighted literature suggest that IS control theory might 
benefit from incorporating dimensions of service quality to obtain a more holistic 
understanding of issues from the clients’ angle. Majority of existing control research 
have been focused on examining controls from the vendor’s perspectives in outsourcing 
contexts (Wiener et al. 2016). There is thus value to examine clients’ perceptions in this 
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regard. However, in relation to the findings in this study, responsiveness can potentially 
impact on the clan for it leads to decline in customer satisfaction, which can indirectly 
result in impact on the partnership between client and vendor. It thus affects the clan 
substantially due to unsatisfactory vendor’s performances, and lead to loss of trust. It can 
also trigger switching of service provider, which can lead to termination of contracts and 
impact organisation performance.  
 
Perhaps, it is recognition of the impact that GTECH has since revised its clip levels at 
the approval process for INFRA divisions in both APPS and BETA (Section 5.4.2 and 
6.4.2). Thus, this study has only managed to offer a snapshot at a point in time, of 
participants’ perceptions towards existing controls and the impact on the clan. On the 
other hand, for participants to highlight this issue suggest an intrinsic motivation to 
want to perform to the best for the clients.  
7.4.5 Addressing research question three 
Research question three aimed to understand the limitations of outsourcing and 
organisation controls and their influence on the clan. This is reflected in the question 
that was developed and is reproduced below: 
 
 SQ3: What are the limitations of outsourcing and 
organisation controls and how do they exert influence on the 
clan? 
 
 
The limitations of outcome controls rest upon its influence on the quality of solution. 
This is in accordance with prior research that have noted of how outcome controls are 
not defined in accordance with demands and expectations (Lioliou et al. 2014). While 
prior research has observed that volatility of requirements have no effect on the quality 
of solution (Tiwana & Keil 2009), the results of this study indicate otherwise. Not 
being able to provide a holistic solution due to unclear requirements can result 
unintended consequences, which can at a later stage lead to unsatisfactory vendors’ 
performances, and subsequent loss of trust.  
 
Due to the organisation structure, individuals from different divisions are required to 
collaborate across divisional lines. This led to a view of not being a single organisation, 
due to the need to establish contracts within the clan (ALPHA). This might also result 
in further distancing between members within the clan, resulting in a disjointed view of 
clients’ requirements. As a result of the need to put proposals through the approval 
process within the organisation, responsiveness can be impacted. This can have 
implications considering the primary aim of the work of members employed within 
outsourcing arrangements is to perform to service levels which sets a time limitation on 
work. Slow response can lead to unsatisfactory performances and result in loss of client 
loyalty.  
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7.5 Self-control 
This section reports on the results of self-control. In the examination of the 
contradictory experiences of individuals in order to demonstrate the importance of self-
control (Alvesson & Wilmott 2002), the significance of work autonomy emerged from 
the analysis.  
7.5.1 Work autonomy 
Within IS control research, self-control acknowledges that the creative nature of the 
task demands autonomy. It was noted in the literature review (Table 2.1) is self-
controls’ association with the creativity of the task at hand, and is usually complex. As 
outlined in the previous section, members across both cases reported on limitations to 
their work as a result of limitations of outcome controls, which might impede the 
quality of work, impact on responsiveness as well as impact on cross-divisional 
collaboration. These were overcome with workarounds to existing constraints and 
limitations.  
 
To make sense of these findings, a future literature review was conducted. Workarounds 
have been reported to be a common phenomenon within modern organisations (Alter 
2014; Pollock 2005). For Alter (2014), employees workaround for a number of reasons, 
including but not limited to allow oneself to continue with, prevent mishaps on 
subsequent activities or to comply with management intentions. Workarounds can also 
be quick fixes to issues that would go away, or facades of compliance (Alter 2014). In 
this study, participants used a variation of the above concepts as workarounds to 
problems and issues with work.  
 
At ALPHA (Section 5.6.1), the results of the study indicate that participants were 
drawing upon formal controls as workarounds to issues. It was reported that consulting 
workshops were used to workaround issues with unclear requirements, and provisions of 
extensions to SLAs were also utilised to workaround time limitations. Escalations were 
drawn upon to resolve issues with clients to obtain relief from SLAs. The 
aforementioned finding  is summarised in Table 7.8 on the next page.  
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Table 7.8: Workarounds pursued at ALPHA 
 Control 
domain 
Control 
identified 
Limitations of control 
identified 
Control 
pursued as 
workaround 
Rationale 
ALPHA 
OUTSOURCING 
Service levels 
(OC) 
Limited timeframe to fully 
understand clients’ 
requirements  
Consulting 
workshops 
(BC) 
Overcome time limitations, requirements 
clarification process, and quality issues. 
 
Able to help client generate requirements 
before requests is sent through the official 
channel. Ability to provide solution based on 
clear understanding of requirements, which 
would overcome issues of quality. Spend more 
time upfront with clients.  
Service levels  
(OC) 
Require more time due to 
complexity of requirements 
Provisions for 
extensions of 
SLAs 
(BC) 
Clients do not truly understand the complexity 
of their requirements, and sets the SLAs 
based on their assessment of the 
requirements.  
Service levels 
and financial 
penalties 
(OC) 
Overcome clients’ non-
approval of extension of 
SLAs that might lead to 
failure of SLAs 
Provisions for 
disputes and 
escalation 
(BC) 
Relief of service levels to prevent incurring 
financial penalties. 
ORGANISATION 
 
Organisation 
structure 
Formalised collaboration 
between divisions 
Conceal dual 
charging 
Clients perceive GTECH as a single 
organisation. However, SOWs that are 
processed at both INFRA and APPS is based 
on two sets of costs due to divisional 
differences, which are both charged to clients.  
Organisation 
structure 
Formalised collaboration 
between divisions 
People 
engagement 
and networking 
 
Rules, policies 
and procedures  
Impact on responsiveness. 
Approval process adds on 
time to existing time 
limitations set by SLAs 
People 
engagement 
and 
negotiations 
Escalation through informal means to bypass 
time constraints and achieve SLAs. 
Rules, policies 
and procedures 
Impact on competitiveness. 
Over-processing adds on 
costs to solutions. 
Feedback within 
organisation 
Increases the costs of solutions submitted to 
clients, which are more expensive than 
competitors. 
 
At BETA (Section 6.6.1), one participant reported working around limitations on 
outcome controls through open communication (clan control) with the client. Abiding 
by process was also observed as a workaround to overcome limitations of cross-
divisional collaboration. In relation to responsiveness, participants reported “begging” 
and relying on escalations and negotiations to bypass time constraints. Results in 
summarised in Table 7.9 below.  
 
Table 7.9: Workarounds at BETA 
Control 
domain 
Control identified Limitations of control identified Control pursued as workaround 
OUTSOURCING 
Service levels and 
financial penalties 
(OC) 
Limited timeframe to fully understand 
clients’ requirements. Inability to provide 
quality solutions. 
Compliance to SLAs to prevent incurrence of 
financial penalties. Serious cases might result 
in legal disputes. 
ORGANISATION 
Organisation 
structure 
Formalised collaboration between divisions Compliance with existing rules, procedures 
and policies 
Organisation 
structure 
Divisional differences in terms of objectives – 
contention between divisions 
Liaise with third party vendors 
Rules, policies and 
procedures  
Impact on responsiveness. Approval process 
adds on time to existing time limitations set by 
SLAs. 
People engagement and negotiations 
Rules, policies and 
procedures 
Impact on competitiveness. Over-processing 
adds on costs to solutions. 
Compliance with existing rules, procedures 
and policies 
 
 
Chapter 7: Cross-Case Analysis 
 
 
 
Page 204 of 249 
As discussed previously, these workarounds were pursued in response to limitations and 
constraints experienced in relation to the clan, which was reported in the previous 
section. The results of the study illustrated participants’ intrinsic motivation to want to 
do the best for their clients, and in doing so, exhibited that they were working for the 
goals of the organisation. Utilising workarounds is thus a function of self-management 
and self-control.  
7.5.2 Self-sanctioning to performance measurements and outcome 
controls 
Contrary to the commonly utilised position of self-control which only consider the 
presence of intrinsic motivations (Kirsch 1997), this study draws upon self-
determination theory (SDT) and extend self-control to include extrinsic motivations 
(Deci & Ryan 1998; Ryan & Deci 2000). This is consistent with Jaworski (1988)’s view 
of the need for incentives and other forms of controls for self-control to be successful. 
The current study found that performance targets and evaluations alongside with 
technical control play a significant role in ensuring individuals perform to performance 
targets. Contrary to prior studies that have excluded self-control from analysis for 
reasons pertaining to how self-control is exercised from the controllee (Tiwana & Keil 
2009), is not part of the manager’s toolkit (Gopal & Gosain 2009), and is equivalent to 
no control (Srivastava & Thompson 2012), the incorporation of extrinsic motivations 
have obtained significant insights into the link between performance measurements and 
outcome controls. That is, self-control is established within the organisation in the form 
of extrinsic rewards and is indirectly tied to achieving of client-specified outcomes. The 
current study found that performance measurement and evaluations within the 
outsourcing arrangement and organisation environment are indirectly linked to one 
another (Section 7.3.3).  
 
In relation to self-control, the results indicate that three out of the nine participants at 
ALPHA and one out of the six participants at BETA reported of how they exercise 
self-control in accordance to extrinsic rewards in the form of performance 
measurements within the organisation. At ALPHA (Section 5.6.2), one participant 
reported on how the team deserved to be credited for consulting workshops, which is 
part of formal controls. Another participant reported of self-management, wanting to 
know his performance in order to sell himself to the organisation and get converted to a 
permanent position. A third participant related that she did not pursue a certain strategy 
with the client, as it does not fit in with her performance measurements framework. At 
BETA (Section 7.5.2), only once instance was noted. The sole participant who 
highlighted this related how she would rather approve non-quality proposals as it is in 
accordance with what client wants.  
 
The current study did not identify any instances that demonstrated that clients 
intervened to encourage members within the vendor organisation to exercise self-control 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1996), or support suggestions that self-control 
is initiated internally at the vendor organisation through mechanisms suggested by the 
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client (Gopal & Gosain 2009; Tiwana 2010; Tiwana & Keil 2009; Wiener et al. 2015). 
Although, the results did indicate that daily meetings are established within the vendor 
organisation to keep track of the statuses of solutions, it is however unknown if this is 
recommended by the client organisation (Section 7.2.2.3). On the other hand, the daily 
meetings that are used to track the statuses of requests might be a result of the need to 
produce a daily performance report. This was however not examined in detail in this 
study, and can be examined in future studies.  
7.5.3 Addressing research question four 
Research question four aimed to establish that individuals actively self-sanction 
themselves in accordance to performance measurements. This is reflected in the 
research question below.  
 
 SQ4: How do individuals self-sanction in relation to 
performance measurements and incentives? 
 
 
Through research question two, the study was able to establish that extrinsic rewards are 
established within the organisation as part of performance measurements. Individuals 
actively engage in workarounds in the course of their work through work autonomy, as 
well as engage in self-sanctions in the course of their work by adhering to organisation 
requirements of performing to performance measurements.  
 
 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter systematically discussed the collective results from the participants in 
Team ALPHA and BETA in a global technology firm, GTECH, located in Victoria, 
Australia. The results from the analysis of the interviews, field notes and relevant 
documents of the participants involved in the research were presented. The following 
chapter will conclude the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
8.1 Overview 
This study has carried out an in depth investigation into the role of controls in an 
outsourcing unit in a large multinational IT organisation. Considering the growth in 
volume and significance of IT outsourcing, it is important to understand what affects 
work in that area and its impact on performance.  Two quite different teams serving 
different clients are studied to identify similarities and differences between the way that 
outsourcing work is controlled and managed. A qualitative approach was taken because 
of the newness of this area of research and the need to identify significant concepts and 
themes before any quantitative studies are pursued. Understanding how the subjects 
perceive control and the significance and meaning they attribute to it, provides an 
important basis for future research.   
 
The study synthesises prior research on control relevant to the field of Information 
Systems (IS) to provide a conceptual framework against which the various work 
activities and artefacts may be examined.  This includes considering the relationship 
between control at the level of the outsourcing arrangements and at the wider 
organisation level and how the two sets of controls interrelate. The study therefore 
extends research on control by applying it to the outsourcing domain.  
8.2 Aims and objectives of the study 
This study set out with four main objectives (Section 2.4); firstly to extend IS control 
theory to a long-term outsourcing arrangement. The second objective is to understand 
the interface between controls at the outsourcing level and controls at the organisational 
level. The third objective sets out to examine the limitations of outsourcing and 
organisation controls and the potential influence on the ‘clan’. Last but not least, the 
study aims to contribute to the concept of self-control by incorporating the notion of 
extrinsic rewards.  
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The primary research question is as follow: 
 
 How might extending IS control theory to an outsourcing 
arrangement contribute to our understanding on how 
outsourcing and organisation controls interface with one 
another to limit the ability for individuals to attain client-
specified outcomes? 
 
 
The sub-questions developed are: 
 
 SQ1: What are the forms of formal governance mechanisms 
established between client and vendor, how do they translate 
to outcome or behavioural controls that act upon individuals? 
 
SQ2: What are the forms of controls present within the 
vendor organisational environment that influences or operate 
in tandem with controls at the outsourcing level to ensure that 
individuals work towards achieving client-specified outcomes?  
 
SQ3: What are the limitations of outsourcing and 
organisation controls and how do they exert influence on the 
clan? 
 
SQ4: How do individuals self-sanction in relation to 
performance measurements and incentives? 
 
 
The following section will proceed to discuss the main research findings in relation to 
the research questions developed. 
8.2.1 Summary of research findings 
The extension of IS control theory to an outsourcing arrangement has shown that 
outsourcing and organisation controls interface with each other in more complex ways 
than expected. For individuals working within outsourcing arrangements, controls are 
exercised from two distinct domains, i.e. both within and external to the organisation. 
At the outsourcing level, individuals are expected to perform to outcomes within set 
time limitations, and perform the task of requirements assessment, relationship 
management concurrently. They are also expected to attend meetings to provide daily 
updates to clients, while at the same time perform to performance measurements set 
within the organisation environment.  
 
The current study found that client-specified outcome controls can limit the ability for 
individuals to provide a holistic solution. Their intrinsic motivation for wanting to 
provide quality piece of work ties back to individual reputation, or simply wanting to 
ensure that solutions proposed will not result in any unintended consequences for the 
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client. Bound by time limitations, members are also required to collaborate across 
divisional lines and navigate through constraints and roadblocks due to existing 
processes. However, they are only limited to a certain extent due to the ability to 
exercise professional autonomy in the conduct of their work.  
8.2.2 Addressing the first research question 
The aim of the first research question was to depart from the transaction costs economic 
(TCE) (Williamson 1979; 1985; 1998) perspective utilised to examine controls within 
outsourcing arrangements, and draw upon IS control theory to provide a more targeted 
understanding as to the forms of controls that are operationalised and act upon 
members within outsourcing arrangements. The results support prior scholars’ assertion 
that not all formal governance mechanism function as outcome or behavioural control 
and acts upon individuals in outsourcing arrangements (Kern & Wilcocks 2002).  
 
Formal governance mechanisms identified include contractual details, business office, 
request for service (RFS) document and procedures for receiving RFSs. These were 
classified in accordance with Lioliou et al. (2014, p. 505) definition, where formal 
governance mechanisms are mechanisms that ‘aims to coordinate activities between 
partners and prevent opportunistic behaviours through the creation of a mutually agreed 
upon and legally binding set of acceptable behaviours’ (Lioliou et al. 2014, p. 505). In 
the two outsourcing arrangements examined in this study, the results based on the 
respondents in this study suggest that formal governance mechanisms that play a role in 
their work, i.e. they are aware of but do not impact them significantly, appear to relate 
to the governance structure of the outsourcing arrangements. For the respondents in 
this study, the structure facilitates how work in the form of request for service (RFS) is 
received from the client and how work gets transmitted to them via the electronic portal 
established (Section 7.2.1). For the respondents, it is the way in which clients exercise 
controls in outsourcing arrangements.  
 
Consistent with prior research (Kern & Wilcocks 2002; Lacity, Yan & Khan 2017; 
Lioliou et al. 2014), outcome controls that exercised influence over individuals include 
(1) service levels agreements (SLAs) and (2) penalties for failing SLAs (Section 7.2.2). 
Behavioural controls identified in this study that is consistent with prior empirical 
observations include (1) dispute and conflict arbitration processes (Chen & Bharadwaj 
2009; Goo et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002); and (2) frequency of monitoring and 
review (Cao & Lumineau 2015). This study has also added on to prior research with 
regards to what constitutes behavioural controls, such as (1) requirements clarification 
process upon receipt of RFSs, (2) procedures for extensions of SLAs, as well as (3) 
consulting workshops. The aforementioned exert influence over the work of individuals 
as they depict certain actions and behaviours that must be conducted by respondents 
(Detailed findings can be found in Section 7.2.3).  
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Table 8.1: Formal governance and controls identified 
Formal governance 
mechanisms 
Outcome controls Behaviour controls 
! Contractual details 
! Business Office 
! RFS document 
! Procedures for receiving 
RFSs 
! Service levels with 
different levels of 
complexities 
! Financial penalties 
! Requirements 
assessment 
! Provisions for extensions 
(only at ALPHA) 
! Provisions for dispute 
resolutions 
! Consulting workshops 
! Frequency of monitoring 
and review 
 
The results indicate that a combination outcome and behaviour controls operate in 
tandem to exert influence over individuals. This view is consistent with prior studies 
that found that outcome and behaviour controls operate in tandem (Choudhury & 
Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997). In relation to how specifically formal controls act upon 
individuals, the results indicate that service levels exert influence over individuals by 
setting a time limitation on the response time when requests are received from clients. 
The influence is shown through how respondents were discussing time pressures they 
faced in the course of their work activities. Financial penalties are tied together with 
service levels (outcome controls) and its influence is exerted both directly through the 
daily meetings that track SLAs (behaviour controls), to ensure SLAs are met, by keep 
track of statues of RFSs and identify RFSs that are at risk of failing SLAs.  
 
Other behaviour controls identified include (1) dispute and conflict arbitration 
processes, and (2) procedures for extensions of SLAs have specific procedures that must 
be adhered to, and are drawn upon when situations arise that require their use. The 
results indicate that utilisation of these mechanisms are also tied to the need to achieve 
outcomes in that dispute resolution facilitate the relief from failing services levels, while 
requiring more time, i.e. extensions are utilised in situations when more clarifications on 
requirements are needed. Behaviour controls such as requirements clarification process 
and consulting workshops act upon individuals in that there are specific procedures to 
follow after receiving requests from clients. Consulting workshops on the other hand, 
written within contracts, require individuals to provide professional services at no charge 
to the client.  
 
This section has addressed research question one, and similar to studies before (Huber 
et al. 2013; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Srivastava & Thompson 2012), have 
demonstrated the efficacy of approaching the examination of controls in outsourcing 
arrangements using concepts from IS control theory in conjunction with the TCE 
perspective. However, unlike prior studies, the use of the two approaches in conjunction 
have firstly, led to the identification as to how outcomes are exercised in outsourcing 
arrangement. Secondly, the results in this study have provided an initial baseline of 
formal controls in which future research can draw upon for further examinations and 
testing. Answers to the second research question will be addressed next.  
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8.2.3 Addressing the second research question 
The objective of the second research question was to understand how outsourcing and 
organisation controls interface with one another in the course of working towards 
client-specified outcomes. Client-specified outcomes, identified through the first 
research question are namely services levels and penalties should SLAs not be met.  The 
results of the current study observed the influence of organisation structure, hierarchies, 
standardised work procedures, as well as performance measurements in place established 
to ensure IS professionals achieve client-specified outcomes. This supports previous 
empirical observations in large consultancy firms (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; 
Orlikowski 1991), professional services firm (Alvehus & Spicer 2012), and in IS 
projects (Henderson & Lee 1992; Nandhakumar & Avison 1999; Nandhakumar & 
Jones 2001). The current study found that organisation controls, dependent on 
perspective can operate in tandem with outsourcing controls throughout the course of 
working towards client-specified outcomes. It can also influence the work activities 
towards achieving client-specified outcomes.  
 
The role of organisation structure characterised by different goals and objectives define 
how collaboration should occur. This is more apparent in the first case study (ALPHA) 
as opposed to the second case (BETA), due to the nature of the outsourcing agreement 
where members within two divisions at GTECH are contracted to the client. The role 
of organisation structure only becomes apparent at BETA when there is a need for 
members to respond to requests that require specialised skills not available within its 
own division. This is largely due to the nature of the outsourcing arrangement; where 
ALPHA provides both application and infrastructure management services, thus 
requiring members from two divisions to collaborate, while BETA only provide 
infrastructure services to the client. In parallel, the results of the study also observed that 
internal collaboration across divisional lines is guided by existing rules, procedures and 
policies (processes) within each division. Collaboration within the organisation is 
facilitated through the establishing of a contractual agreement, essentially treating 
fellow colleagues or division as a third party vendor.  
 
Rule, procedures and policies were also evident in the approval process, which guides 
actions. Each and every solution that is submitted have to go through pricing and 
quality assurance checks to ensure the quality of the requirements are met, the quoted 
price is within standards and there are stocks or resources available to deliver the 
product and services stated within the SOW. The value of the contract determines 
whether an RFS demands local or global approval or whether it requires more stringent 
quality assurance checks. More significantly, the current study found that that 
performance measurement are tied to outcome controls, in that working towards 
achieving client outcomes and clients signing off on proposals submitted constitute 
either a new project that respondents can bill hours towards, or a new business that 
respondents get credited for the contract value.  
 
This section has addressed the second research question. The findings in relation to the 
third research question will be presented next.  
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8.2.4 Addressing the third research question 
Based on the examination of the two case studies, the findings indicate the significance 
of commitment in long-term outsourcing arrangements. This was observed across both 
cases during participants’ description of their relationship with the client (Section 7.4). 
Trust also appeared to be more interpersonal as opposed to being situated at the clan 
level (Section 7.4.1.1).  
 
In relation to the research question, the results indicate that outcome controls can 
impact on the clan due to the time limitations that prevents IS professionals from 
providing a well-rounded and holistic solution that can cater for unintended 
consequences (Section 7.4.2). Respondents who responded to this perceived it as a 
limitation due to unclear requirements, the inability to solicit a holistic understanding of 
the business case, differences in clients’ perceptions of the complexities associated with 
the requirements, individual’s reputation within the industry (Section 7.4.2.1 and 
7.4.2.2). Amongst those who responded, with the exception of the participant indicated 
of reputation within the industry, majority of respondents were of the view that the 
inability to gain a clear understanding of requirements can result in unintended 
consequences. This can be inferred to be a potential influence on the clan due to 
unsatisfactory performances and can lead to loss of trust.  
 
Transcending to the organisation level, participants identified issues with formalised 
collaboration (only at ALPHA) (Section 7.4.3) and impact on responsiveness (Section 
7.4.4). The results of the study indicate that existing organisation structure can lead to 
the perception of not being in a single organisation with a single objective of servicing 
the client due to differences in financial objectives set at the divisional level of the 
organisation. This can inadvertently result in the division of the clan, only apparent in 
the first case study, which consists of two divisional members that are contracted to 
service the client (Section 7.4.3). Additionally, existing process controls can impact on 
responsiveness, which can once again impact on responsiveness and competitiveness for 
the organisation, which might lead to a sub-par partnership view, in that the clients 
might not view the vendor as a trusted service provider (Section 7.4.4). While existing 
relationship can be used to counteract challenges and issues, and prior research have 
outlined that formal and informal control can function as both complementary and 
substitutes, however the results of this case study showcased how formal and informal 
controls can be paradoxical in nature, with no silver bullet to resolve contradictions. 
This has implications for practitioners, as will be discussed in Section 8.5. 
8.2.5 Addressing the fourth research question 
The fourth research question focuses attention on the contradictions faced by members 
within outsourcing arrangements, and aims at developing an understanding that in spite 
of contests against existing controls, individuals who are still working for the objectives 
of the organisation will still abide by controls. Prior research have omitted self-control 
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due to the perceived non-influence of self-control on project outcomes (Gopal & 
Gosain 2009; Srivastava & Thompson 2012; Tiwana & Keil 2009), the results of the 
study indicate that the individual is very much involved with achieving client-specified 
outcomes. The results of the study shows that individuals exert self-control because 
achieving outcomes controls (SLAs) directly ties back to their individual performance 
measurements in the organisation environment, either in the form of billable hours or 
total value of contracts signed off by clients (Section 7.5). While respondents in the 
study contest and disagree with performance measurements, they however actively 
workaround constraints and limitations, and sanction oneself in accordance to 
performance measurements established.  
 
Having addressed the research questions, the next section will discuss the findings in 
relation to the main research question.  
8.3 Significance and contributions of the study 
The main theoretical contribution in this study lies in the extending of IS control 
theory, which is rooted in organisation control, agency, and cognitive evaluation 
theories (Section 2.3.1), to the domain of an outsourcing arrangement, thereby 
extending the control framework developed by Kirsch (1997). Prior studies have 
primarily drawn on formal controls in their examination of controls in outsourcing 
arrangements (Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008; Tiwana 2007). To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is among the first study to draw upon IS control theory 
(both formal and informal controls) in the examination of outsourcing arrangement, 
more specifically, to gain insights into how controls act upon individuals in outsourcing 
arrangements.  
 
Secondly, through the incorporation of TCE, IS control theory and management 
control frameworks, this study has been able to paint a rich description on how 
outsourcing and organisation controls interface with one another. Based on the findings 
in this study, formal governance mechanisms in accordance with prior research pertains 
to the established set of mechanisms for how client and vendor relate to one another. 
Thus far, little is known with regards to how controls are exercised in outsourcing 
arrangements (Rustagi, King & Kirsch 2008). This study has contributed to the body of 
control research by identifying precisely how controls are exercised in outsourcing 
arrangements (Section 7.2.2). The results indicate that outcome controls are exercised 
through formal governance mechanisms established. Additionally, exercising of 
outcomes is based on specification of a complexity level that is associated with a time-
limitation in the form of number of days to turnaround, i.e. respond to the client with a 
proposal. This study has also identified and developed concepts of outcome and 
behaviour controls, which would provide a baseline for future testing (Section 7.2.5, 
Table 7.3).  
 
Another significant contribution of the current study is the extension of IS control 
theory to the organisation environment. Insights from empirical observations that 
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control over individuals can be distinguished into two distinct levels, namely inter-
organisation (outsourcing controls) and within the organisation (Alvesson & Kärreman 
2004), as well as studies that have highlighted how client firms are dependent upon 
vendor’s internal controls to protect them from threats and risks (Hall & Liedtka 2007) 
have augment the need to understand the interface between outsourcing and 
organisation controls. This study thus fills a gap within the knowledge base by 
examining the interface between outsourcing and organisation controls. More 
significantly, the descriptive nature of the study has illustrated “how things work” and 
the controls employees have to navigate through, which will encourage more 
theorisation in future research.  
 
Additionally, based on the premise that long-term outsourcing arrangements would 
have established a significant level of clan control mechanisms, this study aimed to 
examine how the interface between outsourcing and organisation controls and how they 
affect the relationship within the clan. Thus far, within the body of control research, 
few studies have examined the limitations of formal controls, with the exception of 
Lioliou et al. (2014). This study has thus contributed to the knowledge base by 
outlining the unintended consequences from the vendor’s perspectives as to how 
outcome controls can impact on the quality of requirements (Section 7.4.2), existing 
organisation structure can result in formalised collaboration within the clan (Section 
7.4.3), as well as how the processes within the organisation can lead to an impact on 
responsiveness which can inadvertently lead to unsatisfactory performances, last but not 
least, impact on the competitiveness of the organisation due to slow response (Section 
7.4.3).  
 
Last but not least, while there is a general agreement that there will be controls 
established within the vendor organisation to encourage self-control (Gopal & Gosain 
2009; Tiwana 2010; Tiwana & Keil 2009), little is known with regards to what form of 
controls there are. This study has thus contributed to the knowledge base by identifying 
the link between outcome controls and performance measurements within the 
organisation. This study found that participants do not find issues with performance 
measurements, and understood the need for their existence. Their issue lies upon what 
is being measured, as what counts do not exactly account for the nuances of work. This 
study has shown that in spite of disagreements and contests, participants still chose to 
sanction oneself in accordance to existing performance measurements.  
8.4 Implications for researchers 
Prior research that has examined controls within outsourcing arrangements has 
generally approached their studies by employing a TCE perspective (Goo 2010; Goo et 
al. 2009; Lioliou et al. 2014). The current study has shown that formal governance 
mechanisms, for participants in this study, relates to how controls are received through 
the governance structure in place. Outcome controls and behaviour controls identified 
were, with the exception of a few (Refer Section 8.3.1), remained consistent with prior 
research. Future researchers can draw upon the framework in this study in their 
Chapter 8: Discussion & Conclusion 
 
 
 
Page 214 of 249 
examination of controls in outsourcing arrangements. The researcher proposed the 
collection of the outsourcing contracts as a form of data to verify whether what was 
found in this study, such as requirements clarification constitute a behaviour control 
that is part of the operating procedure written within contracts.  
 
Secondly, the current study have identified substantial differences between outsourced 
and offshored IS projects (Refer Section 7.4). The body of research on control dynamics 
have outlined that internal and outsourced IS projects rely on formal controls at the 
beginning of projects, but eventually migrate to use of informal controls as the 
relationship progresses (Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008; Mähring 2002; Prifling, 
Gregory & Beck 2009). The current study however indicates that outcome controls are 
primarily utilised in outsourcing arrangements, whereas informal controls are relied 
upon to overcome limitations and constrains of formal controls.  
 
Scholars have stressed the importance of context in research. That is, the setting of a 
study, its social, cultural, political and institutional differences needs to be differentiated 
in order to distinguish one study from another (Avgerou 2001; Chiasson & Davidson 
2005; Pettigrew 1987). In relation to this study, one of the issues identified during the 
discussion of the findings pertains to the apparent differences in context between 
different forms of outsourcing arrangements. Prior empirical research Rustagi, King and 
Kirsch (2008) and Wiener et al. (2015) have examined formal controls in more than one 
form of outsourcing arrangements, such as applications management, infrastructure 
management and business process outsourcing. Participants in this study are specialised 
in applications and infrastructure management.  
 
The findings of the study suggest that that the work of IS professionals in applications 
management is similar to that of IS projects, where the focus is on developing of 
software functionalities, applications development testing etc. This is also ascertained by 
Beulen, Van Fenema and Currie (2005) where the authors posited that professionals in 
applications management conduct primarily project-based activities. The individual 
performance measurements on billable hours are similar to that of professional service 
firms where the focus is on billable hours, i.e. utilisation rate (Alvehus & Spicer 2012; 
Nandhakumar & Avison 1999). On the other hand, the findings of the study suggest 
that in general, IS professionals specialising in infrastructure management with job 
scopes and responsibilities similar to that of professionals in IS project context, were 
however assessed and evaluated as sales people, where the focus is on quota achievement 
(Section 7.3.3). Following this finding, future research should be careful in the way they 
contextualise the outsourcing arrangement they intend to investigate and examine. 
Thus, the researcher is of the opinion that further insights can be drawn from studies on 
controls in professional services firm and sales or marketing.  
 
Prior literature have been inconclusive with regards to whether controls are present 
within the vendor organisation to encourage self-control, and whether self-control is 
instantiated by vendors or within the vendor organisation. The results of the study have 
indicated that outcome controls are tied to performance measurements at the 
organisation level, and the study has shown that individuals actively work towards the 
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goals of the organisation and for the client by using creative ways of bypassing 
constraints. Thus, future research can consider exploring the role of performance 
measurements within the vendor organisation that facilitates the exercising of control by 
individuals.  
8.5 Implications for practitioners 
What is presented through the two case studies might be unique, and does not apply to 
other form of outsourcing arrangements, such as call centre, human resource functions 
etc. However, the current study does provide several learning and takeaway for both 
client and vendor organisations that can be considered “fruit for thought”.  
 
Synonymously across both case studies, participants identified that outcome controls, 
SLAs can potentially impede the ability for members within the vendor organisation to 
provide a quality and holistic solution for the client they serviced. This finding posed 
certain implications for clients. As this study has shown, the issue with SLAs is that 
members within vendor organisation can only spend a certain amount of time and effort 
of a solution based on the time limitations. While what is presented are unique cases 
and cannot be generalised, however, based on the findings in this study, the researcher 
is of the view that clients should exercise more pragmatism when granting extensions to 
members within the vendor organisation, particularly in relation to solutions that are 
not within the realm of their technical knowledge. Or perhaps, another solution is to 
ensure the vendor team liaises with someone with technical knowledge to assess the 
complexity of the requirements.  
 
Vendor organisations thus have to be mindful on how existing processes and structure 
affect responsiveness and collaboration. As this study have shown, existing processes can 
add on unnecessary time and appears to conflict with the SLAs that are set by the 
client. The organisation in this case has responded to challenges faced by increasing the 
clip level for assessments and reviews, and have benefited the participants. Existing 
organisation structure, due to different objectives, can result in the feeling of not being a 
single organisation and formalised collaboration across divisions. As one of the 
participants in this study envisaged and suggested,  
 
 “If I can change the GTECH world, I will do away with INFRA and 
APPS. I will have an organisation, which is what we're trying to focus and 
move towards - that is here to service the customer. Whereas, if you are a 
customer dealing with GTECH, I should be able to get on the phone, 
and say as a customer, we have a common theme service, which is you. 
Whether it's a piece of hardware, whether it's a piece of software, whether 
it's a piece of service from a consulting point of view, that completely 
should be transparent. So I wouldn't have an INFRA group nor an APPS 
division, I will have GTECH with people and products and expertise” 
[Robert_APPS]. 
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The following section will outline the limitations of this research.  
8.6 Limitations of the research 
As with all studies, there are limits relating to the methodology chosen, sample size and 
the scope and duration of the study.  
 
The first limitation of this study lies in the use of the descriptive case study 
methodology. While the strength of descriptive case study lies in the ability to provide 
descriptive information regarding the research issues, they however do not facilitate the 
ability to understand causal relationships or offer in-depth explanations of the 
phenomenon under examination. An explanatory case study is therefore needed to 
further test the proposed relationship in the research framework. A quantitative study 
(e.g., conducting a large scale survey) could provide more empirical support and 
methodological triangulation for the propositions or the formation of constructs in the 
current research. However as mentioned before, the qualitative approach allows access 
to the respondents’ perceptions and the meaning they attribute to phenomena. 
Moreover, it is important to establish what is significant in relation to a phenomenon 
before attempting to count or measure it. Since outsourcing is a new area of research 
and has hardly been studied in relation to control, qualitative studies are necessary to 
understand the phenomenon.  
 
Secondly, the sample size of fifteen participants is a reflection of the limitations the 
researcher had owing to a worldwide restructuring exercise that was in progress at the 
organisation of study. One of the concepts of IS control theory is self-control, where the 
researcher specifically examined the contradictory experiences of individuals in relation 
to controls established at the outsourcing and organisation level. Noting negative 
comments pertaining to how individuals felt demotivated due to the restructuring 
exercise, or how one can be made redundant suggests that continual inquiries into the 
experiences of controls by participants might yield biased results. A decision was thus 
made to halt data collection. The researcher’s intuition and observations were somewhat 
proven, as two out of the fifteen participants were made redundant by GTECH shortly 
after the data collection ended. Two other participants also left the organisation for 
greener pastures. Despite this, most qualitative scholars suggest that the number of 
subjects studied is less significant than the depth of data collected, especially in a new 
research area.  
 
Thirdly, this study has only examined GTECH’s operations in Victoria, Australia. 
There were several participants that related the need to collaborate with members 
located in the South East Asia (SEA) region, which were not within the scope of this 
study. There might also be cultural differences as well as different modus operandi in 
the other locations in which GTECH operates. There is thus a location bias that must 
be taken note of in the interpretation of the findings of this study. On hindsight, the 
findings in the study could have been more robust and detailed if members from the 
Business Office were included.  
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Last but not least, the methodological approach for this study utilised multiple case 
studies for comparison purposes. A central concern of case study research is the ability 
to generalise results beyond the case studies utilised (Yin 2003; 2014). Steps have thus 
been taken to offset this potential limitation through the choice of the cases, including a 
rich description of the context of the organisation under examination.  As Schwandt 
(2007, p. 127) notes, the value of qualitative research is in its specificity, detail, and 
closeness to the real situation so that the findings from this case may be transferred to 
another. 
8.7 Recommendations for future research 
This section documents recommendations for further research based on firstly, the 
findings in this study, and secondly, future research that can build on the findings in 
this study. They will be discussed accordingly.  
8.7.1 From the research findings 
One of the subset of knowledge within IS control research have examined the 
complementary and substitutive nature of formal and informal control mechanisms in 
outsourced IS projects and services (Huber et al. 2013; Poppo & Zenger 2002; Tiwana 
2010) and outsourcing arrangements (Cao & Lumineau 2015; Lioliou et al. 2014). By 
substitution, it means formal and informal control mechanisms are used as equivalents, 
and one can replace the other in achieving outcomes. For instance, in cases of disputes, 
clan mechanisms, such as interpersonal relationship and open communications, have 
been identified by empirical research as a way for clients and vendors to resolve conflicts 
harmoniously (Huber et al. 2013; Poppo & Zenger 2002). The complementary 
perspective argues that formal and informal controls compensates for the weaknesses of 
the other. For example, Huber et al. (2013) identified in their study on how provision of 
workshops which is written within contracts (formal control) similarly functions as a 
form of clan control building due to the ability for increased frequencies and 
interactions between client and vendor.  
 
The findings in this study can be reanalysed and framed within the above subset of 
knowledge, as the findings in this study are consistent with the view that formal and 
informal controls functioned as both substitutes and complements. For instance, the 
results in this study indicate that contractual workshops as a form of formal governance 
mechanism functions as a behavioural control. At the same time, contractual workshops 
also offer opportunities for members within the vendor organisation to interact with 
clients, and in doing so, can lead to more trusting relationship. This finding is 
consistent with prior literature that formal and informal control mechanisms can 
function as complements (Huber et al. 2013; Poppo & Zenger 2002). The results of the 
study also indicate the substitutive nature of formal and informal controls, which is 
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more apparent during conflict and dispute resolutions. In one example from the study, 
due to a loss of trust between client and vendor (clan control), member within the 
vendor organisation had to reply on escalation and dispute resolution channels 
(behaviour controls) to relief the failing of SLAs (outcomes). There were other 
examples noted within this study that augment the perspective of the feasibility of 
reanalysing the data collected in this study for publication purposes.  
8.7.2 Future research opportunities 
Firstly, instead of approaching the examination of controls through a TCE perspective, 
this study has demonstrated the feasibility of extending IS control theory to an 
outsourcing arrangement, specifically in the vendor organisation. This is based on the 
premise that not all formal governance mechanisms translate to outcome and behaviour 
that directly influence the actions and behaviours of individuals. More research can be 
conducted by formulating formal and relational governance as formal and informal 
controls (1) to further validate the research findings in this study; and (2) to enhance 
our understanding on controls in outsourcing arrangements. A quantitative study will be 
useful to validate the findings in this research.  
 
Secondly, similar to majority of previous literature, this study has examined controls in 
the vendor organisation. Prior research has conducted studies in both client and vendor 
organisations by examining client-vendor matched pairs (Kirsch, Ko & Haney 2010; 
Kirsch et al. 2002; Narayanaswamy, Grover & Henry 2013; Rustagi, King & Kirsch 
2008). The researcher can further continue this research by approaching participants 
from GTECH to obtain referrals to members within the client organisations they are 
currently servicing in order to enhance the findings in this study by providing a 
perspective from the client. For instance, the results of this study have provided 
perspectives into how formal controls are exercised in outsourcing arrangements. The 
results across both cases indicate that clients exercise controls by assessing the 
complexities of the requirements documented within the RFS document. The 
complexities are in turn translated to different levels of SLAs that function as outcome 
controls that are tracked through daily tracking of the statuses of RFSs (behavioural 
control) established within the vendor organisation. Future research can thus examine 
how clients determine the complexities of requirements, and under what circumstances 
do they deem a request as less complex, how do they determine when to extend SLAs, 
what sort of issues they encounter from interacting with the clients and to what extent 
do issues impact the relationship (clan), in order to enrich the knowledge base.  
 
Thirdly, majority of the control research have been focused on examining how controls 
impact project or contract performance; the antecedents towards use of formal and 
informal controls, as well as the dynamics of control configurations which tracks how 
formal and informal controls changes throughout a project duration. Research on 
dynamics of control configurations are however scarce and limited, and are only limited 
to the context of IS projects. As Wiener et al. (2016, p. 745) point out in their recent 
review, ‘less than one sixth of the studies in our review sample apply a dynamic 
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perspective to study the control of IS projects’. The strength of control dynamic studies 
lies upon how they illustrate through phase-based or encounter-based approaches and 
showcase how performance problems trigger control changes (Choudhury & Sabherwal 
2003; Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008; Susilo, Heales & Rohde 2007; Wiener et al. 
2016).  
Future research can explore control dynamics in outsourcing arrangements. There is 
adequate evidence from this study suggesting that members within outsourcing 
arrangements would be managing a number of RFSs at a single point in time. The 
evidence from the study also suggests that members in outsourcing arrangements have 
to manage different groups of stakeholders based on the different RFSs sent through. It 
will therefore be particularly interesting to understand whether a control dynamics 
approach can be extended to that in outsourcing arrangements to obtain insights into 
whether performance problems can trigger the use of various formal governance 
mechanisms. For instance, one participant highlighted how members with technical 
knowledge appeared to be more understanding with regards as to why a solution might 
be complex. A control dynamic perspective might offer more in-depth insights into 
differences in use of controls by a business stakeholder or a technical stakeholder.  
In this section, I have identified areas in which the data collected in this study can be 
reanalysed and reframed to contribute to other knowledge areas.  I have also identified 
four main directions for future research opportunities based on the findings in this 
study. This thesis will be concluded in the next section.  
8.8 Concluding comments 
Outsourcing, as an industry, has been forecasted to achieve a steady but limited growth 
due to shifts in market trends (Gartner 2017c; IBIS World 2016; Report Linker 2017; 
Statista 2017). In response to the changing landscape, there is thus a critical need for 
generation of research topics that reflect industry concerns and gain insights into 
detrimental issues (Benbasat & Zmud 1999; Rosemann & Vessey 2008). This study has 
drawn upon IS control theory (Kirsch 1997) to examine controls within a long-term 
outsourcing arrangement and extended it to understand the interface between 
outsourcing and organisation controls. This study is a departure from prior research by 
exploring what controls means for individuals in outsourcing arrangements.  
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Background 
This research begins with the premise of designing and developing systems that reflects the reality of 
what people do in the business environment, and how they do what they do. 
Information Systems are widely used in the business environment to enhance the daily activities at 
work, promising efficiencies and effectiveness within organisations through continual utilisation. 
However, the notion of new issues occurring, such as the need for greater responsiveness to both 
internal and external customers leads to demands for “better” systems.  
Introduction of new technologies into the business environment requires a great deal of cooperation 
between the designers, developers and end users. It is through communication among these 
stakeholders that leads to the development of high-level business process maps that informs how 
systems are designed and developed. Often, new technologies may require end users to work with 
multiple systems that do not work together, users may reject new technologies due to misfit between 
the designs of systems and how work is done.  
Designing and developing a system that enhances work is a complex process, and should adopt a 
much more comprehensive approach than face-to-face meetings, or electronic exchanges seeking 
clarifications. It is about actually being at the ground level, and understanding what people do, how 
they do it, and why they do what they do, or who they communicate with, to “get things done” at work.  
This study therefore aims at gaining an understanding of the human activities in organisations that are 
creatively enacted, and those activities that may be in tension with rules built in by information 
systems.  
Your participation will help improve the current methods of developing business and information 
systems for use in organisations. More significantly, your insights will help us craft how we can design 
better systems for people, as opposed to people working around systems and also help us gain an 
understanding of how people perform creatively at work and the working relationships they form to do 
their work. 
I plan to conduct an interview with you that will be organised at a time suitable to you, and at a venue 
of your choice. We anticipate that the interview may take between 30 to 45 minutes. With your 
consent, the interview will be recorded and used for analysis at a later stage in the research. 
At the beginning of the interview, we will ask you to sign a consent form. The interview questions will 
revolve around your daily work activities and provide an understanding of your role in your 
organisation, what you are expected to do on a daily basis, and how you overcome or resolve any 
problems your face at work. Other interview themes will involve understanding your current work 
processes, and what you think can be improved upon. Some indicative questions are provided below. 
Indicative interview questions 
! Most organisations have a variety of management systems to manage this process. What I’ll 
like to know what systems you use on a daily basis to do your work, and areas in which the 
system works, or does not work well to help you with your work. (It could be a system on an 
Excel spread sheet, or even templates you use to gain approvals, or technical systems such!
as ERP/CRM.) 
! What are the “tricks” of the trade that comes to your mind when you deal with the difficult 
business processes you described previously?  
! What are some of the improvements you might suggest to the system, or processes if you had 
the authority to do so? Do you think your fellow colleagues will agree with you? Why and why 
not?
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Any feedback or opinion is welcome and will be kept strictly confidential. The audio data or any notes 
taken will not be made available to anyone outside of the research team for any purpose. Participants 
and IBM will also not be identifiable in any reports or publications. All data files will be stored in 
password-protected files and only made available to the researchers. The computer file will be deleted 
after the minimum retention period of 5 years, as specified by Deakin’s Human Research Ethics 
policies. 
The research team do not foresee any risks that are out of the ordinary risks of everyday lives. Please 
take note that you are entitled to reject any questions that you may feel uncomfortable answering, or 
provide any feedback to help us improve the study further.  
There will be no reimbursement for your participation.  
We plan to publish the results of this research in academic and industry publications. If you are 
interested in the results of the study, a report summary can be made available to you at your request. 
This project is funded by Deakin University.  
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or any 
questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
 
The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 
Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Please quote project number BL-EC 57-14. 
 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any problems 
concerning this project (for example, any side effects), you can contact the principal researcher or any 
other associate researchers below. 
 
Dr Darryl Coulthard 
 
School of Information and Business Analytics 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Australia 
 
Phone: 0392 446 196 
Fax: 03 556 33320 
Email: darryl.coulthard@deakin.edu.au 
 
Dr Susan Keller 
 
School of Information and Business Analytics 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Australia 
 
Phone: 0392 446 564 
Fax: 03 556 33320 
Email: susan.keller@deakin.edu.au 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Participant 
 
Consent Form 
Date:   DD/MM/YYYY 
Full Project Title:  Exploring the “Creative Tension” at Work 
Reference Number:  BL-EC 57-14 
 
 
I have read, and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain Language 
Statement.  
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep.  
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where 
information about this project is published, or presented in any public form.   
I also specifically allow researchers to audio record our conversations for research purposes. !
Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………………………… 
Signature ………………………………………………………  
Date  ………………………… 
 
Dr Darryl Coulthard 
 
School of Information and Business Analytics 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Australia 
 
Phone: 0392 446 196 
Fax: 03 556 33320 
Email: darryl.coulthard@deakin.edu.au 
 
Dr Susan Keller 
 
School of Information and Business Analytics 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Australia 
 
Phone: 0392 446 564 
Fax: 03 556 33320 
Email: susan.keller@deakin.edu.au 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Participant 
 
 
Withdrawal of Consent Form 
 
Date:   DD/MM/YYYY 
Full Project Title:  Exploring the “Creative Tension” at Work 
Reference Number:  BL-EC 57-14 
 
 
 
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research project and 
understand that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardise my relationship with Deakin 
University. 
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………. 
 
 
Signature ………………………………………………………………. Date …………………… 
 
 
 
Please mail or fax this form to: 
 
Dr Darryl Coulthard 
 
School of Information and Business Analytics 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Australia 
 
Phone: 0392 446 196 
Fax: 03 556 33320 
Email: darryl.coulthard@deakin.edu.au 
 
Dr Susan Keller 
 
School of Information and Business Analytics 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Australia 
 
Phone: 0392 446 564 
Fax: 03 556 33320 
Email: susan.keller@deakin.edu.au 
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SKETCH OF ORGANISATION CHART 
 
The accompanying commentaries from the interview transcripts are as follow: 
 
 “I’ll draw you the structure in a second. They fall into a part of 
the organisation, and their function is very siloed to do a very 
specific function, with a whole bunch of processes about what 
they actually do. So there are lots of tools on how it's done. So 
there is a delivery organisation that's very vertical-based, and 
that's got line managers in there. And there's people who do 
functional management, like myself, PEs and DPEs, and we 
look at the organisation this way (HORIZONTALLY), so 
there are SDMs and PMs, and they look at the organisation 
this way (VERTICAL)… the line management is over here, 
but that's hierarchical, and there's the functional management 
looks this way, and they are the ones that actually get things 
done across all of the part of that organisation. It's matrix-
management” [Donald_BETA]. 
 
 
